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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by virtue of § 78A-3-102, U.C.A. 
i 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue 1: Issues related to whether the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's request 
for attorney fees in this guardianship and conservatoi ship pi occeding. 
Determinative Law: This is a case of first impression in the State of Utah. Other 
jurisdictions have already addressed this issue and those jurisdictions have ruled that as a 
matter of law the protected person's estate should pay tl ic: attoi nc y lees incurred by a 
petitioner who successfully establishes protection for the protected person. In the instant 
case, a conservator was appointed by the trial court. 
Standard of Review: Questions of whether the correct legal standards were applied 
are questions of law and are reviewed for correctness. See generally State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
Issue 2: Issues related to whether the trial court erred in denying the Rule 59 Motion 
to amend its order denying attorney fees to Petitioner. 
Determinative Law: Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, governs requests to 
vacate or modify orders issued by the trial court. 
Standard of Review: The denial of a Rule 59 Motion by a trial court is normally 
reviewed for a?i abuse of discretion. Here, however, the trial court's initial order was 
based on its interpretation of a stipulation that was not found to be ambiguous. Therefore, 
the review should fall under a correctness standard. See Peterson v. Sunrider Corp, 
2002 UT 43. 
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KEY LEGAL PROVISIONS 
The following legal provisions are included in Addendum A. 
1. Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-303 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-424 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, 
This case began as a simple, straight forward guardianship and conservatorship 
proceeding when Margaret Guynn's daughter, Catherine Ortega, filed a petition to 
appoint a guardian and conservator for her mother. However, it quickly became 
complicated and contentious when Margaret's son, Bruce Guynn, first objected to his 
sister, Catherine, being appointed as guardian and conservator and then demanded that his 
mother fire her court-appointed attorney. 
Upon learning of the petition, Mr. Guynn immediately retained counsel and sought a 
different attorney for his mother. Through a referral from his attorney, he demanded that 
his mother, Ms. Guynn, fire Ms. Bradford and hire attorney Elizabeth Conley. 
Eventually, Ms. Conley began representing Ms. Guynn under the guise that it was actually 
Ms. Guynn's idea to hire Ms. Conley when it was in reality Mr. Guynn's demand. 
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Although no formal evaluation of Ms. Guynn was ever conducted, she clearly 
exhibited diminished capacity. This was highlighted by conflicting statements from the 
two attorneys who represented her. However, to eliminate further hostile litigation, 
Petitioner agreed to enter into a stipulation with Ms. Conley and Mr. Guynn's attorney, 
Kent Alderman, to appoint Mr. Guynn as the conservator for Ms. Guynn. 
To avoid further legal fees and costs, Petitioner's counsel requested that Ms. Conley 
include in the stipulation a provision to pay Petitioner's legal fees from the estate of 
Ms. Guynn. However, Ms. Conley refused. Since the parties did not agree on the issue 
of attorney fees, the stipulation drafted by Ms. Conley focused solely on the appointment 
of a conservator. The issue of attorney fees was at that time unresolved. 
Since the issue of attorney fees remained open without any agreement between the 
parties, Petitioner filed a motion to have her attorney fees paid from Ms. Guynn's estate. 
This request was based on the fact that Petitioner successfully obtained a protective order 
to protect Ms. Guynn's estate, and it was also based on the common practice in Utah for a 
petitioner's legal fees to be paid from the estate of the protected person whenever a 
protective ordered is entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. In this case, that 
protective order was in the form of a conservator being appointed for Ms. Guynn. 
The trial court then denied Petitioner's request for attorney fees to be paid from the 
protected person's estate, and this created the primary question and issue before this 
Court. Should such fees be paid from the protected person's estate? 
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B. Course of Proceedings/Disposition in the District Court Below, 
This case commenced in the trial court by a petition filed by Petitioner/Appellant. 
Two days later, the district court appointed Petitioner as a temporary guardian and 
conservator for the Ward, Margaret Guynn. The district court also appointed counsel for 
the Ward. After an objection was filed by Ms. Guynn's son, Bruce Guynn, the matter was 
referred to mediation and to the trial court assigned to the case. 
Fairly soon thereafter, the parties entered into a stipulation for the appointment of a 
conservator; the trial court accepted the stipulation and appointed a conservator for 
Ms. Guynn. But at that time, the issue of attorney fees for Petitioner remained an open 
dispute between the parties. The stipulation never was intended to resolve the issue of 
Petitioner's attorney fees. 
Following the appointment of a conservator. Petitioner filed a motion to have the 
estate of the protected person pay the legal fees incurred by Petitioner for Petitioner's 
efforts in obtaining protection for Ms. Guynn. 
The trial court denied Petitioner's motion solely based on its interpretation that the 
stipulation didn't contain any provision for attorney fees.1 Since the trial court's order 
was based solely on the stipulation to appoint a conservator and had nothing to do with 
1
 It appears that the trial court's logic was that if there was no provision in the 
stipulation for attorney fees, then no attorney fees should be awarded to Petitioner. 
However, the trial court's ruling did not express that logic and no other basis was 
articulated by the trial court except that the stipulation didn't provide for fees. 
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attorney fees, Petitioner then filed a Rule 59 Motion claiming that the trial court erred as a 
matter of law because the stipulation was never intended to address attorney fees. 
The trial court then denied the Rule 59 Motion. Instead of considering its prior 
reliance on the stipulation, it supported its Rule 59 denial on a general analysis of attorney 
fees unrelated to the stipulation. More importantly, the trial court's analysis failed to 
acknowledge the law from other jurisdictions that allow such fees to be paid from the 
estate of the protected person. This appeal then followed that denial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Petition to Appoint Guardian and Conservator, 
On August 31, 2009, Catherine Ortega, Petitioner/Appellant, filed a petition to 
appoint a guardian and conservator for her mother, Margaret Guynn. (R. 1-3; Add. B. at 
B001-B004.) The petition also requested that a temporary guardian and conservator be 
appointed until September 23, 2009. Id. On September 2,2009, an ex parte motion was 
filed to appoint counsel for Ms. Guynn as required by § 75-5-303, U.C.A. (R. 5-6.) 
As an add-on to the regular law and motions probate calendar2 ("Probate Court") held 
on September 2, 2009, the petition and the ex parte motion were briefly heard. The 
2
 It is the practice of the Third District Court in Salt Lake City to have all probate 
matters initially heard on a law and motions probate calendar that is generally heard each 
Wednesday morning. Such calendar is presided over by a rotating judge who presides for 
six months: January through June and July through December. If there are no objections 
to the petition, the "probate judge" then signs the appropriate order being requested. If 
there is an objection, then the matter is first referred to mediation and then to the trial 
court that is assigned to the case. 
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Probate Court then entered on that day orders temporarily appointing Petitioner as 
guardian and conservator for Ms. Guynn (R. 10-11.) and appointing attorney 
Wendy Bradford to represent her. (R. 7-8.) The petition was set for hearing on the 
regular weekly law and motions probate calendar for September 16, 2009. (R. 15-16.) 
Proper notices were then sent and posted by the Probate Court as required for this next 
hearing. 
On September 14, 2009, Bruce Guynn, the son of Ms. Guynn, filed an objection to 
the appointment of Petitioner as guardian and conservator. (R. 19-22.) On 
September 16, 2009, at the scheduled hearing, Petitioner and her attorney were present 
along with Ms. Guynn and her appointed attorney, Ms. Bradford, and another attorney, 
Elizabeth Conley, who alleged that she had been retained by Ms. Guynn. Ms. Conley had 
been referred to Ms. Guynn by Bruce's attorney, and Bruce then instructed Ms. Guynn to 
hire Ms. Conley. Since there was an objection on file at the time of the hearing on 
September 16, 2009, the matter was referred by the Probate Court to mediation and then 
to the trial court assigned. (R. 23.) 
B. Negotiations, the Stipulation, and the Appointment of Conservator. 
During the following two months, the attorneys engaged in negotiations over whether 
or not Ms. Guynn needed any protection and if so who should serve as guardian and/or 
conservator. After agreeing to allow Bruce to serve as the conservator for Ms. Guynn, 
Petitioner Catherine Ortega requested that a provision be included in a stipulation that her 
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attorney fees be paid from the estate of Ms. Guynn. However, Ms. Guynn's attorney 
refused that request. As a result, Ms. Conley drafted a stipulation that omitted any 
reference to attorney fees, and after the necessary signatures were obtained the stipulation 
was filed on November 25,2009. (R. 38-41; Add. B. at B005-B008.) 
Since the stipulation was silent on the issue of attorney fees, Catherine filed on 
December 18. 2009, a motion requesting that her attorney fees paid from the estate of 
Ms. Guynn, a common practice in these kinds of proceedings. (R. 75-98; Add. B. at 
B009-B032.) In fact, it is customary for the newly appointed conservator to simply 
reimburse the petitioner who sought the appointment.3 This case represents a departure 
from that custom and this departure was apparently based solely on the personal feelings 
of Ms. Guynn's attorney, Elizabeth Conley, toward Catherine and her counsel.4 
3
 In her Reply Memorandum, (R. 232-262.) (Add. B at Bl 11-B125.), Catherine 
referenced and attached as exhibits to her memorandum four declarations of three 
attorneys who regularly practice in the area of guardianships and conservatorships. In 
fact, one of those attorneys is the very attorney who is representing the conservator in 
these proceedings. The fourth declaration is from a well-seasoned and experienced 
professional who has served by appointment of the district courts in scores of 
conservatorship cases. All of their testimonies corroborate the common practice of 
having the estate of the protected person pay for the legal fees incurred by the petitioner 
who sought such protection in the first place. 
4
 Ms. Guynn's attorney failed to weigh the costs of refusing to pay Catherine's 
legal fees with the costs of defending against the costs, including this appeal. In effect, 
Ms. Guynn's attorney was acting on her own issues of principle rather than looking out 
for the best economic outcome for her protected client. The same can be said for the 
conservator for Ms. Guynn and his attorney. Not reimbursing Catherine's legal fees will 
end up being far more expensive for Ms. Guynn that it would have been to compromise 
on that issue. 
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THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS 
The trial court entered two relevant rulings in this case: 
1. On February 24, 2010, the trial court entered its minute entry in which it denied 
Petitioner's request for attorney fees. (R. 283-286.) (Add. B at B033-B036.) 
2. On April 7,2010, the trial court entered its minute entry in which it denied 
Petitioner's Rule 59 Motion. (R. 324-327.) (Add. B at B054, B057.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When the trial court denied Petitioner's request for attorney fees to be paid from the 
estate of Ms. Guynn. the trial court relied on its equitable powers and on the traditional 
principle that attorney fees are generally not awarded unless provided by contract or 
statute. Unfortunately, the trial court failed entirely to consider the law established in 
other jurisdictions. Despite the extensive argument and citations provided to the trial 
court, it failed to mention any of the credible citations. 
Since Utah's Probate Code is silent on the issue of a petitioner's attorney fees in 
guardianship and conservatorship proceedings, we look to other jurisdictions for 
guidance. For the particular issue presented in this case, the Nebraska Supreme Court has 
weighed in and held that these kind of protective proceedings are in support of the 
protected person and the protected person's estate ought to pay for the legal fees and costs 
incurred in establishing the protection. The Nebraska Court also concluded that"... in a 
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conservatorship proceeding, the interest to be considered by the court and the principles 
to be applied are quite unlike those in an ordinary litigation case." 
The trial court in this case did not appreciate the difference annunciated by the 
Nebraska Court and instead applied the routine analysis to this conservatorship case. In 
doing so, the trial court ignored the substantial benefit to Ms. Guynn and failed to 
acknowledge that Petitioner incurred substantial expenses in obtaining that benefit for 
Ms. Guynn. Petitioner gained no benefit except possibly to see that her mother's estate is 
now protected. 
In addition to the strong opinions by the Nebraska Supreme Court and other 
jurisdictions cited by the Nebraska Court, there is a strong public policy supporting the 
payment of costs and fees incurred by Petitioner. As an example, the Ad hoc Committee 
on Probate Law and Procedure published its Final Report to the Judicial Council in 
February 2009 and addressed this issue extensively. In its Final Report, the Committee 
recommended that the " . . . reasonable and necessary expenses, costs and attorney fees" 
be paid from the estate of the protected person. 
The Committee also included in its Report the reasoning for its recommendation. 
The Committee reasoned that paying such legal fees will encourage family members who 
might otherwise hesitate to file a protective proceeding because of their own lack of funds 
to do so. The Committee also opined that it is far better to expend the assets of the estate 
to protect the incapacitated person than to preserve them for the heirs. 
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In this case, the trial court took a traditional and narrow view of these proceedings 
and thereby denied Petitioner's request for costs and fees. Had the trial court considered 
the opinions of other jurisdictions and considered the public policy issue, the trial court 
more likely would have done the correct thing by granting Petitioner's request. 
Finally, Petitioner should also be entitled to the fees she incurred in defending against 
the opposition in the trial court and the fees she incurred on appeal under the "fees-for-
fees" doctrine that is well established in the State of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
Utah's Probate Code is silent on the issue of Petitioner's attorney fees in a 
guardianship or conservatorship proceeding. Currently, there are only two sections of the 
Code dealing with attorney fees in these proceedings. 
For a guardianship proceeding, section § 75-5-303(2), U.C.A., provides for attorney 
fees to be paid from the protected person's estate for the attorney who represents the 
protected person unless the petition is found to be without merit and then those fees are to 
be paid by the petitioner: 
(2) Upon the filing of a petition, the court shall set a date for hearing on 
the issues of incapacity; and unless the allegedly incapacitated person 
has counsel of the person's own choice, it shall appoint an attorney to 
represent the person in the proceeding the cost of which shall be paid by 
the person alleged to be incapacitated, unless the court determines that 
the petition is without merit, in which case the attorney fees and court 
costs shall be paid by the person filing the petition. 
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For a conservatorship, section § 75-5-424(3 )(w), U.C.A., provides the authority for 
the conservator to hire and pay attorneys without authorization or confirmation by the trial 
court: 
(w) Employ persons, including attorneys, auditors, investment advisors, 
or agents, even though they are associated with the conservator, to 
advise or assist him in the performance of his administrative duties; act 
upon their recommendation without independent investigation; and 
instead of acting personally, employ one or more agents to perform any 
act of administration, whether or not discretionary; 
Other than these sections, Utah's Probate Code is silent on the issue of attorney fees. 
I. The trial court's ruling relied solely on the contents of the stipulation that was 
silent on the issue of attorney fees, and the trial court ignored entirely the case 
law from other jurisdictions. 
In denying Ms. Ortega's request for attorney fees to be paid from Ms. Guynn's estate, 
the trial court entered the following ruling: 
The petitioner's motion for payment of her attorney fees is denied. 
This (sic) substance of this matter was resolved in November 2009, by a 
stipulation signed by counsel for all parties, and an order entered by the court 
on November 30, 2009. The stipulation and order did not contain a 
provision for attorneys fees; that issue, apparently, arose later after 
disagreements between the petitioner and conservator. Based upon the 
pleadings filed since the entry of the order, it is apparent to the court that 
many of the requested attorneys fees have been incurred since then. 
Based on the resolution of this matter, which did not provide for 
petitioner's attorneys fees, as well as the increase of fees since the order was 
entered, the court declines to award attorneys fees to the petitioner. 
(R. 238-286.) (Add. B at B033-B036.) 
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First, the trial court was very much mistaken about when the issue of attorney fees 
arose. The trial court seems completely unaware that the issue of attorney fees was very 
much discussed between the parties prior to them signing a stipulation. In particular, 
Ms. Guynn's counsel filed a memorandum in opposition to Petitioner's request for fees 
and expressly stated that the issue was discussed during negotiations that led to the 
stipulation. (R. 130-158.) In her memorandum, Ms. Guynn's counsel even attached 
correspondence that she had with Petitioner's counsel about the issue of attorney fees. 
(R. 150-158.). The trial court apparently overlooked these documents. Otherwise, the 
trial court would never have made the statement that it did about when the issue of 
attorney fees arose. And, the trial court's lack of understanding about the issue likely led 
it to believe that the fees in question were not related to or at least not in support of the 
establishment of the protective order for Ms. Guynn. 
Second, the apparent logic or analysis applied by the trial court is flawed because 
there is no basis in law that requires a stipulation to contain a provision for attorney fees, 
whether attorney fees are to be paid or not. That is, the trial court denied payment of 
attorney fees solely based on the absence of an express provision in the stipulation, a 
stipulation that was only intended to appoint a conservator and was never intended to 
resolve the dispute about attorney fees. The trial court's ruling relied on the four comers 
of the stipulation and nothing else. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying attorney 
fees solely based on the stipulation. 
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However, the trial court may have relied on the traditional notion of when attorney 
fees are to be awarded. That is, attorney fees are generally only awarded if provided by 
contract or by statute.5 The stipulation would naturally be deemed to fail under the 
contract provision for attorney fees, and no statutory basis was cited for an award of fees. 
Therefore, the trial court could have had a separate but legal basis to deny attorney fees, 
although the trial court's ruling is entirely silent on any another basis to deny fees. 
Nonetheless, the trial court failed entirely to acknowledge or even remotely address 
the legal basis for awarding attorney fees that Ms. Ortega extensively cited in her 
Memorandum in Support of Wendy Bradford's Motion for Attorney Fees; Memorandum 
in Opposition to Ms. Guynn 's Claim That Petitioner's Petition Was Without Merit; 
Motion to Disqualify Ms. Conleyfrom Representing Ms. guynn; Request for an 
Evidentiary Hearing; and Request for Petitioner fs Attorney Fees. (R. 75-98; Add. B. at 
B009-B032.) In support of awarding attorney fees to Petitioner, the foregoing referenced 
memorandum contained an extensive argument with appropriate citations to the holdings 
in other jurisdictions. Id. Inexplicably, the trial court's ruling never mentions any of the 
referenced citations. 
5
 Later in denying Petitioner's Rule 59 Motion, the trial court expanded on its 
analysis and cited cases relating to the trial court's inherent equitable power to award 
attorney fees. The trial court also cited the traditional view that attorney fees are 
generally awarded only when provided by statute or contract. (R. 324-327; Add. B. at 
B054-B057.) 
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II. Case law in other jurisdictions supports the payment of attorney fees for the 
petitioner who successfully obtains a protective order. 
Whether a petitioner who seeks a protective order for an incapacitated person or 
person who is in need of financial protection should have his or her attorney fees paid 
from the estate of the protected person is an issue of first impression in the State of Utah. 
Since this issue is one of first impression, we should also look to other jurisdictions for 
guidance. See Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 2007 UT 25 f 15. 
Specifically, the Nebraska Supreme Court has weighed in on this issue.6 See In re 
Guardianship & Conservatorship of Donley, 262 Neb. 282 (Neb 2001).7 The Nebraska 
Court acknowledged that it had never before addressed this issue when it made the 
following statement: 
While we have never considered the precise issue, we are persuaded by 
the rule adopted in other states that costs and attorney fees incurred in 
the good faith initiation of conservatorship proceedings constitute 
necessaries for the support or benefit of the protected person such that 
payment of reasonable costs incurred may be assessed against the 
protected person's estate, (citing, In re Estate of Bayers, 295 Mont. 89, 
983 P.2d 339 (1999); In re Dunn, 239 N.C. 378, 79 S.E.2d 921 (1954); 
Penney v. Pritchard & McCalL 255 Ala. 13, 49 So. 2d 782 (1950); 
Carney v. Aicklen, 587 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); In re Estate 
and Guardianship ofVermeersch, 15 Ariz. App. 315, 488 P.2d 671 
(1971); In re Estate of Sherwood, 56 111. App. 2d 334, 206 N.E.2d 304 
(1965); In re Bundy, 44 Cal. App. 466, 186 P. 811 (1919). 
6
 In making its ruling, Nebraska followed the rule adopted in Montana, North 
Carolina, Alabama, Texas, Arizona, Illinois, and California. Such states do not 
necessarily represent all states that have adopted this rule. 
7
 For convenience the Nebraska case is included in Addendum B at B058-B65. 
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The Nebraska Court further expressed its rationale on this issue: 
The rationale supporting the rule is that in guardianship and 
conservatorship cases, the applicant most often acts for and on behalf of 
one who is unable to act or care for himself or herself. See, In re Dunn, 
supra; In re Bundy, supra. Thus, the filing of the petition and the 
hearing thereon are indispensable steps in the preservation of the 
protected person's estate. See, In re Bundy, supra; In re Estate and 
Guardianship ofVermeersch, supra. It is recognized that when an 
individual is in need of physical or financial protection, the law must in 
many instances think and act for him or her. See, In re Dunn, supra; In 
re Bundy, supra. The state and society have a significant interest in 
bringing the estate of individuals in need of protection under the vigil of 
the county court. See In re Estate and Guardianship ofVermeersch, 
supra. See, also, Penney v. Pritchard & McCall, supra. The court, as 
general conservator of the rights of persons in need of protection, is 
dependent upon applications being filed by interested persons so that the 
court may assume control of the estate and preserve it for the protected 
person. See In re Bundy, supra. 
In Donley, the Nebraska Court went on to state: 
Further, we note that an action to appoint a conservator is not an 
adversarial proceeding, but, rather, is a proceeding to promote the best 
interests of the person for whom the conservatorship is sought. A 
conservatorship action is uniquely nonadversarial in that everyone 
involved, including the petitioner and the court, is presumably interested 
in protecting the interest of the person for whom the conservatorship is 
sought. 
Finally, the Nebraska Court stated: 
Therefore, in a conservatorship proceeding, the interest to be considered 
by the court and the principles to be applied are quite unlike those in an 
ordinary litigation case. 
In the instant case, the Court should find that Petitioner was at all times attempting to 
protect Ms. Guynn from personal and economic harm. Therefore, Petitioner's costs and 
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legal fees should be paid from the estate of Ms. Guynn, particularly since Ms. Guynn is 
the only beneficiary from Petitioner's efforts. Petitioner received nothing from her efforts 
except that Bruce turned their mother against her. 
III. Public policy also supports the payment of attorney fees for the petitioner who 
successfully obtains a protective order. 
While case law in other jurisdictions strongly supports the payment of attorney fees 
from the estate of the protected person, public policy also supports such payments. See 
Final Report to the Judicial Council by the Ad hoc Committee on Probate Law and 
Procedure, dated February 23, 2009. (Add. B. at B066-B0110.)8 
The Committee's Final Report makes a number of recommendations, a summary of 
which are contained on Pages 4-5. (Add. B. atB074-B075.). The seventh 
recommendation is as follows: 
"If the court determines that a petition resulted in an order beneficial to 
the respondent,9 and if funds are available in the estate, permit the court 
or conservator to pay the reasonable and necessary expenses, costs and 
attorney fees from the estate/' 
(Add. B. at B074.) 
8
 The Final Report contains 147 pages, only the first 40 pages are included in 
Addendum B. Pages 41-147 represent a draft of proposed legislation to implement the 
Committee's recommendations. The first 40 pages are sufficient for the purposes of this 
brief. 
9
 The term "Respondent*' in the Final Report refers to the individual who has 
diminished capacity or who is alleged to be incapacitated or in need of a protective order. 
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Further, in Section 7, Page 17, the Final Report states the following: 
uIf a protective proceeding is legally necessary to benefit the respondent, 
and if the respondent's estate is ample enough to provide for the 
respondent and still pay the expenses of that process, then the court or 
conservator should be permitted to pay reasonable and necessary fees 
and expenses from the estate. This is the conclusion of the 
1997 Uniform Act.10 
"If a petition is brought in good faith with the goal of protecting the 
respondent, and the court appoints a guardian or conservator, or enters 
some other protective order, then the petitioner's costs should be paid, if 
possible, by the respondent's estate. This will encourage family 
members who may hesitate to file a protective proceeding because of 
their own lack of funds. It is far better to expend the estate to protect the 
respondent than to preserve it for the heirs." 
(Add.B.atB087.) 
On the issue of petitioner's attorney fees, the Committee adopted and then proposed 
to codify with legislation the common practice that exists among attorneys who regularly 
practice in the area of guardianships and conservatorships. Four declarations were filed 
in the trial court proceedings: three from attorneys11 and one from a professional 
conservator, all of whom strongly support the payment of a petitioner's attorney fees in 
guardianship and conservatorship proceedings. (R. 242-262; Add. B. at Bl 11-B125.). 
10
 Citing to Section 417 of the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings 
Act of 1997. 
11
 Ironically, one of the attorneys whose declaration is in the record is also the 
attorney of record for Bruce, the Conservator appointed for Ms. Guynn, and one of the 
attorneys who has opposed the payment of attorney fees for Petitioner. 
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IV. The trial court erred by not granting Plaintiffs1 Rule 59 Motion. 
The denial of a Rule 59 Motion by a trial court is normally reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. However, where the trial court, as here, relied on its interpretation of the 
stipulation, the review falls under a correctness standard. See Booth v. Booth, 
2006 UT App 144 ^ [10 (citing Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch, 860 P.2d 937, 938 
(Utah 1993) ("... if the trial court has made a determination of law that provides a 
premise for its denial of a new trial, such a legal decision is reviewed under a correctness 
standard."). In denying Petitioner's Rule 59 Motion, the trial court stated that "[I]n its 
prior ruling, the court made clear that there was no provision in the Stipulation nor in any 
other underlying contract or statute that authorized petitioner's request for attorney fees." 
(R. 324-327.) (Add. B at B054-B057.) {emphasis added). In fact, the trial court did not 
cite any other basis for denying attorney fees when entered its prior ruling. It did so only 
in response to the Rule 59 Motion. 
The trial court also failed to acknowledge the body of law from other jurisdictions 
that have held as a matter of law that a successful petitioner in these proceedings should 
have his or her costs and attorney fees paid from the estate of the protected person. Had 
the trial court properly analyzed and considered the case law provided to it, the trail court 
should have amended its initial ruling and awarded attorney fees to Petitioner. 
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V. Petitioner should also be awarded attorney fees in defending her fees against 
the Conservator's and Ms. Conlev's opposition and also on appeal. 
There is a well-established principle in Utah known as b'fees-for-fees." See e.g., 
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 895-896 (Utah 1996) {citing James Constructors 
v. Salt Lake City, 888 P.2d 665, 674 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The Utah Supreme Court 
extensively discussed, analyzed, and treated this issue in Salmon as follows: 
Although this court has not directly addressed the issue of whether fees 
incurred in recovering fees allowed under a statute should also be 
awarded pursuant to the statute, we agree with the rationale articulated 
in American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 
3882 v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 301 U.S. App. D.C. 293, 
994 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1993): Federal courts have repeatedly recognized 
that the unavailability of "fees for fees" could render fee-shifting 
provisions impotent, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the 
underlying statutes An award of "fees for fees" is not merely a 
remote descendant of the underlying action from which it derives. 
Rather, it is an integral aspect of the statutory scheme on which the 
underlying claim is based. 994 F.2d at 22; see also Commissioner, INS 
v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163-64, 110 L. Ed. 2d 134, 110 S. Ct. 2316 
(1990); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 1978); 
Souza v. Southworth, 564 F.2d 609,614 (1st Cir. 1977). This rationale is 
consistent with our prior case law awarding attorney fees for appeals 
where attorney fees are initially authorized by statute. See First 
Southwestern Financial Servs., 875 P.2d at 556. 
Analogously, we have recognized that a contractual obligation to pay 
attorney fees incurred in enforcing a contract should also include fees 
incurred on appeal. In Management Services v. Development Associates, 
617 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah 1980), we stated that the purpose of an 
attorney fees provision is to indemnify the prevailing party against the 
necessity of paying attorney fees and thereby enable him to recover the 
full amount of the obligation. Id. at 409. In accordance with this 
purpose, we concluded that "a provision for payment of attorney's fees 
in a contract includes attorney's fees incurred by the prevailing party on 
appeal as well as at trial, if the action is brought to enforce the contract." 
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Id. Similarly, the court of appeals recently ruled that the prevailing party 
in a dispute over a contractual attorney fees provision was entitled, not 
only to attorney fees on appeal, but also to the fees it incurred 
establishing the reasonableness of the fees for which it was entitled to be 
indemnified. James Constructors v. Salt Lake City, 888 P.2d 665, 674 
(UtahCt.App. 1994). 
The attorney fees at issue in this case, although they are permitted 
pursuant to statute instead of contract, are very similar in purpose-the 
reimbursement of attorney fees makes the vindicated public employee 
whole. Consequently, if a vindicated employee is required to expend 
attorney fees to recover the original fees to which he was entitled, the 
cost of these subsequent fees must also be reimbursed. Any other 
interpretation would eviscerate the purpose of the statute. In accordance 
with this rationale, we conclude that Salmon is entitled to reasonable 
fees and costs necessarily incurred in recovering the fees and costs 
allowed under section 63-30a-2. 
Id. at 895-896. 
In essence, the Utah Supreme Court has held that if a person is entitled to his or her 
attorney fees, whether by statute or by contract, then the fees expended to recover those 
fees should also be reimbursed. While there isn't a particular statute or contract, there 
certainly are equitable grounds for awarding attorney fees to Petitioner. Therefore, 
Petitioner should also be awarded her legal fees expended in defending her equitable right 
to such fees and the reasonableness of them. These fees would include those incurred in 




For the foregoing reasons, Appellant/Petitioner respectfully request that the district 
court's ruling be vacated and that this action be remanded for proceedings to determine 
the amount of attorney fees to be awarded to Petitioner, including her fees in defending 
against the Conservator's and Ms. Conley's opposition and her fees incurred on appeal. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellant/Petitioner respectfully requests oral argument because it will materially 
assist this Court in adjudicating the legal issues in this appeal. 
DATED this 15th day of September 2010 
Michael A. Jensen (^^J 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner Catherine Ortega 
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ADDENDA 
This Addenda includes the following references and documents divided into two 
separate addenda as follows: 
Addendum A 
Key Legal Provisions 
Addendum B 
Pleadings, Motions, Memoranda, Minute Entries (signed); 
Also, the Donley case from the Nebraska Supreme Court; and 





Key Legal Provisions 
1. 75-5-303. Procedure for court appointment of a guardian of an incapacitated 
person. 
(1) The incapacitated person or any person interested in the incapacitated person's 
welfare may petition for a finding of incapacity and appointment of a guardian. 
(2) Upon the filing of a petition, the court shall set a date for hearing on the issues 
of incapacity; and unless the allegedly incapacitated person has counsel of the 
person's own choice, it shall appoint an attorney to represent the person in the 
proceeding the cost of which shall be paid by the person alleged to be incapacitated, 
unless the court determines that the petition is without merit, in which case the 
attorney fees and court costs shall be paid by the person filing the petition. 
2. 75-5-424. Powers of conservator in administration. 
(1) A conservator has all of the powers conferred in this chapter and any additional 
powers conferred by law on trustees in this state. In addition, a conservator of the 
estate of an unmarried minor as to whom no one has parental rights, has the duties 
and powers of a guardian of a minor described in Section 75-5-209 until the minor 
attains majority or marries, but the parental rights so conferred on a conservator do 
not preclude appointment of a guardian as provided by Part 2 of this chapter. 
(2) A conservator has power without court authorization or confirmation to invest 
and reinvest funds of the estate as would a trustee. 
(3) A conservator, acting reasonably in efforts to accomplish the purpose for which 
he was appointed, may act without court authorization or confirmation, to: 
(a) Collect, hold, and retain assets of the estate, including land in another state, 
until, in his judgment, disposition of the assets should be made, and the assets may 
be retained even though they include an asset in which he is personally interested; 
Addendum A Pase 1 of 4 
(b) Receive additions to the estate; 
(c) Continue or participate in the operation of any business or other enterprise; 
(d) Acquire an undivided interest in an estate asset in which the conservator, in any 
fiduciary capacity, holds an undivided interest; 
(e) Invest and reinvest estate assets in accordance with Subsection (2) above; 
(f) Deposit estate funds in a bank including a bank operated by the conservator; 
(g) Acquire or dispose of an estate asset including land in another state, for cash or 
on credit at public or private sale; and to manage, develop, improve, exchange, 
partition, change the character of, or abandon an estate asset: 
(h) Make ordinary or extraordinary repairs or alterations in buildings or other 
structures, demolish any improvements, and raze existing or erect new party walls 
or buildings; 
(i) Subdivide, develop, or dedicate land to public use; make or obtain the vacation 
of plats and adjust boundaries; adjust differences in valuation on exchange or 
partition by giving or receiving considerations; and dedicate easements to public 
use without consideration; 
(j) Enter for any purpose into a lease as lessor or lessee with or without option to 
purchase or renew for a term within or extending beyond the term of the 
conservatorship; 
(k) Enter into a lease or arrangement for exploration and removal of minerals or 
other natural resources or enter into a pooling or unitization agreement; 
(1) Grant an option involving disposition of an estate asset or take an option for the 
acquisition of any asset; 
(m) Vote a security, in person or by general or limited proxy: 
(n) Pay calls, assessments, and any other sums chargeable or accruing against or on 
account of securities; 
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(o) Sell or exercise stock subscription or conversion rights; consent, directly or 
through a committee or other agent, to the reorganization, consolidation, merger, 
dissolution, or liquidation of a corporation or other business enterprise; 
(p) Hold a security in the name of a nominee or in other form without disclosure of 
the conservatorship so that title to the security may pass by delivery, but the 
conservator is liable for any act of the nominee in connection with the stock so 
held; 
(q) Insure the assets of the estate against damage or loss and the conservator against 
liability with respect to third persons; 
(r) Borrow money to be repaid from estate assets or otherwise; and advance money 
for the protection of the estate or the protected person, and for all expenses, losses, 
and liabilities sustained in the administration of the estate or because of the holding 
or ownership of any estate assets, and the conservator has a lien on the estate as 
against the protected person for advances so made; 
(s) Pay or contest any claim; settle a claim by or against the estate or the protected 
person by compromise, arbitration, or otherwise; and release, in whole or in part, 
any claim belonging to the estate to the extent that the claim is uncollectible; 
(t) Pay taxes, assessments, compensation of the conservator, and other expenses 
incurred in the collection, care, administration, and protection of the estate; 
(u) Allocate items of income or expense to either estate income or principal, as 
provided by law, including creation of reserves out of income for depreciation, 
obsolescence, or amortization, or for depletion in mineral or timber properties; 
(v) Pay any sum distributable to a protected person or his dependent without 
liability to the conservator, by paying the sum to the distributee or by paying the 
sum for the use of the distributee either to his guardian, or if none, to a relative or 
other person with custody of his person; 
(w) Employ persons, including attorneys, auditors, investment advisors, or agents, 
even though they are associated with the conservator, to advise or assist him in the 
performance of his administrative duties; act upon their recommendation without 
independent investigation; and instead of acting personally, employ one or more 
agents to perform any act of administration, whether or not discretionary; 
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(x) Prosecute or defend actions, claims, or proceedings in any jurisdiction for the 
protection of estate assets and of the conservator in the performance of his duties; 
and 
(y) Execute and deliver all instruments which will accomplish or facilitate the 
exercise of the powers vested in the conservator. 
3. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 6L a new trial may be granted 
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(a)(7) Error in law. 
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Probate Judae Robert Hilder 
Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-301 and § 75-5-401 et seq, 
Petitioner Catherine Ortega, by and through counsel, hereby petitions this Court for an 
Order appointing Catherine Ortega as guardian and conservator for the above named 
incapacitated person, Margaret Guynn, ("the Ward"). Because of emergency conditions 
set forth below and as provided by § 75-5-310, Utah Code Ann., Petitioner also requests 
the Court to enter a temporary appointment of a conservator until the regular law and 
motions hearing is held on this Petition. Petitioner states and represents to the Court that: 
1. Pursuant to § 75-5-302, Utah Code Ann., venue is proper in the Third District 
Court because the Ward is presently residing in Salt Lake County. 
2. The Ward is unmarried and 84 years of age. She presently resides at Atria, a 
senior facility located at 10970 S 700 E, Sandy UT 84070-4990. 
3. The Ward does not own any real property, but she has approximately $400,000 in 
liquid assets. 
4. The Ward suffers from confusion and dementia. Upon information and belief, 
the Ward is (a) impaired to the extent of lacking sufficient understanding or capacity to 
make or communicate responsible decisions; and (b) unable to manage her financial 
affairs. Based on the Ward's condition, the Ward is deemed to be incapacitated as defined 
by § 75-1-201(22), Utah Code Ann. 
5. The basis for requesting a temporary appointment is as follows. The Ward 
appears to be subject to exploitation by Petitioner's son who has been trying to obtain a 
power of attorney from the Ward so that he can access her bank accounts. A temporary 
conservator is needed until this Court holds a hearing on this Petition, which hearing is 
expected to be on either September 16, 2009 or September 23, 2009. 
6. No guardian or conservator has been appointed for the Ward. 
7. The Ward's children are the only viable or practicable guardians and 
conservators, and pursuant to § 75-5-311 and § 75-5-410, Utah Code Ann., they have 
priority to be appointed. Petitioner is the only child residing in the State of Utah; her 
brother resides in North Carolina. Therefore, Petitioner is likely in the best position to be 
appointed to provide the necessary oversight to the Ward's care. 
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8. Notice of the time and place of hearing on this petition should be given to the 
following persons: 
Catherine Ortega Margaret Guynn 
1455 Madera Hills Dr Atria 
Bountiful UT 84010-1522 10970 S 700 E 
801-598-1109 Sandy UT 84070-4990 
Donald Bruce Guynn Wendy Bradford (Attorney for the Ward) 
6412 Glendevon Dr 147 W Election Rd Ste 200 
Whitsett NC 27377-9240 Draper UT 84020 
336-446-1120 801-518-3623 
bradfordlawoffi ce@gmail. com 
Pursuant to § 75-5-303(4), Utah Code Ann., Petitioner also requests the Court to 
waive the presence of the Ward and to waive the appointment of a visitor, based on the 
physician's letter to be submitted prior to or at the hearing in this matter. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests: 
1. The Court to fix a date and time for hearing on this Petition. 
2. Notice be given as required by law. 
3. The Court appoint, until September 23, 2009, or sooner if a hearing is held prior 
to said date, a Temporary Conservator for the above named incapacitated person, 
Margaret Guynn, and to serve without bond. 
4. Temporary Letters of Conservatorship be issued by the Court to the Petitioner. 
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5. Following hearing, the Court appoint Catherine Ortega as guardian and 
conservator for the above named incapacitated person, Margaret Guynn, and to serve 
without bond. 
6. That pursuant to § 75-5-501(5), Utah Code Ann., the order appointing a Guardian 
and Conservator also grant to the Conservator the power to revoke any and all powers of 
attorney that the Ward may have in the past granted to any persons. 
7. Following hearing, Letters of Guardian and Conservator be issued by the Court to 
Petitioner. 
Dated this 31st day of August 2009. 
Michael A. Jensen 
Attorney for Petitioner 
ELIZABETH S. CONLEY (4815) 
Attorney for Margaret Guynn 
3604 Astro Circle 
Telephone: (801) 272-0719 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
MARGARET GUYNN, 
A protected person. 
STIPULATION FOR APPOINTMENT 
OF LIMITED CONSERVATOR 
Probate No. 093901284 GU 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
The parties to this action being Margaret Guynn ("Margaret"), represented by 
Elizabeth S. Conley, Donald Bruce Guynn ("Bruce"), represented by Kent B. Alderman of 
Parsons Behle & Latimer and Petitioner Catherine Ortega ("Catherine"), represented by Michael 
A. Jensen, hereby enter into a stipulation and agreement for the appointment of a conservator for 
Margaret. 
INTRODUCTION 
Margaret is an 85 year old woman currently residing at Atria Assisted Living in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. Margaret lived on her own in Tyler, Texas until the summer of 2009 when her 
son Bruce assisted her in selling her Texas home and moving to Utah. 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
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On or about August 31, 2009, Catherine, the daughter of Margaret, filed a petition 
seeking appointment as guardian and conservator of Margaret. Bruce and Margaret objected to 
the appointment of Catherine as a conservator and guardian. 
While Catherine believes that Margaret lacks the capacity to manage her own care and 
financial affairs, Bruce and Margaret disagree. Nonetheless, to avoid further litigation, they have 
reached an agreement on the level of protection that is now needed. Accordingly, the parties 
agree that a limited conservatorship should be established and that Bruce will serve as the 
Conservator for Margaret. 
STIPULATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Therefore, the parties now agree as follows and intend to be bound by the terms of this 
Stipulation. 
1. The parties agree that Margaret needs assistance in handling her financial affairs. 
2. The parties agree it is in Margaret's best interest that a limited conservator be 
appointed to assist her with her financial affairs and to protect her estate. 
3. The limitations of the Conservator are intended to grant Margaret as much 
financial independence and freedom as possible. 
4. To that end, the Conservator shall assist Margaret in her financial affairs by first 
consulting with her to ascertain her desires regarding her finances. 
5. The parties agree that Bruce be appointed as Margaret's Conservator with the 
limitations described herein. 
6. The parties agree not to pursue a guardianship at this time. 
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DATED this K fray of October, 2009. 
2v iz- ^iiusflu \J\iii</ 
Elizabeths. Conley U 
Attorney for Margaret Guynn 
Michael A. Jensen 
Attorney for Catherine Ortega 
-^Kent B. Alderman 
Attorney for Bruce Guynn 
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DATED this day of ©CTolJ5rr2009. 
Elizabeth S. Conley 
Attorney for Margaret Guynn 
'-fk/Hdd, 
Michael A. Jensen 
Attorney for Catherine Ortega 
Kent B. Alderman 
Attorney for Bruce Guynn 
498848.1 
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MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231) 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 571708 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708 
(801) 519-9040: mikefSiitahattornev.corn 
Counsel for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
450 South State Street, PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -1860 
801-238-7020 (DeVonva); 238-7051 (Kathy); 238-7022 (MaKae); 238-7021 (Rhonda); 238-7509 (Kim) 
In the Matter of 
MARGARET GUYNN 
An Alleged Incapacitated Person. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
WENDY BRADFORD'S MOTION 
FOR ATTORNEY FEES; 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO MS. GUYNN'S CLAIM THAT 
PETITIONER'S PETITION WAS 
WITHOUT MERIT; MOTION TO 
DISQUALIFY MS. CONLEY FROM 
REPRESENTING MS. GUYNN; 
REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING; AND REQUEST FOR 
PETITIONER'S ATTORNEY FEES 
HEARING REQUESTED 
Civil No. 093901284 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
Pursuant to Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Petitioner Catherine Ortega, by 
and through counsel, hereby joins in support of the motion for attorney fees filed by 
Wendy Bradford and concurrently opposes the opposition filed by Elizabeth Conley, 
ostensibly on behalf of Margaret Guynn. 
Since a legal representative, i.e., a Conservator, has been appointed for Ms. Guynn, 
Petitioner also moves the Court to disqualify Ms. Conley from directly representing 
Ms. Guynn pursuant to Rule 1.14, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Petitioner believes that the objection filed by Ms. Conley is itself without merit since 
it is unsupported by any evidence and Ms. Conley's statements are substantially 
controverted by Ms. Bradford and by Petitioner's Declaration being filed concurrently 
with this memorandum. However, if the Court is not inclined to deny Ms. Conley's 
objections or is inclined to find that the Petition was filed without merit, Petitioner 
expressly requests the Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to ascertain the facts in 
these proceedings and to determine whether or not the petition was frivolous or having no 
basis in law or fact. In doing so, such evidentiary hearing should include, but not limited 
to, the testimonies of Ms. Guynn, Ms. Conley, Ms. Bradford, Mr. Alderman, Ms. Ortega, 
Mr. Ennenga (Ms. Ortega's husband), Tim Griffin (employee at Atria), Jeremy and 
Rebecca Ortega, and rebuttal witnesses as identified. 
Finally, Petitioner should be reimbursed from the estate of Ms. Guynn for 
Petitioner's legal fees and costs, since her entire efforts were solely for the benefit of 
Ms. Guynn. 
FACTS 
1. On August 31, 2009, Petitioner filed her Petition to Appoint a Guardian and 
Conservator for Margaret Guynn, Petitioner's mother. 
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2. On September 2, 2009, the Court appointed Petitioner as temporary Guardian and 
temporary Conservator. 
3. On September 2, 2009, the Court appointed Wendy Bradford as counsel for the 
alleged protected person, Margaret Guynn. 
4. Petitioner is the daughter of Margaret Guynn, and she has one sibling, 
Bruce Guynn ("Bruce"), who is six years older than Petitioner. 
See Decl Catherine Ortega at 1 ^ 1-2. 
5. Petitioner is a Physician's Assistant and has been employed as a PA since 1992. 
Moreover, she has no criminal background; she has an excellent credit score, and she has 
made a six figure income for more than a decade. Id. at 1 ffl[ 3-4. 
6. After Bruce left home when Petitioner was about 11 years of age, Bruce has 
refused to speak with Petitioner and he has made no attempt to speak with her for more 
than 30 years. Id. at 2 \ 7. 
7. Right after high school, Petitioner had a son, Jeremy Ortega. Id. at 21j 11. 
8. While Petitioner was in the University of Utah's LPN Program, Jeremy was 
tended by his grandmother, Ms. Guynn. Id. at 2 \ 14. 
9. When Jeremy was nine years of age, his grandparents moved to Texas, and their 
contact after that was only occasional and consisted mostly of a couple of telephone calls 
each year. Id. at 3 <| 15. 
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10. Jeremy's life was somewhat troubled; he had fathered four children with three 
different women by the time he was 30 years of age. Id. at 3-4 ffif 17-22. 
11. Jeremy relinquished his parental rights to his first two children, but since 
Petitioner had developed a close bond with the children over many years, she intervened 
to protect her rights as a grandmother and retained visitation. Id. at 4 f 24. 
12. Over an extended period of time, Jeremy didn't keep it a secret that his 
grandmother Margaret had been willing to buy him things over the past 10 years or more. 
Id. at 5 % 26. She purchased a car for him when he first got married. Id. She bought him 
a computer a few years ago, and Ms. Guynn informed Petitioner that she gave Jeremy 
money on a regular basis. Id. 
13. One day late last summer (2009), Jeremy was at Petitioner's home and they had 
some alcoholic beverages. Id. at 5 \ 27. After Jeremy had several drinks and appeared 
somewhat inebriated, he began informing Petitioner of his and Bruce's plans to move 
Ms. Guynn from Texas to Utah. Id. He stated that he was going to "drag" Ms. Guynn to 
the airport (in Texas) and "throw her on the plane." Id. Jeremy went on to state that he 
planned on getting a power of attorney so that he could sell $200,000 worth of 
Ms. Guynn's stock. Id. 
14. A few days later, Petitioner called her mother in Texas and found that Jeremy 
was there in the process of moving his grandmother to Utah. Id. at 5 % 28. During that 
call, Jeremy began yelling at Petitioner for her not to interfere with him or Bruce. Id. He 
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then hung up on Petitioner, and he has never called her since nor has he accepted any 
calls from her. Id. 
15. When Petitioner called her mother the next day, the telephone number was 
disconnected. Id. at 5 J^ 29. 
16. When Petitioner hadn't heard anything from her mother or from Jeremy, she 
began searching in the Salt Lake County area for her mother. Id. at 5 f 30. She reported 
her mother missing, and the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office conducted an 
investigation. Id. Petitioner was informed that a deputy contacted Jeremy's wife, 
Rebecca, to locate Petitioner's mother, but Rebecca refused to cooperate or provide any 
information to the deputy. Id. Petitioner then hired a private investigator to locate her 
mother. Id. 
17. After four weeks, Petitioner found her mother at Atria Assisted Living Facility 
in Sandy. Id. at 6 \ 31. Petitioner and her husband then went to Atria to visit Petitioner's 
mother, and she welcomed them warmly. Id. 
18. When they arrived at Atria, Petitioner found much of her mother's personal 
belongings in a huge pile in the middle of the room. Id. at 6 \ 32. She began helping her 
mother put things away, and Petitioner's husband spent the following days helping 
Ms. Guynn get her apartment in order. Id. 
19. Petitioner's mother expressed her desire that Petitioner help her with her 
financial affairs. Id. at 6 \ 33. Petitioner's mother insisted on going to the bank with her 
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daughter. Id. The bank representative suggested to Ms. Guynn that Petitioner and her 
husband's names should be added to Ms. Guynn's account to set up bill pay and monitor 
activity in the account. Id. Petitioner's mother agreed that it was a good idea and she 
signed the necessary documents. Id. Petitioner and her husband then arranged for direct 
deposits and automatic payments of Ms. Guynn's bills. Id. 
20. While at the bank, the bank's representative indicated that he would place a 
"watch" over Ms. Guynn's account to see if any unusual amounts began flowing out of 
the account. Id. at 6 \ 34. 
21. Petitioner spoke with Tim Griffin at Atria about her mother's arrival, and he 
informed Petitioner that Ms. Guynn was effectively dropped off with no familial contact 
information. Id. at 6 \ 35. He was grateful for Petitioner's visit and to obtain Petitioner's 
contact information. Id. 
22. Based on what Petitioner learned about Jeremy's plans during his visit with 
Petitioner a few weeks earlier, and based on what Ms. Guynn told Petitioner about 
needing help with her financial affairs, Petitioner thought it was prudent to seek legal 
counsel about how best to protect her mother and her estate. Id. at 6 ^ f 36. Petitioner was 
also informed by her mother that Rebecca had been trying to get Ms. Guynn to sign a 
power of attorney for Rebecca and Jeremy. Id. Later, after filing a petition, 
Wendy Bradford and Tim Griffin at Atria also informed Petitioner that Rebecca was 
seeking a power of attorney for Ms. Guynn. Id. at 7. 
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23. Petitioner then arranged to file a petition to appoint a guardian and a conservator 
and to have her mother properly evaluated by a physician. Id. at 7 \ 37. 
24. Petitioner was present at her mother's apartment on September 4, 2009, when 
her mother was served with a Notice of Petition and Hearing. Id. at 7 ^ 38. Petitioner 
discussed the petition with her mother, and all her mother said was, "Bruce will be very 
angry about this." Id. Petitioner's mother didn't indicate any opposition to the Petition at 
that time. Id. To the contrary, she continued to express her warmth and appreciation to 
Petitioner for helping her; Petitioner by that time had obtained specialized cremes or 
lotions to treat her mother's dry skin condition, and I had purchased closet racks and a 
lamp to help my mother settle into her apartment. Id. 
25. Petitioner arranged for Dr. Newhall to examine and evaluate Ms. Guynn for the 
guardianship proceeding. Id. at 7 f 39. However, Petitioner later learned that 
Dr. Newhall would not accept being Ms. Guynn's physician because she refused needed 
lab work. Id. This was the first indication that Petitioner's mother may have some 
delusions, since she expressed her belief that Petitioner had told Dr. Newhall that 
Petitioner wanted her blood drawn to get her money. Id. 
26. After Bruce received notice of the petition and hearing, he called his mother. 
Petitioner's mother began screaming and throwing things at Petitioner when Petitioner 
next arrived for a visit. Id. at 7 % 39. Petitioner and her husband were unable to calm her 
down. Id. Subsequent to that last visit, Petitioner's mother has not been the same as when 
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she was first visited by Petitioner and her husband. Petitioner's mother now refuses to 
speak with Petitioner. Id. 
27. At the hearing held on September 21, 2009, Ms. Conley stated in open court that 
Ms. Guynn needs assistance with her financial affairs. 
28. Subsequently, Ms. Conley agreed in a Stipulation filed with the Court that "it is 
in [Ms. Guynn's] best interest that a limited conservator be appointed to assist her with 
her financial affairs and to protect her estate." See Stipulation at 2 \ 2. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Ms, Conley should be disqualified from representing Ms. Guvim since a 
Conservator has been appointed and she is apparently not acting in the best 
interest of Ms. Guynn, 
Rule 1.14 governs how an attorney treats a client with diminished capacity. 
Specifically, the relevant part of Comment 4 to Rule 1.14, Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct, states the following: 
If a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, the 
lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on 
behalf of the client.... 
Bruce Guynn has been appointed as Conservator for Ms. Guynn. In fact, 
Ms. Conley wholeheartedly consented to Mr. Guynn's appointment when she entered into 
that certain Stipulation filed with the Court that states: 
".. . it is in [Ms. Guynn's] best interest that a limited conservator be 
appointed to assist her with her financial affairs and to protect her 
estate.1' 
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Accordingly, Ms. Conley is required to work through Bruce Guynn, Ms. Guynn's 
legal representative. However, Mr. Guynn already has counsel in these proceedings and 
there is evidence from Wendy Bradford that an adversarial relationship exists or has 
recently existed between Mr. Guynn and his mother, Ms. Guynn. 
Rule 1.9, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibits Ms. Conley to now 
represent Mr. Guynn and Ms. Guynn unless there is written consent by both parties. 
Therefore it would be a conflict of interest for Ms. Conley to now represent Mr. Guynn in 
his role as Conservator for Ms. Guynn while at the same time representing Ms. Guynn. 
Further, Ms. Conley has a duty to act in the best interest of Ms. Guynn and not 
necessarily act on Ms. Guynn's wishes. Pursuant to § 75-5-407(2), Utah Code Ann., 
Ms. Conley was appointed to represent Ms. Guynn as a guardian ad litem, with all of the 
powers and duties thereof. Therefore, if Ms. Conley is to represent Ms. Guynn, she 
should be acting in Ms. Guynn's best interest, not adverse to her economic interest. 
Ms. Conley is not acting in the best interest of Ms. Guynn. Filing an objection to 
Ms. Bradford's attorney fees will only result in economic harm to Ms. Guynn's estate 
without any benefit to Ms. Guynn. If anything, Ms. Conley's objection is frivolous and 
she knows very well that the law supports payment of Ms. Bradford's fees from the estate 
of Ms. Guynn. Accordingly, Ms. Conley should no longer represent Ms. Guynn. 
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II. Petitioner's Petition is and was not without merit 
Ms. Conley has now asserted for the first time that the Petition filed in this case is 
without merit. Whether or not a claim is "without merit" is a question of law. 
Matthews v. Olympus Construction., L.C., 2009 UT 29 f 8 (citing In re Sonnenreich, 
2004 UT 3 |^ 45). To determine whether a claim is without merit, the courts look to 
whether it was "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance having no basis in law or 
fact." Id. at % 30 (citing Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102 \ 22 (quoting 
Cadyv. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983))). 
The declaration of Petitioner clearly demonstrates that Ms. Guynn has been in need 
of assistance. Petitioner also made many other observations about her mother after her 
mother arrived in Utah. However, just learning from her son about his plans to move his 
grandmother to Utah and potentially exploit her assets was sufficient information for 
Petitioner to take affirmative action to protect her mother: 
One day late last summer in 2009, Jeremy was at Petitioner's home 
and they had some alcoholic beverages. Id. at 5 H 27. After Jeremy 
had several drinks and appeared somewhat inebriated, he began 
informing Petitioner of his and Bruce's plans to move Ms. Guynn 
from Texas to Utah. Id. He stated that he was going to "drag" Ms. 
Guynn to the airport (in Texas) and "throw her on the plane." Id. 
Jeremy went on to state that he planned on getting a power of 
attorney so that he could sell $200,000 worth of Ms. Guynn's stock. 
Id. 
See Paragraph 13 above. 
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Further, both Ms. Conley and Ms. Bradford have stated and acknowledged that 
Ms. Guynn needs assistance with her financial affairs. Moreover, Ms. Guynn has 
substantial assets that may be at risk if a conservator was or is not appointed. Ms. Conley 
acknowledged by entering into the Stipulation that it is in the best interest of Ms. Guynn 
to have a conservator appointed to protect her estate. How then can the Petition that 
sought such protection for Ms. Guynn be deemed frivolous or of little weight or 
importance having no basis in law or fact? If anything, the objection filed by Ms. Conley 
is frivolous; the Petition is clearly not frivolous or of little weight or importance. 
Also, the erratic and sometimes volatile behavior of Ms. Guynn during these 
proceedings further demonstrates her delusions or fear or paranoia. Ms. Conley has 
refused all attempts to allow a meeting with Ms. Guynn or to have her properly evaluated 
by medical professionals for capacity or incapacity. Ms. Conley has also refused to 
provide any medical evidence from Dr. Newhall, requiring the Court and Petitioner to 
rely solely on Ms. Conley's statements and/or interpretations. 
Under all of these facts and circumstances, the Petition should be found to be not 
without merit and Ms. Bradford's fees should be paid from Ms. Guynn's estate as 
required by § 75-5-303, Utah Code Ann. 
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III. If there is any doubt by the Court that the facts and circumstances of this case 
suggest in anv way that the Petition was without merit Petitioner should be 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine the facts. 
Ms. Conley has set forth a claim that the Petition was without merit without any 
supporting evidence. To the contrary, Petitioner has set forth extensive facts showing that 
her actions in seeking protection of her mother was not frivolous or of little weight or 
importance. Moreover, at least part of Petitioner's concerns actually resulted in the 
appointment of a conservator to protect Ms. Guynn's estate. 
Nonetheless, should there be any doubt about the facts, the Court should conduct an 
evidentiary hearing at which all of the relevant testimony can be taken and weighed by the 
Court. In doing so, the following individuals should be required to testify: Ms. Guynn, 
Ms. Conley, Ms. Bradford, Mr. Alderman, Ms. Ortega, Mr. Ennenga, Tim Griffin, 
Jeremy and Rebecca Ortega, and other rebuttal witnesses as becomes necessary and 
appropriate. 
It is hoped, however, that such an evidentiary hearing will be unnecessary. 
IV. Petitioner's Petition was filed in good faith and for the sole purpose of 
providing protection for Ms. Guynn: hence. Petitioner's legal fees and costs in 
obtaining such protection should be paid from Ms. Guynn's estate. 
Petitioner is entitled to have her legal fees reimbursed from the estate of Ms. Guynn. 
Petitioner did not intend to pursue such a claim for fees, and in fact was not pursuing such 
fees. However, but for the litigious behavior of Ms. Conley, ostensibly on behalf of 
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Ms. Guynn, but more likely on behalf of Bruce Guynn, it is only equitable and just that 
Petitioner's legal fees and costs now be reimbursed from the estate of Ms. Guynn. 
While there is no Code section or Utah case on point, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
has weighed in on this issue.1 See In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Donley, 
262 Neb. 282 (Neb 2001).2 The Nebraska Court acknowledged that it had never before 
addressed this issue when it made the following statement: 
While we have never considered the precise issue, we are persuaded 
by the rule adopted in other states that costs and attorney fees 
incurred in the good faith initiation of conservatorship proceedings 
constitute necessaries for the support or benefit of the protected 
person such that payment of reasonable costs incurred may be 
assessed against the protected person's estate, {citing, In re Estate of 
Bayers, 295 Mont. 89, 983 P.2d 339 (1999); In re Dunn, 239 N.C. 
378, 79 S.E.2d 921 (1954); Penney v. Pritchard & McCall, 255 Ala. 
13,49 So. 2d 782 (1950); Carney v. Aicklen, 587 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1979); In re Estate and Guardianship ofVermeersch, 15 
Ariz. App. 315, 488 P.2d 671 (1971); In re Estate of Sherwood, 56 
111. App. 2d 334, 206 N.E.2d 304 (1965); In re Bundy, 44 Cal. App. 
466,186 P. 811(1919). 
The Nebraska Court further expressed its rationale on this issue: 
The rationale supporting the rule is that in guardianship and 
conservatorship cases, the applicant most often acts for and on behalf 
of one who is unable to act or care for himself or herself. See, In re 
Dunn, supra; In re Bundy, supra. Thus, the filing of the petition and 
the hearing thereon are indispensable steps in the preservation of the 
1
 In making its ruling, Nebraska followed the rule adopted in Montana, North Carolina, Alabama, 
Texas, Arizona, Illinois, and California. Such states do not necessarily represent all states that have 
adopted this rule. 
2
 For the convenience of the Court's review of this important Nebraska case, Petitioners have 
attached hereto a copy of the case as exhibit A. 
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protected person's estate. See, In re Bundy, supra; In re Estate and 
Guardianship ofVermeersch, supra. It is recognized that when an 
individual is in need of physical or financial protection, the law must 
in many instances think and act for him or her. See, In re Dunn, 
supra; In re Bundy, supra. The state and society have a significant 
interest in bringing the estate of individuals in need of protection 
under the vigil of the county court. See In re Estate and 
Guardianship of Vermeersch, supra. See, also, Penney v. Pritchard 
& McCall, supra. The court, as general conservator of the rights of 
persons in need of protection, is dependent upon applications being 
filed by interested persons so that the court may assume control of 
the estate and preserve i; for the protected person. See In re Bundy, 
supra. 
In Donley, the Nebraska Court went on to state: 
Further, we note that an action to appoint a conservator is not an 
adversarial proceeding* but, rather, is a proceeding to promote the 
best interests of the person for whom the conservatorship is sought. 
A conservatorship action is uniquely nonadversarial in that everyone 
involved, including the petitioner and the court, is presumably 
interested in protecting the interest of the person for whom the 
conservatorship is sought. 
Finally, the Nebraska Court stated: 
Therefore, in a conservatorship proceeding, the interest to be 
considered by the court and the principles to be applied are quite 
unlike those in an ordinary litigation case. 
In the instant case, the Court should find that Petitioner was at all times attempting 
to protect Ms. Guynn from personal and economic harm. Therefore, Petitioner's costs 
and legal fees should be paid from the estate of Ms. Guynn, particularly since Ms. Guynn 
is the only beneficiary from Petitioner's efforts. Petitioner received nothing from her 
efforts except that Bruce has turned her mother against her. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ms. Conley should be disqualified from representing Ms. Guynn in this economic 
battle when a conservator has been appointed for Ms. Guynn and where Ms. Conley is not 
acting in the best interest of Ms. Guynn. The Petition is not without merit since it is not 
frivolous or of little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact. To the contrary, 
it is Ms. Conley's objection that is frivolous. An evidentiary hearing should be conducted 
if the Court is inclined to find that the Petition is without merit. Finally, Petitioner is 
entitled to her legal fees in filing her Petition, resolving the issues through a Stipulation, 
and defending the Petition against Ms. Conley's claims that it is without merit. Upon a 
ruling by the Court, Petitioner's counsel will file, pursuant to Rule 73, a declaration of 
fees with supporting details. 
Dated this 17th day of September 2009. 
Michael A. Jensen 
Attorney for Petitioner, Catherine Ortega 
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1. Estates: Appeal and Error. An 
appellate court reviews probate cases for 
error appearing on the record made in the 
county court. 
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When 
reviewing questions of law, an appellate 
court has an obligation to resolve the 
question independently of the conclusion 
reached by the trial court. 
3. Attorney Fees. The general rule with 
respect to the award of attorney fees 
under Nebraska law has been that 
attorney fees and expenses may be 
recovered only where provided for by 
statute or when a recognized and 
accepted uniform course of procedure 
has been to allow recovery of attorney 
fees. 
4. Actions: Guardians and 
Conservators. An action to appoint a 
conservator is not an adversarial 
proceeding, but rather, is a 
proceeding to promote the best 
interests of the person for whom the 
conservatorship is sought. 
5. Estates: Guardians and Conservators: 
Attorney Fees. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 
30-2654 (Reissue 1995), a conservator 
is to expend or distribute sums 
reasonably necessary for the support, 
Page 
orship of Donley, 262 Neb. 282 
. No.S-00-965. 
education, care, or benefit of the 
protected person. The cost, including a 
reasonable attorney fee, of initiating a 
good faith petition for the appointment 
of a conservator, where such 
appointment is determined to be in the 
best interests of the protected person, 
constitutes a necessary expenditure on 
behalf of the protected person and is 
compensable out of the 
conservatorship estate. 
6. Attorney Fees. When an attorney fee is 
authorized, the amount of the fee is 
addressed to the discretion of the trial 
court. 
7. . To determine proper and 
reasonable fees, it is necessary for the 
court to consider the nature of the 
proceeding, the time and labor required, 
the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions raised, the skill required to 
properly conduct the case, the 
responsibility assumed, the care and 
diligence exhibited, the result of the suit, 
the character and standing of the 
attorney, and the customary charges of 
the bar for similar services. 
Appeal from the County Court for 
Lancaster County: James L. Foster, 
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NATURE OF CASE 
Raymond Donley filed a petition in the 
county court for Lancaster County to 
have a guardian and conservator 
appointed for his father, Leon C. Donley. 
The appointment of the guardian and 
conservator was contested by Leon, 
Leon's wife, and Leon's daughter. 
Ultimately, the guardianship proceeding 
was transferred to Colorado and the 
parties agreed that coconservators would 
be appointed for Leon in Nebraska. The 
sole issue presented on appeal is whether 
the attorneys hired by Raymond, the 
petitioner, can recover, from Leon's 
estate, reasonable attorney fees incurred 
in the efforts to have a guardian and 
conservator appointed for Leon. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Raymond is the adult son of Leon and 
is one of five children born during 
Leon's first marriage to Raymond's 
mother. Leon subsequently married 
Margaret Donley, and the couple had a 
child during their marriage, Mary Davis. 
After being married for approximately 30 
years, Leon and Margaret were divorced 
in 1994 but continued living together in 
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the home they occupied during their 
marriage. 
As a result of Leon and Margaret's 
divorce in 1994, the house and acreage 
Leon and Margaret lived on in Lincoln 
were awarded to Leon. The record 
reveals that the property was in 
Margaret's name during the couple's 
marriage and that after the divorce was 
final, Margaret did not formally transfer 
title to the property to Leon as required 
by the divorce decree. Leon and 
Margaret were remarried on July 8,1998, 
and on July 13, Leon and Margaret 
granted, for $100,000, an option to 
purchase the acreage and house in 
Lincoln for $450,000. Margaret testified 
that the option was granted because the 
couple had plans to move to Colorado so 
that they could be closer to Davis. The 
$100,000 from the sale of the option was 
used as part of the purchase price for a 
home in Longmont, Colorado. Margaret 
testified that she also contributed to the 
purchase price of the home in Colorado, 
and the home was titled solely in 
Margaret's name. The $100,000 from the 
sale of the option was eventually placed 
in Leon's conservatorship estate. 
Raymond testified that prior to these 
proceedings, Leon would often visit 
Raymond's automobile repair shop, just 
a few blocks from Leon's house in 
Lincoln. Raymond stated that on many 
occasions between October 1998 and 
March 1999, Leon told Raymond that he 
and Margaret would be moving to 
Colorado but that Leon did not want to 
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move. Raymond became concerned about 
his father when Leon came to Raymond's 
shop one day with two bottles of 
mouthwash and a bottle of cleaner, 
handed the bottles to Raymond, and told 
Raymond that he would not need the 
bottles anymore because he was moving. 
Raymond stated that this conversation 
took place about 10 days after Leon's last 
expression of his desire not to move to 
Colorado. 
Raymond decided to file the petition 
for the appointment of a guardian and 
conservator because he had concerns that 
things were happening to Leon that Leon 
did not understand. Raymond stated that 
he and Leon discussed having someone 
appointed to look out for Leon's best 
interests and that Leon thought doing so 
would be a good idea. 
On March 19, 1999, Raymond, through 
counsel, filed a petition for the 
appointment of a guardian and 
conservator for Leon. A temporary 
guardian and conservator was also 
requested in the petition for Leon. John 
McHenry, a lawyer and an independent 
third party, was suggested in the petition 
as a suitable guardian and conservator. 
Raymond thought having an independent 
party as guardian and conservator would 
be advisable to avoid potential conflict 
between the families from Leon's two 
marriages. In addition to requesting 
McHenry as the temporary guardian and 
conservator in the petition, Raymond also 
had Leon sign a document, which was 
filed with the county court, nominating 
McHenry as his guardian and conservator. 
McHenry was appointed and accepted the 
position as temporary guardian and 
conservator. 
Leon and Margaret moved to 
Longmont, Colorado, in early May 1999. 
Also, on May 6, the county court 
authorized the sale of Leon's property in 
Lincoln, where Leon and Margaret had 
been living, pursuant to the purchase 
option executed in July 1998. On July 12, 
1999, the county court noted that 
settlement negotiations were progressing, 
so the case was set for trial on August 31. 
At a later hearing regarding the allowance 
of attorney fees, Roger Cox, one of 
Raymond's attorneys, testified that by 
August 25, the parties had agreed to settle 
the case and that the only thing left to do 
was agree on specific wording in the 
drafted settlement agreement. Cox stated 
that on August 26, Cox was informed that 
Davis had filed petitions for the 
appointment of a conservator and a 
guardian in a Boulder County, Colorado, 
court on August 20 and that the settlement 
was probably off. The petitions for 
guardian and conservator in the Colorado 
court were both signed by Leon. 
A hearing on the issue whether the 
proceedings should be transferred to 
Colorado was held on September 22, 
1999, in the county court for Lancaster 
County. The county court determined that 
the guardianship proceeding should be 
transferred to Colorado but that the 
conservatorship proceeding should stay in 
Nebraska. 
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The parties eventually filed a joint 
stipulation for settlement on January 28, 
2000, agreeing that McHenry and Davis 
should be appointed as coconservators 
for Leon. On February 28, the county 
court found, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that a conservator should be 
appointed for Leon and that there were 
no less restrictive alternatives available. 
The county court also found the joint 
stipulation for settlement to be fair and 
reasonable. The agreement essentially 
gave Davis control of the day-to-day 
spending with respect to Leon and gave 
McHenry control over how Leon's assets 
should be invested in the event the 
coconservators disagreed as to 
investment of the assets. The final 
inventory of Leon's estate totaled 
$841,607.80. 
On April 7,2000, Raymond ffied a 
petition for attorney fees incurred as the 
petitioner in this matter in the amount of 
$28,422.02. Briefs in opposition to the 
payment of fees were filed on behalf of 
Leon by his attorney as well as by Davis 
as coconservator. Leon's brief argued 
that Raymond's attorney's services were 
not required in this matter because Leon 
had previously appointed a power of 
attorney to provide assistance in the 
future. 
It was established at the hearing on the 
issue of attorney fees that Raymond 
initially hired the firm of Harding, Shultz 
& Downs and that there was never an 
express agreement between that firm and 
Leon. Further, Cox, an attorney with the 
Harding, Shultz & Downs law firm, 
testified that as of the date of the hearing, 
Raymond had paid the firm $20,000 
toward the $28,422.02 incurred by the 
firm for services the firm had rendered in 
this matter. 
The county court determined that 
Raymond wras not entitled to attorney 
fees. The court cited In re Guardianship 
& Conservatorship of Tucker, 9 Neb. 
App. 17, 606 N.W.2d 868 (2000), for the 
proposition that attorney claims for 
professional services must be based upon 
a contract of employment made with the 
person to be charged. The county court 
then found that there was never an 
express or implied contract between 
Leon and the attorneys employed by 
Raymond. Therefore, the court ruled that 
the attorney fees were not to be paid 
from Leon's estate. Raymond filed this 
appeal, and we moved the case to our 
docket pursuant to our authority to 
regulate the dockets of the appellate 
courts. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
On appeal, Raymond assigns that the 
county court erred (1) in ruling that there 
was no express or implied contract 
between Leon and the attorneys 
employed by Raymond and (2) in failing 
to award Raymond his reasonable 
attorney fees to be paid by Leon's 
conservatorship estate. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1,2] An appellate court reviews 
probate cases for error appearing on the 
record made in the county court. In re 
Estate of Myers, 256 Neb. 817, 594 
N.W.2d 563 (1999). See In re 
Guardianship of Zyla, 251 Neb. 163, 555 
N.W.2d 768 (1996). When reviewing 
questions of law, an appellate court has 
an obligation to resolve the question 
independently of the conclusion reached 
by the trial court. Mertz v. Pharmacists 
Mut. Ins. Co., 261 Neb. 704, 625 N.W.2d 
197(2001). 
ANALYSIS 
On appeal, Raymond argues that the 
county court should have ordered 
attorney fees to be paid from Leon's 
estate in this case because his attorney's 
actions benefited Leon's estate and 
because there is a uniform course of 
procedure to grant such fees when a 
petitioner in a guardianship and 
conservatorship action is ultimately 
successful. Raymond further argues that 
attorney fees are appropriate because the 
petition was ultimately successful, as a 
guardian and co-conservators were 
appointed for Leon. 
[3] The general rule with respect to the 
award of attorney fees under Nebraska 
law has been that attorney fees and 
expenses may be recovered only where 
provided for by statute or when a 
recognized and accepted uniform course 
of procedure has been to allow recovery 
of attorney fees. See Nebraska Nutrients 
v. Shepherd, 261 Neb. 723, 626 N.W.2d 
472 (2001). Raymond argues that 
attorney fees should be paid out of 
Leon's conservatorship estate under this 
general rule. The appellee Davis, on the 
other hand, asserts that there is no 
uniform course of procedure in 
guardianship/conservatorship matters to 
allow attorney fees for petitioner's 
attorneys. Moreover, Davis argues that 
the county court correctly determined 
that there was never an express or 
implied contract between Leon and the 
attorneys employed by Raymond and 
that, therefore, there was no basis for the 
recovery of an attorney fee in this 
conservatorship proceeding. We find that 
when the petitioner's good faith actions 
are a necessary expense to the 
conservatorship estate, attorney fees are 
authorized by statute in Nebraska and are 
compensable under the general rule 
regarding attorney fees. 
While we have never considered the 
precise issue, we are persuaded by the 
rule adopted in other states that costs and 
attorney fees incurred in the good faith 
initiation of conservatorship proceedings 
constitute necessaries for the support or 
benefit of the protected person such that 
payment of reasonable costs incurred 
may be assessed against the protected 
person's estate. See, In re Estate of 
Bayers, 295 Mont. 89, 983 P.2d 339 
(1999); In re Dunn, 239 N.C. 378, 79 
S.E.2d 921 (1954); Penney v. Pritchard 
& McCall, 255 Ala. 13,49 So. 2d 782 
(1950); Carney v. Aicklen, 587 S.W.2d 
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507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); In re Estate 
and Guardianship of Vermeersch, 15 
Ariz. App. 315,488 P.2d 671 (1971); In 
re Estate of Sherwood, 56 111. App. 2d 
334,206 N.E.2d 304 (1965); In re 
Bundy, 44 Cal. App. 466, 186 P. 811 
(1919). 
The rationale supporting the rule is 
that in guardianship/conservatorship 
cases, the applicant most often acts for 
and on behalf of one who is unable to act 
or care for himself or herself. See, In re 
Dunn, supra; In re Bundy, supra. Thus, 
the filing of the petition and the hearing 
thereon are indispensable steps in the 
preservation of the protected person's 
estate. See, In re Bundy, supra; In re 
Estate and Guardianship of Vermeersch, 
supra. It is recognized that when an 
individual is in need of physical or 
financial protection, the law must in 
many instances think and act for him or 
her. See, In re Dunn, supra; In re Bundy, 
supra. The state and society have a 
significant interest in bringing the estate 
of individuals in need of protection under 
the vigil of the county court. See In re 
Estate and Guardianship of Vermeersch, 
supra. See, also, Penney v. Pritchard & 
McCall, supra. The court, as general 
conservator of the rights of persons in 
need of protection, is dependent upon 
applications being filed by interested 
persons so that the court may assume 
control of the estate and preserve it for 
the protected person. See In re Bundy, 
supra. 
[4] Further, we note that an action to 
appoint a conservator is not an 
adversarial proceeding, but, rather, is a 
proceeding to promote the best interests 
of the person for whom the 
conservatorship is sought. A 
conservatorship action is uniquely 
nonadversarial in that everyone involved, 
including the petitioner and the court, is 
presumably interested in protecting the 
interest of the person for whom the 
conservatorship is sought. See Neb. Rev. 
Stat. § 30-2630 (Reissue 1995) 
(conservator may be appointed if trial 
court is satisfied by clear and convincing 
evidence that (1) person is unable to 
manage his or her property effectively 
and (2) person has property which will be 
wasted or dissipated unless proper 
management is provided or that funds are 
needed for support of person and that 
protection is necessary to obtain or 
provide funds). Therefore, in a 
conservatorship proceeding, the interest 
to be considered by the court and the 
principles to be applied are quite unlike 
those in an ordinary litigation case. 
[5] Thus, we cannot agree with the 
appellee that the county court lacked 
power to assess the costs of the 
conservatorship proceeding and the 
petitioner's attorney fees against the 
alleged protected person's estate. In 
Nebraska, under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 
30-2654(a)(2) (Reissue 1995), a 
"conservator is to expend or distribute 
sums reasonably necessary for the 
support, education, care or benefit of the 
protected person." Clearly, the cost of 
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initiating a good faith petition for the 
appointment of a guardian or 
conservator, where such appointment is 
determined to be in the best interests of 
the protected person, constitutes a 
necessary expenditure on behalf of the 
protected person. We hold that such 
costs, including reasonable attorney fees, 
are compensable out of the 
conservatorship estate as they are 
necessary expenditures on behalf of the 
protected person. Therefore, attorney 
fees are authorized by statute when a 
good faith petition results in the 
appointment of a conservator and, under 
the general rule regarding attorney fees 
in Nebraska, may be recovered from 
Leon's estate. See § 30-2654. 
In the instant case, the trial court and 
the parties agreed that the appointment of 
coconservators was in the best interests 
of Leon, and the parties all agreed that 
the appointment of a guardian was in 
Leon's best interests. However, in 
denying Raymond's petition for attorney 
fees, the county court cited In re 
Guardianship & Conservatorship of 
Tucker, 9 Neb. App. 17, 606 N.W.2d 868 
(2000), and focused on whether there 
was a contractual relationship between 
Leon and the law firm Raymond hired to 
assist him in filing the petition for the 
appointment of a guardian and 
conservator. The county court stated that 
"it is apparent to me that the Courts of 
this State are taking the position that 
attorney claims for professional services 
must rest upon a contract of employment 
made with the person sought to be 
charged." 
The Court of Appeals, in In re 
Guardianship & Conservatorship of 
Tucker, supra, granted attorney fees 
based upon an implied contract between 
the petitioner's attorney and the protected 
person. The court, however, did not hold 
that a contractual relationship was 
required in a guardianship and 
conservatorship case in order to grant 
attorney fees to a successful petitioner. In 
fact, many situations arise in which an 
incapacitated individual is in dire need of 
a guardian or conservator, yet he or she 
contests the 
guardianship/conservatorship 
proceeding. In such a case, a successful 
petitioner who filed an action in good 
faith would not be entitled to attorney 
fees under an express or implied contract 
theory because the protected person 
would not have accepted the benefit of 
the attorney's services by agreeing to the 
protection. Basing the decision whether 
to grant attorney fees on whether an 
incapacitated person, who has been 
adjudged unfit to manage his or her own 
affairs, has expressly or impliedly 
entered into a fee agreement is generally 
not sound policy, given that the 
incapacitated person's ability to 
understand and enter into such 
agreements is often the very question at 
issue in conservatorship proceedings. 
Such a rule can only have the effect of 
encouraging manipulation of 
incapacitated persons in order to secure 
an "agreement" that would make fees 
recoverable. This would be contrary to 
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the interest of the protected person and 
inconsistent with the nature of the 
proceedings. 
We determine that the existence of an 
express or implied contractual 
relationship between a petitioner's 
attorney and an incapacitated person is 
not a prerequisite for the award of 
attorney fees in a guardianship or 
conservatorship proceeding. Therefore, 
because the county court erred in 
concluding that ar express or implied 
contract between Leon and Raymond's 
attorneys was necessary prior to the 
award of attorney fees, we reverse the 
order of the county court. 
Based on the circumstances of the 
instant case, we conclude that the costs, 
including reasonable attorney fees, of 
initiating and prosecuting proceedings 
that ultimately resulted in the 
appointment of a guardian and 
co-conservators for Leon should be 
compensable out of the conservatorship 
estate as they are necessary expenditures 
for the benefit of the protected person. 
See § 30-2654. Because the county court 
did not address the issue of the amount 
of attorney fees in this case, we remand 
the matter to the county court to 
determine a reasonable fee to be paid 
from the conservatorship estate to 
Raymond's attorneys. We remand the 
cause for a fee determination, keeping in 
mind that the county court has seen and 
heard the witnesses and is familiar with 
the background and intricacies of these 
proceedings. Moreover, the county court 
expressly noted in its August 8,2000, 
order that there was sufficient evidence 
presented to the court to allow it to make 
a determination as to the amount of 
attorney fees without further hearing. 
[6,7] We note that when an attorney 
fee is authorized, the amount of the fee is 
addressed to the discretion of the trial 
court. See In re Estate of Stall, 261 Neb. 
319,622N.W.2d886(2001).To 
determine proper and reasonable fees, it 
is necessary for the court to consider the 
nature of the proceeding, the time and 
labor required, the novelty and difficulty 
of the questions raised, the skill required 
to properly conduct the case, the 
responsibility assumed, the care and 
diligence exhibited, the result of the suit, 
the character and standing of the 
attorney, and the customary charges of 
the bar for similar services. See Schirber 
v. State, 254 Neb. 1002, 581 N.W.2d 873 
(1998). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse 
the order of the county court and remand 
the cause to the county court for a 
determination of reasonable attorney fees 
to be paid to Raymond's attorneys out of 
the conservatorship estate. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




February 24, 2010 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
Before the court is a Request to Submit for Decision on Petitioner's motion for 
attorney fees. The memorandum filed on December 18, 2009, in support of the motion 
aiso requests that the court disqualify Ms Coniey from representing Ms Guynn, that the 
court order payment of Ms. Bradford's attorneys fees, and opposes Ms. Guynn's claim that 
Petitioner's petition was filed without merit. All of these matters have been briefed by other 
counsel, and the court has previously ruled on the issue of Ms Bradford's fees. Although 
a request has been made for hearing, the Court does not find that a hearing would assist 
with ruling, and would only serve to increase attorneys fees, which is the major issue at this 
time. Accordingly, the court rules as follows, based on the memoranda filed. 
1. As noted above, the court has previously ruled on the issue of Ms Bradford's 
fees. Mr Guynn has filed a motion to set that ruling aside, based upon Rule 60(b)(3). The 
court finds that the statement referred to giving rise to the motion does not rise to the level 
of misrepresentation, as it was in the nature of a future promise to refrain from seeking 
attorneys fees, rather than a statement of presently existing fact. Mr. Guynn has failed to 
Rrm 
set forth a sufficient basis for the court to revisit the issue of Ms. Bradford's fees. 
2. Petitioner's motion to disqualify Ms. Conley as counsel is denied. The court finds 
no basis to disqualify an attorney retained by Ms. Guynn. Although petitioner argues that 
Ms. Guynn's representation must be through the limited conservator, Ms. Conley 
represented at the hearing on September 22, 2009, that she had been retained by Ms. 
Guynn personally, and that was reflected in the order prepared from that hearing. 
3. The petitioner's motion for payment of her attorneys fees is denied. This 
substance of this matter was resolved in November 2009, by a stipulation signed by 
counsel for all parties, and an order entered by the court on November 30, 2009. The 
stipulation and order did not contain a provision for attorneys fees; that issue, apparently, 
arose later after disagreements between the petitioner and conservator. Based upon the 
pleadings filed since the entry of the order, it is apparent to the court that many of the 
requested attorneys fees have been incurred since then. 
Based on the resolution of this matter, which did not provide for petitioner's 
attorneys fees, as well as the increase of fees since the order was entered, the court 
declines to award attorneys fees to the petitioner. 
4. The court has previously determined that the petition was not filed in bad faith. 
Although both parties have recently set forth their disagreements and family disputes in 
great detail, the standard to be used is what information the petitioner had at the time the 
petition was filed, that caused her to take the action that she did. While, as previously 
noted, there are many disputes between the parties, the court cannot find that the actions 
of the petitioner at that time were in bad faith. 
This minute entry is the Order of the Court, and no further order is required to be 
prepared by counsel. 
Dated this ^ day of February, 2010 
DISTRICT COURT J 
Mi 
p n ^ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
450 South State Street, PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860 
801-238-7020 (DeVonya); 238-7051 (Kathy); 238-7022 (MaKae); 238-7021 (Rhonda); 238-7509 (Kim) 
In the Matter of 
MARGARET GUYNN 
A Protected Person. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITIONER'S RULE 59 MOTION 
HEARING REQUESTED 
Civil No. 093901284 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
Pursuant to Rule 7, Utah R. Civ. P., Petitioner Catherine Ortega, by and through 
counsel, hereby submits her memorandum in support of her Rule 59(a)(7) Motion, and 
requests the Court to grant the motion based on an error in law. 
INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner filed her petition for the protection of her mother, Margaret Guynn. The 
Court has ruled that the petition was not filed in bad faith. The parties, by and through 
their respective attorneys, entered into a stipulation that was filed with the Court on 
November 25,2009 (the "Stipulation"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
The Stipulation provides for the appointment of a Conservator for Ms. Guynn, and in fact, 
the Court appointed Ms. Guynn's son, Bruce Guynn, as her Conservator. 
Subsequent to the filing of the Stipulation, Petitioner sought the reimbursement of 
her attorney fees and submitted an initial memorandum and a reply memorandum with 
various declarations in support. 
The Court entered a signed Minute Entry on February 24,2010 (the "Ruling") in 
which the Court denied Petitioner's request for her attorney fees. The Court's denial 
appears to be based on its interpretation of the Stipulation. However, the Stipulation was 
void of any mention of attorney fees, and the Court confirmed that observation in her 
Ruling. This then leads to the question of how the Court could possibly conclude that the 
attorney fee issue "was resolved" by the Stipulation when there is no language in the 
Stipulation relating to attorney fees or the waiver of attorney fees. It would appear that 
the Court wrongly interpreted the Stipulation, and that is the basis for Petitioner's motion. 
RELEVANT AND MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On August 31,2009, Petitioner filed her Petition to Appoint a Guardian and 
Conservator for Margaret Guynn, Petitioner's mother. 
2. After negotiations between Ms. Elizabeth Conley, representing Ms. Guynn, and 
Kent Alderman, representing Bruce Guynn, and Michael Jensen, representing Petitioner, 
Catherine Ortega, an agreement was reached to appoint only a conservator for 
Ms. Guynn. 
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3. On November 25,2009, the parties' agreement was filed with the Court, entitled 
Stipulation for Appointment of Limited Conservator, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A. 
4. On December 18, 2009. Petitioner filed her motion for reimbursement of her 
attorney fees, and on February 1, Petitioner filed her reply memorandum in support of her 
motion for attorney fees. 
5. On February 24,2010, the Court entered its Ruling denying Petitioner's attorney 
fees. 
ARGUMENT 
The Stipulation is void of any reference to attorney fees: therefore, the 
Stipulation, unless ambiguous, cannot be the basis for denying attorney fees to 
Petitioner. 
That part of the Court's Ruling that deals with the issue of Petitioner's attorney fees 
is contained in Paragraph No. 3, and set forth in its entirety below: 
The petitioner's motion for payment of her attorney fees is denied. This 
(sic) substance of this matter was resolved in November 2009, by a stipulation 
signed by counsel for all parties, and an order entered by the court on 
November 30, 2009. The stipulation and order did not contain a provision for 
attorneys fees; that issue, apparently, arose later after disagreements between 
the petitioner and conservator. Based upon the pleadings filed since the entry 
of the order, it is apparent to the court that many of the requested attorneys fees 
have been incurred since then. 
Based on the resolution of this matter, which did not provide for 
petitioner's attorneys fees, as well as the increase of fees since the order was 
entered, the court declines to award attorneys fees to the petitioner. 
Court's Ruling, February 24, 2010 at 2 If 3; see also Exhibit B attached hereto. 
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A. The Stipulation is construed as a contract 
It is basic law that a stipulation is construed as a contract. Lloyd v. Lloyd, 
2009 UT 314 P6 (citing Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206,1209). And, 
interpretation of contract terms is a question of law. Tom Heal Commer. Real Estate v. 
yarfc, 2007 UTApp 265 P 7. 
B. A contract is first interpreted by looking within the four corners of the 
document 
The Utah Supreme Court held in Inner light, Inc. v. Matrix Group, LLC, 2009 UT 31 
the following: 
When interpreting a contract, we begin by looking within the four corners 
of the contract "to determine the parties' intentions, which are controlling." 
Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel, Inc. , 2002 UT 62, P 16, 52 P.3d 1179 
(citations omitted). "If the language within the four corners of the contract is 
unambiguous,... a court determines the parties' intentions from the plain 
meaning of the contractual language as a matter of law." Id. 
Innerlight, Inc. V. Matrix Group, LLC, 2009 UT 31 P14. 
In this case, the Stipulation contains six simple agreements: 
1. The parties agree that Margaret needs assistance in handling her financial 
affairs. 
2. The parties agree it is in Margaret's best interest that a limited conservator 
be appointed to assist her with her financial affairs and to protect her estate. 
3. The limitations of the Conservator are intended to grant Margaret as much 
financial independence and freedom as possible. 
4. To that end, the Conservator shall assist Margaret in her financial affairs by 
first consulting with her to ascertain her desires regarding her finances. 
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5. The parties agree that Bruce be appointed as Margaret's Conservator with 
the limitations described herein. 
6. The parties agree not to purse a guardianship at this time. 
Looking within the four corners of the Stipulation, there is absolutely no reference to 
any waiver of attorney fees or any mention of attorney fees. Further, the Stipulation is 
void of any language that waives any claims by any party. Moreover, the Court's Ruling 
also confirms that the Stipulation does "not contain a provision for attorneys fees." 
Therefore, the Stipulation cannot be the basis for concluding that the issue of attorney 
fees for Petitioner "was resolved" or waived or treated in any manner whatsoever. There 
is no logical way to conclude that the attorney fee issue was resolved by looking at the 
four corners of the Stipulation. 
Further, there is no rule or law that requires all issues to be included in a stipulation. 
In fact, the issue of attorney fees was discussed among the attorneys without resolution. 
Therefore, the issue was intentionally omitted from the Stipulation and raised in a 
separate motion with the Court. 
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner requests the Court to amend its Ruling to 
specifically address and grant her request for attorney fees based on the arguments 
submitted previously and to allow the increase in fees incurred as provided by law and set 
forth in her Reply Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Attorney Fees. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court's Ruling appears to be based solely on its interpretation of the Stipulation. 
In looking at the four corners of the Stipulation, the Stipulation is completely silent on the 
issue of Petitioner's attorney fees or any attorney fees. Therefore, the Stipulation cannot 
logically be the basis for denying Petitioner's request for attorney fees. The Court should 
amend its Ruling and grant Petitioner's motion, including Petitioner's request for 
additional fees incurred in defending the attorney fees she sought in the first place. 
Dated this 1st day of March 2010. 
^/ffejt^ 
Michael A. Jensen ( ^ y 
Attorney for Petitioner, Catherine Ortega 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Civil No. 093901284 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
In the Matter of 
MARGARET GUYNN, a Protected Person. 
I, Michael A. Jensen, hereby certify that on this day I personally served the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S RULE 59 
MOTION by personally Mailing it to: 
Kent B. Alderman 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
(801) 532-1234; kalderman@pblutah.com 
Attorney for Bruce Guynn 
Wendy Bradford 
147 W Election Rd Ste 200 
Draper UT 84020-6436 
801-518-3 623; bradfordlawoffice@gmail.com 
Former Attorney for Margaret Guynn 
Elizabeth S. Conley 
Attorney at Law 
3604 Astro Cir 
Salt Lake City UT 84109-3843 
(801) 272-0719; e_conlev(Steomcast.net 
Attorney for Margaret Guynn 
Dated this 1st day of March 2010. 
Michael A. Jensen (J 
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EXHIBIT A 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
.NOV 2 5 
Deputy Clerk 
ELIZABE1H S. CONLEY(4815) 
Attorney for Margaret Guyim 
3604 Astro Circle 
Telephone: (801) 272-0719 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
MARGARET GUYNN, 
A protected persoa 
STIPULATION FOR APPOINTMENT 
OF LIMITED CONSERVATOR 
Probate No. 093901284 GU 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
The parties to this action being Margaret Guynn ("Margaret"), represented by 
Elizabeth S Conley, Donald Bruce Guynn ("Bruce"), represented by Kent B. Alderman of 
Parsons Behle & Latimer and Petitioner Catherine Ortega ("Catherine"), represented by Michael 
A. Jensen, hereby enter into a stipulation and agreement for the appointment of a conservator for 
Margaret. 
INTRODUCTION 
Margaret is an 85 year old woman currently residing at Atria Assisted Living in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. Margaret hved on her own in Tyler, Texas until the summer of 2009 when her 
son Bruce assisted her in selling her Texas home and moving to Utah 
Exhibit A 
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On or about August 31, 2009, Catherine, the daughter of Margaret, filed a petition 
seeking appointment as guardian and conservator of Margaret. Bruce and Margaret objected to 
the appointment of Catherine as a conservator and guardian. 
While Catherine believes that Margaret lacks the capacity to manage her own care and 
financial affairs, Bruce and Margaret disagree. Nonetheless, to avoid further litigation, they have 
reached an agreement on the level of protection that is now needed. Accordingly, the parties 
agree that a limited conservatorship should be established and that Bruce will serve as the 
Conservator for Margaret. 
STIPULATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Therefore, the parties now agree as follows and intend to be bound by the terms of this 
Stipulation. 
1. The parties agree that Margaret needs assistance in handling her financial affairs. 
2. The parties agree it is in Margaret's best interest that a limited conservator be 
appointed to assist her with her financial affairs and to protect her estate. 
3. The limitations of the Conservator are intended to grant Margaret as much 
financial independence and freedom as possible. 
4. To that end, the Conservator shall assist Margaret in her financial affairs by first 
consulting with her to ascertain her desires regarding her finances. 
5. The parties agree that Bruce be appointed as Margaret's Conservator with the 
limitations described herein. 
6. The parties agree not to pursue a guardianship at this time. 
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DATED this JV_ day of October, 2009. 
Elizabeths. Conley u 
Attorney for Margaret Guynn 
Michael A Jensen 
Attorney for Catherine Ortega 
£UA 
-^Kent B. Alderman 
Attorney for Bruce Guynn 
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DATED this day of ©ttetR5rr2009. 
Elizabeth S. Conley 
Attorney for Margaret Guynn 
"-Yk^od, 
Michael A. Jensen 
Attorney for Catherine Ortega 
Kent B. Alderman 
Attorney for Bruce Guynn 
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EXHIBIT B 
RfUQ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
MARGARET GUYNN. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE # 093901284 
February 24, 2010 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
Before the court is a Request to Submit for Decision on Petitioner's motion for 
attorney fees. The memorandum filed on December 18, 2009, in support of the motion 
also requests that the court disqualify Ms Conley from representing Ms Guynn, that the 
court order payment of Ms. Bradford's attorneys fees, and opposes Ms. Guynn's claim that 
Petitioner's petition was filed without merit. All of these matters have been briefed by other 
counsel, and the court has previously ruled on the issue of Ms Bradford's fees. Although 
a request has beeii made for hearing, the Court does not find that a hearing would assist 
with ruling, and would only serve to increas^attorneys-fees,-whiGh is the roapr-issue-at this 
time. Accordingly, the court rules as follows, based on the memoranda filed. 
1. As noted above, the court has previously ruled on the issue of Ms Bradford's 
fees. Mr Guynn has filed a motion to set that ruling aside, based upon Rule 60(b)(3). The 
court finds that the statement referred to giving rise to the motion does not rise to the level 
of misrepresentation, as it was in the nature of a future promise to refrain from_seeking 
attorneys fees, rather than a statement of presently existing fact Mr. Guynn has failed to 
Exhibit B 
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set forth a sufficient basis for the court to revisit the issue of Ms. Bradford's fees. 
2. Petitioner's motion to disqualify Ms. Conley as counsel is denied. The court finds 
no basis to disqualify an attorney retained by Ms. Guynn. Although petitioner argues that 
Ms. Guynn's representation must be through the limited conservator, Ms. Conley 
represented at the hearing on September 22, 2009, that she had been retained by Ms. 
Guynn personally, and that was reflected in the order prepared from that hearing. 
3. The petitioner's motion for payment of her attorneys fees is denied. This 
substance of this matter was resolved in November 2009, by a stipulation signed by 
counsel for all parties, and an order entered by the court on November 30, 2009. The 
stipulation and order did not contain a provision for attorneys fees; that issue, apparently, 
arose later after disagreements between the petitioner and conservator. Based upon the 
pleadings filed since the entry of the order, it is apparent to the court that many of the 
requested attorneys fees have been incurred since then. 
Based on the resolution of this matter, which did not provide for petitioner's 
attorneys fees, as well as the increase of fees since the order was entered, the court 
declines to award attorneys fees to the petitioner. 
4. The court has previously determined that the petition was not filed in bad faith. 
Although both parties have recently set forth their disagreements and family disputes in 
great detail, the standard to be used is what information the petitioner had at the time the 
petition was filed, that caused her to take the action that she did. While, as previously 
noted, there are many disputes between the parties, the court cannot find that the actions 
of the petitioner at that time were in bad faith. 
This minute entry is the Order of the Court, and no further order is required to be 
prepared by counsel. 
Dated this Q. f day of February, 2010 
By. 
STAMP USED AT DIRECTION OF JUDGE 
9fr7k 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
Petitioner, Catherine Ortega has filed a motion under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59(a)(7). The motion has been objected to by both Margaret Guynn and 
Bruce Guynn. Petitioner has requested a hearing on her motion, however the court finds 
that oral argument will not assist it in resolving this matter, as the issues presented and 
relevant law are straightforward. The Court having been fully informed, rules as follows. 
Petitioner requests that the court amend its minute entry of February 24, 2010, in 
which it denied petitioner's prior request for attorney fees. Petitioner argues that the 
court denied her prior request for attorney fees simply because the parties' Stipulation 
did not provide for attorney fees. Petitioner claims that this leads to the question of how 
the Court could possibly conclude that the attorney fee issue 'was resolved' by the 
Stipulation when there is no language in the Stipulation relating to attorney fees or the 
waiver of attorney fees." 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 permits the court to order a new trial or amend a 
judgment, based upon several grounds, including an "error in law." UT R. Civ. Pro. 
59(a)(7). The denies petitioner's Rule 59 motion based on the following. 
RfV<S4 
In Utah, "[although courts have inherent equitable power to award attorney fees 
when justice or equity requires .. . attorney fees are typically recoverable only if an 
applicable statute or contract so provides." A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. 
Guy, 2004 UT 47, fl 7 (citations omitted); and see Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n. 
885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994) (stating "in the absence of a statutory or contractual 
authorization, a court has inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees 
when it deems it appropriate in the interest of justice and equity."). The situations where 
a court may properly exercise this power are limited. Carrier v. Salt Lake County. 2004 
UT 98, U 42 (rejecting a request for fees and noting in Stewart the court "held that the 
invocation of this exception is appropriate only when the Vindication of a strong or 
societally important public policy takes place and the necessary costs in doing so 
transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring 
subsidization.'" (citations omitted)). 
In its prior ruling, the court made clear that there was no provision in the 
Stipulation nor in any other underlying contract or statute that authorized petitioner's 
request for attorney fees. Feb. 24, 2010 Minute Entry, fl 3. Petitioner did not dispute 
this. Mem, of Pet. 13 (requesting petitioner's attorney fees from Ms. Guynn's estate but 
acknowledging "there is no Code section or Utah case on point."). Nor did the Court find 
any reason to consider awarding attorney fees based in the interest of justice and 
equity, where "the increase of fees since the order was entered" justified the denial of 
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petitioner's request. Minute Entry, fl 3. 
Petitioner has not shown that the court made any error in law in its ruling. 
Petitioner is not entitled to have that judgment set aside and petitioner's motion is 
therefore DENIED. 
This is the final order of the court no other order is required. 
Dated this 1 day of April, 2010. 
^ 
<g^i^^ugt>JiO 
andra N. Peuler 
District Court J u d g l ^ ^ f g 
mo 
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Nebraska Court Opinion 
In re Guardianship & Conserve 
Filed July 20, 20( 
1. Estates: Appeal and Error. An 
appellate court reviews probate cases for 
error appearing on the record made in the 
county court. 
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When 
reviewing questions of law, an appellate 
court has an obligation to resolve the 
question independently of the conclusion 
reached by the trial court. 
3. Attorney Fees. The general rule with 
respect to the award of attorney fees 
under Nebraska law has been that 
attorney fees and expenses may be 
recovered only where provided for by 
statute or when a recognized and 
accepted uniform course of procedure 
has been to allow recovery of attorney 
fees. 
4. Actions: Guardians and 
Conservators. An action to appoint a 
conservator is not an adversarial 
proceeding, but rather, is a 
proceeding to promote the best 
interests of the person for whom the 
conservatorship is sought. 
5. Estates: Guardians and Conservators: 
Attorney Fees. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 
30-2654 (Reissue 1995), a conservator 
is to expend or distribute sums 
reasonably necessary for the support, 
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education, care, or benefit of the 
protected person. The cost including a 
reasonable attorney fee, of initiating a 
good faith petition for the appointment 
of a conservator, where such 
appointment is determined to be in the 
best interests of the protected person, 
constitutes a necessary expenditure on 
behalf of the protected person and is 
compensable out of the 
conservatorship estate. 
6. Attorney Fees. When an attorney fee is 
authorized, the amount of the fee is 
addressed to the discretion of the trial 
court. 
7. . To determine proper and 
reasonable fees, it is necessary for the 
court to consider the nature of the 
proceeding, the time and labor required, 
the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions raised, the skill required to 
properly conduct the case, the 
responsibility assumed, the care and 
diligence exhibited, the result of the suit, 
the character and standing of the 
attorney, and the customary charges of 
the bar for similar services. 
Appeal from the County Court for 
Lancaster County: James L. Foster, 
Judge. Reversed and remanded with 
directions, 
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NATURE OF CASE 
Raymond Donley filed a petition in the 
county court for Lancaster County to 
have a guardian and conservator 
appointed for his father, Leon C. Donley. 
The appointment of the guardian and 
conservator was contested by Leon, 
Leon's wife, and Leon's daughter. 
Ultimately, the guardianship proceeding 
was transferred to Colorado and the 
parties agreed that coconservators would 
be appointed for Leon in Nebraska. The 
sole issue presented on appeal is whether 
the attorneys hired by Raymond, the 
petitioner, can recover, from Leon's 
estate, reasonable attorney fees incurred 
in the efforts to have a guardian and 
conservator appointed for Leon. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Raymond is the adult son of Leon and 
is one of five children born during 
Leon's first marriage to Raymond's 
mother. Leon subsequently married 
Margaret Donley, and the couple had a 
child during their marriage, Mary Davis. 
After being married for approximately 30 
years, Leon and Margaret were divorced 
in 1994 but continued living together in 
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the home they occupied during their 
marriage. 
As a result of Leon and Margaret's 
divorce in 1994, the house and acreage 
Leon and Margaret lived on in Lincoln 
were awarded to Leon. The record 
reveals that the property was in 
Margaret's name during the couple's 
marriage and that after the divorce was 
final, Margaret did not formally transfer 
title to the property to Leon as required 
by the divorce decree. Leon and 
Margaret were remarried on July 8, 1998, 
and on July 13, Leon and Margaret 
granted, for $100,000, an option to 
purchase the acreage and house in 
Lincoln for $450,000. Margaret testified 
that the option was granted because the 
couple had plans to move to Colorado so 
that they could be closer to Davis. The 
$100,000 from the sale of the option was 
used as part of the purchase price for a 
home in Longmont, Colorado. Margaret 
testified that she also contributed to the 
purchase price of the home in Colorado, 
and the home was titled solely in 
Margaret's name. The $100,000 from the 
sale of the option was eventually placed 
in Leon's conservatorship estate. 
Raymond testified that prior to these 
proceedings, Leon would often visit 
Raymond's automobile repair shop, just 
a few blocks from Leon's house in 
Lincoln. Raymond stated that on many 
occasions between October 1998 and 
March 1999, Leon told Raymond that he 
and Margaret would be moving to 
Colorado but that Leon did not want to 
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move. Raymond became concerned about 
his father when Leon came to Raymond's 
shop one day with two bottles of 
mouthwash and a bottle of cleaner, 
handed the bottles to Raymond, and told 
Raymond that he would not need the 
bottles anymore because he was moving. 
Raymond stated that this conversation 
took place about 10 days after Leon's last 
expression of his desire not to move to 
Colorado. 
Raymond decided to file the petition 
for the appointment of a guardian and 
conservator because he had concerns that 
things were happening to Leon that Leon 
did not understand. Raymond stated that 
he and Leon discussed having someone 
appointed to look out for Leon's best 
interests and that Leon thought doing so 
would be a good idea. 
On March 19,1999, Raymond, through 
counsel, filed a petition for the 
appointment of a guardian and 
conservator for Leon. A temporary 
guardian and conservator was also 
requested in the petition for Leon. John 
McHenry, a lawyer and an independent 
third party, was suggested in the petition 
as a suitable guardian and conservator. 
Raymond thought having an independent 
party as guardian and conservator would 
be advisable to avoid potential conflict 
between the families from Leon's two 
marriages. In addition to requesting 
McHenry as the temporary guardian and 
conservator in the petition, Raymond also 
had Leon sign a document, which was 
filed with the county court, nominating 
McHenry as his guardian and conservator. 
McHenry was appointed and accepted the 
position as temporary guardian and 
conservator. 
Leon and Margaret moved to 
Longmont, Colorado, in early May 1999. 
Also, on May 6, the county court 
authorized the sale of Leon's property in 
Lincoln, where Leon and Margaret had 
been living, pursuant to the purchase 
option executed in July 1998. On July 12, 
1999, the county court noted that 
settlement negotiations were progressing, 
so the case was set for trial on August 31. 
At a later hearing regarding the allowance 
of attorney fees, Roger Cox, one of 
Raymond's attorneys, testified that by 
August 25, the parties had agreed to settle 
the case and that the only thing left to do 
was agree on specific wording in the 
drafted settlement agreement. Cox stated 
that on August 26, Cox was informed that 
Davis had filed petitions for the 
appointment of a conservator and a 
guardian in a Boulder County, Colorado, 
court on August 20 and that the settlement 
was probably off. The petitions for 
guardian and conservator in the Colorado 
court were both signed by Leon. 
A hearing on the issue whether the 
proceedings should be transferred to 
Colorado was held on September 22, 
1999, in the county court for Lancaster 
County. The county court determined that 
the guardianship proceeding should be 
transferred to Colorado but that the 
conservatorship proceeding should stay in 
Nebraska. 
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The parties eventually filed a joint 
stipulation for settlement on January 28, 
2000, agreeing that McHenry and Davis 
should be appointed as coconservators 
for Leon. On February 28, the county 
court found, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that a conservator should be 
appointed for Leon and that there were 
no less restrictive alternatives available. 
The county court also found the joint 
stipulation for settlement to be fair and 
reasonable. The agreement essentially 
gave Davis control of the day-to-day 
spending with respect to Leon and gave 
McHenry control over how Leon's assets 
should be invested in the event the 
coconservators disagreed as to 
investment of the assets. The final 
inventory of Leon's estate totaled 
$841,607.80. 
On April 7, 2000, Raymond filed a 
petition for attorney fees incurred as the 
petitioner in this matter in the amount of 
$28,422.02. Briefs in opposition to the 
payment of fees were filed on behalf of 
Leon by his attorney as well as by Davis 
as coconservator. Leon's brief argued 
that Raymond's attorney's services were 
not required in this matter because Leon 
had previously appointed a power of 
attorney to provide assistance in the 
future. 
It was established at the hearing on the 
issue of attorney fees that Raymond 
initially hired the firm of Harding, Shultz 
& Downs and that there was never an 
express agreement between that firm and 
Leon. Further, Cox, an attorney with the 
Harding, Shultz & Downs law firm, 
testified that as of the date of the hearing, 
Raymond had paid the firm $20,000 
toward the $28,422.02 incurred by the 
firm for services the firm had rendered in 
this matter. 
The county court determined that 
Raymond was not entitled to attorney 
fees. The court cited In re Guardianship 
& Conservatorship of Tucker, 9 Neb. 
App. 17, 606 N.W.2d 868 (2000), for the 
proposition that attorney claims for 
professional sendees must be based upon 
a contract of employment made with the 
person to be charged. The county court 
then found that there was never an 
express or implied contract between 
Leon and the attorneys employed by 
Raymond. Therefore, the court ruled that 
the attorney fees were not to be paid 
from Leon's estate. Raymond filed this 
appeal, and we moved the case to our 
docket pursuant to our authority to 
regulate the dockets of the appellate 
courts. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
On appeal, Raymond assigns that the 
county court erred (1) in ruling that there 
was no express or implied contract 
between Leon and the attorneys 
employed by Raymond and (2) in failing 
to award Raymond his reasonable 
attorney fees to be paid by Leon's 
conservatorship estate. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1,2] An appellate court reviews 
probate cases for error appearing on the 
record made in the county court. In re 
Estate of Myers, 256 Neb. 817, 594 
N.W.2d 563 (1999). See In re 
Guardianship of Zyla, 251 Neb. 163, 555 
N.W.2d 768 (1996). When reviewing 
questions of law, an appellate court has 
an obligation to resolve the question 
independently of the conclusion reached 
by the trial court. Mertz v. Pharmacists 
Mut. Ins. Co., 261 Neb. 704, 625 N.W.2d 
197(2001). 
ANALYSIS 
On appeal, Raymond argues that the 
county court should have ordered 
attorney fees to be paid from Leon's 
estate in this case because his attorney's 
actions benefited Leon's estate and 
because there is a uniform course of 
procedure to grant such fees when a 
petitioner in a guardianship and 
conservatorship action is ultimately 
successful Raymond further argues that 
attorney fees are appropriate because the 
petition was ultimately successful, as a 
guardian and co-conservators were 
appointed for Leon. 
[3] The general rule with respect to the 
award of attorney fees under Nebraska 
law has been that attorney fees and 
expenses may be recovered only where 
provided for by statute or when a 
recognized and accepted uniform course 
of procedure has been to allow recovery 
of attorney fees. See Nebraska Nutrients 
v. Shepherd, 261 Neb. 723, 626 N.W.2d 
472 (2001). Raymond argues that 
attorney fees should be paid out of 
Leon's conservatorship estate under this 
general rule. The appellee Davis, on the 
other hand, asserts that there is no 
uniform course of procedure in 
guardianship/conservatorship matters to 
allow attorney fees for petitioner's 
attorneys. Moreover, Davis argues that 
the county court correctly determined 
that there was never an express or 
implied contract between Leon and the 
attorneys employed by Raymond and 
that, therefore, there was no basis for the 
recovery of an attorney fee in this 
conservatorship proceeding. We find that 
when the petitioner's good faith actions 
are a necessary expense to the 
conservatorship estate, attorney fees are 
authorized by statute in Nebraska and are 
compensable under the general rule 
regarding attorney fees. 
While we have never considered the 
precise issue, we are persuaded by the 
rule adopted in other states that costs and 
attorney fees incurred in the good faith 
initiation of conservatorship proceedings 
constitute necessaries for the support or 
benefit of the protected person such that 
payment of reasonable costs incurred 
may be assessed against the protected 
person's estate. See, In re Estate of 
Bayers, 295 Mont. 89, 983 P.2d 339 
(1999); In re Dunn, 239 N.C. 378, 79 
S.E.2d 921 (1954); Penney v. Pritchard 
& McCall, 255 Ala. 13, 49 So. 2d 782 
(1950); Carney v. Aicklen, 587 S.W.2d 
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507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); In re Estate 
and Guardianship of Vermeersch, 15 
Ariz. App. 315,488 P.2d 671 (1971); In 
re Estate of Sherwood, 56 111. App. 2d 
334, 206 N.E.2d 304 (1965); In re 
Bundy, 44 Cal. App. 466, 186 P. 811 
(1919). 
The rationale supporting the rule is 
that in guardianship/conservatorship 
cases, the applicant most often acts for 
and on behalf of one who is unable to act 
or care for himself or herself. See, In re 
Dunn, supra; In re Bundy, supra. Thus, 
the filing of the petition and the hearing 
thereon are indispensable steps in the 
preservation of the protected person's 
estate. See, In re Bundy, supra; In re 
Estate and Guardianship of Vermeersch, 
supra. It is recognized that when an 
individual is in need of physical or 
financial protection, the law must in 
many instances think and act for him or 
her. See, In re Dunn, supra; In re Bundy, 
supra. The state and society have a 
significant interest in bringing the estate 
of individuals in need of protection under 
the vigil of the county court. See In re 
Estate and Guardianship of Vermeersch, 
supra. See, also, Penney v. Pritchard & 
McCall, supra. The court, as general 
conservator of the rights of persons in 
need of protection, is dependent upon 
applications being filed by interested 
persons so that the court may assume 
control of the estate and preserve it for 
the protected person. See In re Bundy, 
supra. 
[4] Further, we note that an action to 
appoint a conservator is not an 
adversarial proceeding, but, rather, is a 
proceeding to promote the best interests 
of the person for whom the 
conservatorship is sought. A 
conservatorship action is uniquely 
nonadversarial in that everyone involved, 
including the petitioner and the court, is 
presumably interested in protecting the 
interest of the person for whom the 
conservatorship is sought. See Neb. Rev. 
Stat. § 30-2630 (Reissue 1995) 
(conservator may be appointed if trial 
court is satisfied by clear and convincing 
evidence that (1) person is unable to 
manage his or her property effectively 
and (2) person has property which will be 
wasted or dissipated unless proper 
management is provided or that funds are 
needed for support of person and that 
protection is necessary to obtain or 
provide funds). Therefore, in a 
conservatorship proceeding, the interest 
to be considered by the court and the 
principles to be applied are quite unlike 
those in an ordinary litigation case. 
[5] Thus, we cannot agree with the 
appellee that the county court lacked 
power to assess the costs of the 
conservatorship proceeding and the 
petitioner's attorney fees against the 
alleged protected person's estate. In 
Nebraska, under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 
30-2654(a)(2) (Reissue 1995), a 
"conservator is to expend or distribute 
sums reasonably necessary for the 
support, education, care or benefit of the 
protected person." Clearly, the cost of 
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initiating a good faith petition for the 
appointment of a guardian or 
conservator, where such appointment is 
determined to be in the best interests of 
the protected person, constitutes a 
necessary expenditure on behalf of the 
protected person. We hold that such 
costs, including reasonable attorney fees, 
are compensable out of the 
conservatorship estate as they are 
necessary expenditures on behalf of the 
protected person. Therefore, attorney 
fees are authorized by statute when a 
good faith petition results in the 
appointment of a conservator and, under 
the general rule regarding attorney fees 
in Nebraska, may be recovered from 
Leon's estate. See § 30-2654. 
In the instant case, the trial court and 
the parties agreed that the appointment of 
coconservators was in the best interests 
of Leon, and the parties all agreed that 
the appointment of a guardian was in 
Leon's best interests. However, in 
denying Raymond's petition for attorney 
fees, the county court cited In re 
Guardianship & Conservatorship of 
Tucker, 9 Neb. App. 17, 606 N.W.2d 868 
(2000), and focused on whether there 
was a contractual relationship between 
Leon and the law firm Raymond hired to 
assist him in filing the petition for the 
appointment of a guardian and 
conservator. The county court stated that 
"it is apparent to me that the Courts of 
this State are taking the position that 
attorney claims for professional services 
must rest upon a contract of employment 
made with the person sought to be 
charged." 
The Court of Appeals, in In re 
Guardianship & Conservatorship of 
Tucker, supra, granted attorney fees 
based upon an implied contract between 
the petitioner's attorney and the protected 
person. The court, however, did not hold 
that a contractual relationship was 
required in a guardianship and 
conservatorship case in order to grant 
attorney fees to a successful petitioner. In 
fact, many situations arise in which an 
incapacitated individual is in dire need of 
a guardian or conservator, yet he or she 
contests the 
guardianship/conservatorship 
proceeding. In such a case, a successful 
petitioner who filed an action in good 
faith would not be entitled to attorney 
fees under an express or implied contract 
theory because the protected person 
would not have accepted the benefit of 
the attorney's services by agreeing to the 
protection. Basing the decision whether 
to grant attorney fees on whether an 
incapacitated person, who has been 
adjudged unfit to manage his or her own 
affairs, has expressly or impliedly 
entered into a fee agreement is generally 
not sound policy, given that the 
incapacitated person's ability to 
understand and enter into such 
agreements is often the very question at 
issue in conservatorship proceedings. 
Such a rule can only have the effect of 
encouraging manipulation of 
incapacitated persons in order to secure 
an "agreement" that would make fees 
recoverable. This would be contrary to 
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the interest of the protected person and 
inconsistent with the nature of the 
proceedings. 
We determine that the existence of an 
express or implied contractual 
relationship between a petitioner's 
attorney and an incapacitated person is 
not a prerequisite for the award of 
attorney fees in a guardianship or 
conservatorship proceeding. Therefore, 
because the county court erred in 
concluding that an express or implied 
contract between Leon and Raymond's 
attorneys was necessary prior to the 
award of attorney fees, we reverse the 
order of the county court. 
Based on the circumstances of the 
instant case, we conclude that the costs, 
including reasonable attorney fees, of 
initiating and prosecuting proceedings 
that ultimately resulted in the 
appointment of a guardian and 
co-conservators for Leon should be 
compensable out of the conservatorship 
estate as they are necessary expenditures 
for the benefit of the protected person. 
See § 30-2654. Because the county court 
did not address the issue of the amount 
of attorney fees in this case, we remand 
the matter to the county court to 
determine a reasonable fee to be paid 
from the conservatorship estate to 
Raymond's attorneys. We remand the 
cause for a fee determination, keeping in 
mind that the county court has seen and 
heard the witnesses and is familiar with 
the background and intricacies of these 
proceedings. Moreover, the county court 
expressly noted in its August 8, 2000, 
order that there was sufficient evidence 
presented to the court to allow it to make 
a determination as to the amount of 
attorney fees without further hearing. 
[6,7] We note that when an attorney 
fee is authorized, the amount of the fee is 
addressed to the discretion of the trial 
court. See In re Estate of Stull, 261 Neb. 
319, 622 N.W.2d 886 (2001). To 
determine proper and reasonable fees, it 
is necessary for the court to consider the 
nature of the proceeding, the time and 
labor required, the novelty and difficulty 
of the questions raised, the skill required 
to properly conduct the case, the 
responsibility assumed, the care and 
diligence exhibited, the result of the suit, 
the character and standing of the 
attorney, and the customary charges of 
the bar for similar services. See Schirber 
v. State, 254 Neb. 1002, 581 N.W.2d 873 
(1998). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse 
the order of the county court and remand 
the cause to the county court for a 
determination of reasonable attorney fees 
to be paid to Raymond's attorneys out of 
the conservatorship estate. 
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The Honorable Christine M. Durham 
Chief Justice, Utah Supreme Court 
Presiding Officer, Utah Judicial Council 
P.O. Box 140210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0210 
Dear Chief Justice Durham: 
On behalf of the Judicial Council's ad hoc Committee on Probate Law and Procedure, 1 am 
pleased to submit this final report with recommendations. 
The Judicial Council's charge to the committee was very broad, encompassing nearly any 
part of probate policy that we decided needs attention. We focused immediately on protective 
proceedings m the district court. Yet, as narrowly as we have focused our attention, the topic is 
complex enough to have required all of our time. So the work on the probate code and the needs 
of the elderly remains unfinished 
We offer extensive recommendations in the area of guardianships and conservatorships. This 
package combines necessary changes to statutes and rules, improved forms and education, and 
nothing less than a cultural shift in the way we think of guardianships and conservatorships. 
The appointment of a guardian or a conservator removes from a person a large part of what it 
means to be an adult; the ability to make decisions for oneself. The appointment often comes 
later in one's life, but not always. Younger adults incapacitated by accident, disease or 
developmental limitations also are affected. We terminate this fundamental and basic right with 
all the procedural rigor of processing a traffic ticket. 
> The definition of incapacity is essentially the same as it was 100 years ago. 
> The respondent is sometimes not represented. 
> The respondent is sometimes represented by a lawyer recruited by the petitioner's lawyer. 
> The respondent's lawyer sometimes acts as guardian ad litem rather than advocate. 
> There is little or no procedure to elicit and challenge evidence. 
> The evidence itself is cursory. 
> Once appointed, guardians are often given the authority of a conservator whether or not 
that authority is warranted by the respondent's circumstances. 
> Statutes claim to prefer limited authority for guardians and conservators, but fail to 
describe less restrictive alternatives. 
149 East 100 South / Price, Utah 84501 / {435)636-3400 / Fax <435) 637-7349 
The Honorable Christine M. Durham 
February 23,2009 
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> Plenary appointments are common with little evidence to support the need. 
> There is no planning to help the respondent live life as independently as possible. 
> There is no regulation of professional guardians. 
> There is little education or assistance for family guardians. 
> There is little training forjudges and clerks. 
The Deseret News recently reported that when it "went to court to watch guardianship 
proceedings, it was startling how quickly someone could be stripped of all decisionmaking 
rights. Once the paperwork is in order, 'hearings' average seconds, not minutes." 
Utah is not unique. Quite the contrary. Most states have let slip this important area of the law. 
We classify guardianships and conservatorships as probate cases, but they have more in 
common with family law cases than with the intergenerational transfer of property. They share 
many of the emotional and financial issues of a divorce. The court defines future family 
relationships. We offer our recommendations with this idea in mind. 
Our recommendations retain the basic concept of the Uniform Guardianship and Protective 
Proceedings Act to avoid contested litigation whenever possible. But uncontested does not mean 
automatic. We recommend a much more fully developed process to better protect the respondent 
and to present better evidence on which to make a measured intervention. 
We have three recommendations that require public money: 
> attorney fees and expenses of indigent respondents; 
> interpreting guardianship and conservatorship proceedings and translating forms and 
materials for non-English speaking respondents; and 
> a coordinator to recruit and train volunteers to serve as court visitors. 
We recognize that the significant decline in state revenue means there will be no general fund 
appropriation for programs such as these. Nevertheless, we make the recommendations hoping 
that funding may someday be available. In the meantime, we recommend that the courts and the 
Bar pursue funds that might be available through and Justice for All, the Utah Bar Foundation, 
grants, and other sources. And we recommend that the Utah Access to Justice Council and the 
Utah State Bar organize and support a panel of trained, pro bono attorneys. 
Beyond these funds, we recognize that our recommendations require a particularized inquiry 
into the respondent's circumstances. The inquiry replaces traditional subjective judgments about 
the reasonableness of the respondent's behavior with a more focused decision about the 
respondent's capabilities and limitations. And all of that translates into more time. 
We recommend that this report be presented to judges, lawyers, guardians, conservators, 
health care providers, service providers and other stakeholders for critical analysis which can be 
integrated into legislation and rules for 2010. 
The Honorable Christine M. Durham 
February 23,2009 
Page Three 
I want to thank the committee members and staff for their dedicated time and attention to the 
grand concepts and the many, many details of a program of this scope. We were well served. 
Finally, I want to thank Judge Sheila McCleve for her work as the first chair of the 
committee. Circumstances meant that she was not able to remain as chair, but her initial 
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(2) Summary of recommendations 
> Modernize the definition of incapacity to focus on functional limitations. Require 
proof of incapacity (among other grounds) to appoint a conservator or a guardian. 
> Enforce the requirement to prove incapacity by clear and convincing evidence. 
> Consider in every case ordering that the respondent be evaluated by a physician 
or psychiatrist and by a court visitor. Adopt uniform forms on which to report the 
results of a clinical and social evaluation. 
> Appoint a lawyer to represent the respondent in conservatorship cases, as is now 
done in guardianship cases. 
> Require the respondent's lawyer to be from a roster of qualified lawyers 
maintained by the Utah State Bar. Establish minimum qualifications for the roster. 
Appropriate funds to pay the respondent's lawyer if the respondent cannot afford 
a lawyer and does not qualify for existing programs. 
> Respondent's lawyer should be an independent and zealous advocate, rather 
than a guardian ad litem. 
> If the court determines that a petition resulted in an order beneficial to the 
respondent, and if funds are available in the estate, permit the court or 
conservator to pay the reasonable and necessary expenses, costs and attorney 
fees from the estate. 
> Require the respondent to attend all hearings unless the respondent waives that 
right or unless the court finds that attending the hearing would harm the 
respondent. Take steps to accommodate the special needs of respondents at 
court hearings. 
> Appoint a certified court interpreter if the respondent does not understand 
English. 
> Refer protective proceedings to mediation. The mediation community should 
develop training for mediating protective proceedings, including especially the 
skills and accommodations necessary when mediating with a person of potentially 
diminished capacity. 
> Consider appointing a commissioner to hear probate matters, including 
guardianship and conservatorship cases, in districts with sufficient caseload. 
> With a few exceptions, classify guardianship and conservatorship records as 
private. 
> Require the petitioner to show that alternatives less restrictive than appointing a 
fiduciary have failed or that they would not be effective. Presume, rather than 
favor, limited guardianships. Adopt laws, procedures and forms that make limited 
guardianships a realistic option. 
> Require the fiduciary to use the "substituted judgment" standard for 
decisionmaking on behalf of the respondent except in those limited circumstances 
in which the "best interest" standard may be used. 
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> Adopt special procedures for temporary emergency appointments. 
> Eliminate "school guardianships." 
> Permit a person to nominate, rather than appoint, a guardian for self, a child or a 
spouse, and to petition to confirm the nomination during one's lifetime. 
> Require the fiduciary to write a management plan and file it with the court. 
> Appoint a coordinator to develop a program of volunteer court visitors. 
> Regulate the profession of guardian through the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing. Require private guardians and conservators to disclose 
any criminal convictions that have not been expunged. 
> Develop training for lawyers, judges and court staff. Develop outreach and 
assistance to guardians, conservators, respondents and the public. 
> Unify the laws regulating guardians and conservators except where there is sound 
policy to differentiate them. 
(3) Introduction 
The general state of guardianships and conservatorships may depend upon whom 
one talks to. Although a bit dated, one court group, while recognizing that abuses occur, 
notes that, "the great majority of guardianships ... are initiated by people of goodwill 
who are in good faith seeking to assist and protect the respondent. ... Furthermore, in 
the great majority of guardianship proceedings, the outcome serves the best interests of 
the respondent and an appointed guardian acts in the respondent's best interests." On 
the other side of the coin, empirical researchers from a 
similar time period, while noting the benefits of 
guardianships, report that "guardianship ... often 
benefits] the guardian more than the ward and [can] 
hasten institutionalization for the protected person. ... 
[Hearings [are] extremely brief, [do] not rely upon 
medical testimony, and often [result] in plenary orders 
The committee members' experience supports both views. Many of the conclusions 
we reach are based on our observations and experience. We have no statistics to offer 
because, like most jurisdictions, other than the number of petitions filed, we record little 
in a systematic way. In how many cases is the respondent excused from the trial? In 
how many cases is the respondent not represented by counsel? Not evaluated by a 
physician or psychiatrist? By a court visitor? In the end, we do not know. Based on our 
1
 National Probate Court Standards, Commission on National Probate Court Standards and Advisory 
Committee on interstate Guardianships, Section 3.3 (1993). Hereafter cited as National Probate Court 
Standards 
2
 Clinical Evidence in Guardianship of Older Adults Is Inadequate: Findings From a Tri-State Study, 
The Gerontologist Vol. 47, No. 5 (2007) by Jennifer Moye, PhD, Stacey Wood, PhD, Barry Edelstein, 
PhD, Jorge C. Armesto, PhD, Emily H. Bower, MS, Julie A. Harrison, MA, and Erica Wood, JD. pp 604-
605, citing earlier studies. Hereafter cited as "Moye." 
Appointing a guardian or 
conservator legally changes 
an adult into a child once 
more, and, as with a child, 
someone else decides those 
questions. 
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experience we know which observations in the national literature and in the committee 
testimony ring true. 
Appointing a guardian or a conservator is one the most significant interventions by a 
court into a person's life. Like a prison sentence or commitment to a mental health 
facility, the appointment takes from that person the freedom to decide for oneself many, 
and often times all, of the large and small issues we face every day. Appointing a 
guardian or conservator legally changes an adult into a child once more, and, as with a 
child, someone else decides those questions.3 
Ideally, "procedural protections work to ensure that putative wards are fully informed, 
properly evaluated, zealously defended, that the issues are fully developed and heard, 
and that an intervention is finely tuned to the needs and preferences of individuals."4 Yet 
those protections are applied inconsistently at best. 
The law requires that the respondent be represented, but that does not always 
happen. If the respondent is represented, the attorney might have been recruited by the 
petitioner's attorney. Or might fulfill the role of a guardian ad litem rather than advocate. 
The standard to declare someone incapacitated is clear and convincing evidence, but 
clinical evidence is usually modest. Procedures are cursory. The Deseret News reports 
that "'hearings3 average seconds, not minutes."5 
The guardian is usually granted plenary authority over the respondent with little or no 
exploration of the respondent's capabilities and in the face of laws that prefer limited 
authority. Annual reports by guardians and conservators have been required for many 
years, but only recently has the district court enforced the requirement. The court has 
no way to verify the truth of those reports, except 
by objections from the respondent's family, 
which might be uninterested or perhaps does not 
exist. 
This is what we hope to achieve: 
• a deliberate inquiry into the 
limitations and needs of the 
respondent; 
• a measured intervention based on 
those limitations and needs; and 
• oversight to protect the quality of 
life of a respected individual. 
Press reports and official investigations in 
other states have revealed ruined lives and have 
sent fiduciaries to prison.6 Although Utah has so 
far avoided the scandalous headlines in which a 
fiduciary abuses, neglects or defrauds the 
person s/he is responsible for, there is no reason 
to believe that guardians and conservators in Utah are any less prone to abuse or fraud 
than those in other states whose malfeasance and negligence have been discovered. 
3
 Indeed, under current Utah law, "Absent a specific limitation .... the guardian has the same powers, 
rights, and duties respecting the ward that a parent has respecting the parent's unemancipated minor 
child...." Utah Code Section 75-5-312(2). 
4
 Charles P. Sabatino, Competency: Refining Our Legal Fictions, Older Adults' Decision making and 
the Law 1, 2 (Michael Smyer, K. Warner Schaie & Marshall B. Kapp eds., Springer Publg. 1996), pp 20-
21. 
5
 http://deseretnews.com/article/l5143.705265008.0Q.html?pq=2 Deseret News, November 24, 
2008. Who should make choices for the elderly? By Elaine Jarvik and Lois M. Collins. 
6
 See e.g., stories linked at: http://www.citibav.com/cai-
bin/directorv.pl?etvpe=odp&passurl=/Societv/lssues/\/iolence and Abuse/Elder/Guardianships/. 
Most petitions are filed in good faith to appoint a person of goodwill who will serve in 
the best interests of the protected person, but we rely primarily on good faith and 
goodwill to achieve that result. Good intentions and lack of oversight have, over time, 
led to summary proceedings that presume to protect the respondent from others and 
from self, but that offer little real protection from the process itself or from those we put 
in charge of the respondent's life. And even one case in which the fiduciary takes 
advantage of the person s/he is supposed to take care of is one too many. Summary 
proceedings and trust in the capability and goodwill of guardians and conservators are 
easy, but they deny many respondents the level of independence they may be capable 
of. 
To be sure, there are cases in which the respondent is so clearly incapacitated that 
substantial medical evidence would be costly and without purpose. There are cases in 
which the respondent is so fully incapacitated that plenary control over that person is 
the most appropriate arrangement. But not in all cases. Many cases present nuances 
that need to be explored and capacities that need to be protected. 
In Utah, as in most states and in national standards, guardianships and 
conservatorships are classified as probate cases, yet today they have more in common 
with family law than with probate law. Those who need protection or help are often 
seniors but not always. The family faces the same emotional and financial drain faced in 
divorce. Although we do not intend to reclassify an entire area of the law, we 
recommend significant changes to many statutes and rules with the dynamics of family 
relationships in mind. 
This is an area that is ripe for collective action. There are roles here for all three 
branches of government, the Bar, the health care community, and even the larger public 
community. This is what we hope to achieve: 
> a deliberate inquiry into the limitations and needs of the respondent; 
> a measured intervention based on those limitations and needs; and 
> oversight to protect the quality of life of a respected individual. 
(4) Definition of "incapacity" 
(a) Inadequacy of current definition 
Merely defining the term "incapacity" is a complex matter. Is it a legal standard or 
medical? Is it cognitive or functional? What factors I | 
are relevant? Can a person lack capacity for some I The keystone to the entire I 
purposes and have capacity for others? Yet we must I protective arch is not that much ' 
agree on a definition because the appointment of a I different from the definition at 
guardian or conservator7 rests upon the finding that I the time of statehood. | 
a person is incapacitated. • 
Current Utah law permits the appointment of a conservator if the respondent "is unable to manage 
the person's property and affairs effectively for reasons such as mental illness, mental deficiency, 
physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, confinement, detention by a foreign 
power, or disappearance...." Utah Code Section 75-5-401(2). Except for confinement, detention and 
disappearance as reasons to appoint a conservator, this definition is essentially the same as incapacity 
7 
The current statutes governing guardians and conservators were enacted in 1975 
and are based on the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act of 1968. 
Medical care for and everyday functioning of people well into later life has improved a 
lot in 40 years, but our definition of "incapacity," the keystone to the entire protective 
arch, is not that much different from the definition at the time of statehood. 
Utah law defines an incapacitated person as: 
any person who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, 
physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or 
other cause, except minority, to the extent of lacking sufficient 
understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions. 
Utah Code Section 75-1-201(22). 
Although the statute has never been amended to reflect the decision, our Supreme 
Court has added that the lack of understanding or capacity to make or communicate 
decisions must be so impaired that the person is unable to care for personal needs or 
safety to such an extent that illness or harm may occur. 
We hold that ... a determination that an adult cannot make 'responsible 
decisions concerning his person' and is therefore incompetent, may be 
made only if the putative protected person's decisionmaking process is so 
impaired that he is unable to care for his personal safety or unable to 
attend to and provide for such necessities as food, shelter, clothing, and 
medical care, without which physical illness or harm may occur. 
In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Utah 1981). 
In other words, poor choices alone - even choices that a reasonable person would 
describe as irresponsible - do not make one incapacitated. 
The Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act of 1997 moves away 
from the traditional "physical illness" and "mental illness" found in the 1968 Uniform Act 
to focus on the ability to receive and evaluate information or to make or communicate 
decisions.8 
Many states and the National Probate Court Standards have moved away from 
cognition and decisionmaking to focus on functional limitations: What can the 
respondent do and not do? In this approach, cognition and executive functioning remain 
important, perhaps more important than most other functioning, but, in the end, they are 
simply functions in which the respondent may face limitations. This definition inherently 
answers the question: Can a person lack capacity for some purposes and retain 
capacity for others? At least potentially, the answer is "yes," depending on the nature of 
the functional limitations. 
This approach requires a particularized inquiry into the respondent's circumstances, 
which necessarily is more difficult and time-consuming. The inquiry replaces traditional 
for the appointment of a guardian. Later in this report, we recommend using one standard for both 
appointments. 
8
 Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act of 1997, Section 102(5). Hereafter cited as 
1997 Uniform Act. 
subjective judgments about the reasonableness of the respondent's behavior with a 
more focused decision about the respondent's capabilities and limitations.9 
Whether the determination of incapacity is a medical 
or legal decision is more easily concluded. Given the 
consequences of the decision, it has to be a legal 
decision judicially made. The decision might be heavily 
influenced by medical evidence and opinions, but the 
decision itself remains a legal consequence. 
Poor choices alone - even 
choices that a reasonable 
person would describe as 
irresponsible - do not make 
one incapacitated. 
Choices that are linked with 
lifetime values are rational 
for an individual even if 
outside the norm. 
(b) Recommended definition 
By evaluating our current statute and case law, the 
definitions in other states and those recommended in 
national standards, and by considering similar concepts 
from Utah law in other applications, we recommend the 
following definition of incapacity for the appointment of either a guardian or a 
conservator: 
"Incapacity" means a judicial determination that an adult's ability, even 
with assistance, to 
(a) receive and evaluate information, 
(b) make and communicate decisions, 
(c) provide for necessities such as food, shelter, clothing, health care or 
safety, 
(d) carry out the activities of daily living, or 
(e) manage his or her property 
is so impaired that illness or physical or financial harm may occur. 
Incapacity is a judicial decision, not a medical decision, and is measured 
by functional limitations. 
Although not mentioned in the Boyer holding, we recommend adding "financial 
harm" to the definition of Incapacity" so that one definition can serve as the grounds for 
appointing a guardian or a conservator, rather than the separate but similar definitions 
we have now. The importance of this small change can be lost in the enormity of the 
project. Historically, appointment of a conservator has not been a determination of the 
respondent's incapacity.10 With this change, a conservator cannot be appointed unless 
the respondent is incapacitated. 
The grounds for appointing a conservator should also include that the respondent is 
missing, detained, or unable to return to the United States, and the person to be 
protected should be able to voluntarily request the appointment. But the definition of 
9
 Judicial Determination of Capacity of Older Adults in Guardianship Proceedings, American Bar 
Association Commission on Law and Aging - American Psychological Association (2006). Hereafter cited 
as Judicial Determination of Capacity. 
10
 Utah Code Section 75-5-408(2); 1997 Uniform Act Section 409(d). 
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incapacity as grounds to appoint a guardian or conservator should be the same for both 
offices. 
(c) Factors 
We propose several factors that the judge might consider when determining the 
respondent's capacity. Most will be familiar to those experienced in protective 
proceedings. 
(1) whether the respondent's condition, limitations and level of functioning 
leave the respondent at risk of: 
(a) his or her property being dissipated; 
(b) being unable to provide for his or her support, or for the support of individuals 
who are entitled to the respondent's support; 
(c) being financially exploited; 
(d) being abused or neglected, including self injurious behavior; or 
(e) having his or her rights violated; 
(2) whether the respondent has a physical or mental illness, disability, 
condition, or syndrome and the prognosis; 
(3) whether the respondent is able to evaluate the consequences of 
alternative decisions; 
(4) whether the respondent can manage the activities of daily living 
through training, education, support services, mental and physical health 
care, medication, therapy, assistants, assistive devices, or other means 
that the respondent will accept; 
(5) the nature and extent of the demands placed on the respondent by the 
need for care; 
(6) the nature and extent of the demands placed on the respondent by his 
or her property; 
(7) the consistency of the respondent's behavior with his or her long-
standing values, preferences and patterns of behavior, and 
(8) other relevant factors. 
We want to focus on one factor in particular: the respondent's values, preferences 
and patterns of behavior. Although it comes late in the list, it is perhaps one of the more 
important factors. Two brief quotes from the benchbook Judicial Determination of 
Capacity of Older Adults in Guardianship Proceedings by the ABA indicate why. 
Capacity reflects the consistency of choices with the individual's life 
patterns, expressed values, and preferences. Choices that are linked with 
lifetime values are rational for an individual even if outside the norm."11 
Each of the above factors must be weighed in view of the individual's 
history of choices and expressed values and preferences. Do not mistake 
11
 Judicial Determination of Capacity, p 5. 
10 
eccentricity for diminished capacity. Actions that may appear to stem from 
cognitive problems may in fact be rational if based on lifetime beliefs or 
values. Long-held choices must be respected, yet weighed in view of new 
medical information that could increase risk, such as a diagnosis of 
dementia.12 
(5) Evidence of incapacity 
(a) Inadequacy of current evidence 
On what basis should the court decide 
whether a person is incapacitated? 
Although the statute requires only that the 
judge be "satisfied"13 that the respondent is 
incapacitated, the actual standard - clear 
and convincing evidence - is well settled. 
This is the law from the Utah Supreme 
Court14, and it is in keeping with the 1997 
Uniform Act.15 
Yet from the experience of committee 
members, it often does not require very 
much evidence to satisfy that high standard. In an empirical study of guardianship cases 
in Colorado, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania,16 researchers found: 
> Written evaluations were filed in all but one case in Massachusetts and Colorado, 
and in 75% of the cases in Pennsylvania. 
> Evaluations were submitted by physicians in 98% of the Massachusetts cases 
and in 88% of the Pennsylvania cases. In Colorado, clinical reports were 
submitted by physicians (57%), psychologists (27%), other professionals (9%), or 
a multidisciplinary team (6%) consistent with the 1997 Uniform Act. 
> The average length of clinical reports in Colorado as 781 words, 244 words in 
Pennsylvania and 83 words in Massachusetts. 
> 75% of the Massachusetts reports were hand written, and 65% of these had at 
least some portion that was illegible. In Pennsylvania and Colorado, reports were 
almost always typed. 
That 83 words, some of which are illegible, might be offered as clear and convincing 
evidence is beyond belief. 
A judge should never rely exclusively on a clinical evaluation secured by the 
petitioner. "A clinical evaluation secured by the petitioner is for the purpose of 
supporting the petition and may lack attention to the individual's areas of strength, a 
12
 Judicial Determination of Capacity, p 12. 
13
 Utah Code Section 75-5-304(1) 
14
 In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085,1092 (Utah 1981). 
151997 Uniform Act, Sections 311 and 401 
16
 Moye, p 608. 
The danger of relying exclusively on an 
evaluation arranged by the petitioner is 
shown by physicians' disagreement about 
determining capacity. 
In other words, physicians consistently 
diagnosed the obvious subjects at either 
end of the spectrum and disagreed about 
the subjects in the middle for whom the 
diagnosis was a closer question. 
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prognosis for improvement, or important situational factors. An independent assessment 
can flesh out skeletal or purely one-sided information."17 
The danger of relying exclusively on an evaluation arranged by the petitioner is 
shown by physicians' disagreement about determining capacity. In a study reported in 
1997,18 "physicians experienced in competency assessment showed ... virtually 
unanimous judgment agreement [98%] for older normal controls but dramatically lower 
... agreement [56%] for patients with miid [Alzheimer's disease]." "Overall pairwise 
physician ratings showed excellent percentage judgment agreement for the control and 
a severely demented AD patient but lower percentage agreement for patients with mild 
to moderate [Alzheimer's disease]." In other words, physicians consistently diagnosed 
the obvious subjects at either end of the spectrum and disagreed about the subjects in 
the middle for whom the diagnosis was a closer question. 
(b) Recommendation 
The American Bar Association Commission on Law and Aging, in conjunction with 
I I the American Psychological Association and the 
I A fuller picture of the I National College of Probate Judges, has prepared a 
I respondent - gained through I template for a clinical evaluation of the respondent.19 
I more complete evidence - is I yVe have studied it and expanded upon it with 
I desperately needed. I suggestions from other sources. It is extensive. Parts 
• • of it may not be relevant in some cases, and we 
recommend that those be excised. The judge should not be required to order the 
respondent to submit to a clinical evaluation, but we recommend its consideration in 
every case. 
Although Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 35 governs the examination of a party when 
the party's "mental or physical condition ... is in controversy," we recommend that a 
special rule govern the respondent's examination in protective proceedings. Rule 35 
was written for personal injury cases and contains provisions inappropriate to these 
circumstances. 
The Wingspan Conference recommends that "the pre-hearing process include a 
separate court investigator or visitor, who must identify the respondent's wants, needs, 
and values."20 The 1997 Uniform Act also recommends that a court visitor be required. 
Utah law provides that the court may appoint a visitor to interview the respondent, but 
there is no requirement to do so, unless the petitioner proposes that the respondent be 
excluded from the hearing. By omitting this step, the court denies itself critical 
independent information with which to assess the respondent's functional abilities and 
limitations, values and history, all of which affect the fiduciary's appointment and 
authority. 
Judicial Determination of Capacity, p 8. 
18
 Journal of the American Geriatrics Society - Volume 45, Issue 4, pages 453-457 (April 1997). 
19
 Judicial Determination of Capacity, pp 25-32. 
20
 Wingspan - The Second National Guardianship Conference, Recommendations, Recommendation 
30, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 601 (2002). Hereafter cited as Wingspan Conference. 
211997 Uniform Act Section 305. 
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An evaluation by a multidisciplinary team, as in Colorado, may be beyond the means 
of nearly all families, but we recommend at least the perspective of a court visitor in 
addition to that of the clinician. Evaluation by a medical professional will probably occur 
in a clinical setting, but evaluation by the court visitor should, whenever possible, be in 
the respondent's usual environment and with all due consideration for his or her privacy 
and dignity.22 
Evidence from family, friends, colleagues, religious ministers, care providers and 
others will provide the judge with information about who this respondent is, and will 
enable the judge to decide, not just the respondent's capacity, but also the details of the 
guardianship plan. A fuller picture of the respondent - gained through more complete 
evidence - is desperately needed. 
(6) Respondent's lawyer 
Under Utah law, the court must appoint a lawyer to represent a respondent in a 
guardianship proceeding23 and may do so in a conservatorship proceeding24 unless the 
respondent has a lawyer of his or her own choice. Given the importance of the 
proceedings, it is critical that the respondent have a lawyer. 
(a) Current availability of lawyers 
Legal Aid Society of Salt Lake and Utah Legal Services are the primary free legal 
service providers in Utah. Legal Aid Society of Salt Lake is limited to Salt Lake County. 
Utah Legal Services represents clients throughout the state. Both represent clients in a 
variety of cases for which the client must income qualify or meet other eligibility 
requirements. 
• • With intermittent grant funding, the Legal Aid 
I Given the importance of the I Society of Salt Lake represents for free the 
I proceedings, it is critical that I respondent in a guardianship petition in Salt Lake 
I the respondent have a lawyer. I County if the respondent meets the income 
• ' guidelines. There is no age restriction. 
Utah Legal Services, by contract with many of the counties under the Older 
Americans Act,25 represents for free the respondent in a guardianship petition if the 
respondent is 60 or older and if there is sufficient funding through the local Area Agency 
on Aging. There is no income-qualification under the Older Americans Act, but 
resources are limited, so the local Area Agencies on Aging find legitimate ways to 
prioritize services. If there is not sufficient funding through the local Area Agency on 
Aging, Utah Legal Services tries to recruit a lawyer to represent the respondent for free. 
If the respondent is under 60, Utah Legal Services tries to recruit a lawyer to represent 
the respondent for free, but the respondent must meet income guidelines. 
22
 Guardianship, An Agenda for Reform: Recommendations of the National Guardianship Symposium 
and Policy of the American Bar Association. Recommendation lil-B. 13 Mental & Physical Disability L. 
Rep. 271,289 (1989). Hereafter cited as the Wingspread Conference. 
23
 Utah Code Section 75-5-303(2). 
24
 Utah Code Section 75-5-407(1). 
25
 Utah Legal Services is not the exclusive provider. Some counties contract with individual lawyers. 
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Sometimes a respondent will have a lawyer who has represented her or him in 
another matter. The respondent - or perhaps the petitioner on the respondent's behalf-
will seek representation by that lawyer. Sometimes that lawyer may be the "family" 
lawyer, whose interests may be divided between the respondent and the family 
members who are trying to do their best by the respondent. In some cases the 
petitioner's lawyer might recruit a lawyer to represent the respondent. 
We focus on the need for representation of an indigent respondent because that is 
where the need is most acute. But the private bar is doing its share. Private attorneys 
represent respondents and are paid by the respondent in very traditional arrangements. 
Lawyers represent respondents for free or for a reduced charge when recruited by the 
Office of Public Guardian, Utah Legal Services or Legal Aid Society of Salt Lake. 
However, some respondents simply will be missed by the conditional and informal 
arrangements for free legal representation, yet they cannot afford to hire a lawyer. 
Regardless who represents the respondent, the question "Who pays?" is equally 
critical. Utah law provides that if the petition is "without merit," the petitioner pays court 
costs and the respondent's lawyer. Otherwise, the respondent must pay for 
representation, but the respondent often cannot afford an attorney even though s/he 
may not qualify for one of the free Utah programs. 
Finally, how qualified is the lawyer? Lawyers from Legal Aid Society of Salt Lake and 
Utah Legal Services are highly qualified and overworked. Their pro bono recruitment 
efforts usually produce a lawyer qualified for the case, which may run from well-qualified 
for a complex case to well-qualified for simpler, uncontested cases. In the experience of 
committee members, however, and from testimony by lawyers experienced in this area, 
there are many cases in which the respondent's lawyer lacks the qualifications to 
present the respondent's case for capacity or for less restrictive alternatives. 
(b) Recommendation 
The Wingspread Conference recommends that "courts should help develop an 
ongoing system that will ensure effective legal representation of respondents."26 We 
recommend an ambitious program to give real effect to that policy: to ensure in a 
systemic way that respondents are represented by qualified attorneys. 
(i) Conservatorships 
We begin by recommending legislation to require representation for the respondent 
in petitions to appoint a conservator as well as in petitions to appoint a guardian. Utah 
law currently requires representation in the latter case and permits it in the former. The 
reason for the distinction usually involves the explanation that a conservator controls 
only the respondent's property, while a guardian controls the respondent's person. But 
in our society, a person who loses the right to decide how to invest and spend money 
and how to manage property has lost just as much as the person who loses the right to 
vote or to make health care decisions. Representation in conservatorships is just as 
26
 Wingspread Conference. Recommendation IV-D.2 13 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 271, 
295(1989). 
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necessary as in guardianships. Mandatory representation in both types of appointments 
is recommended by the National Probate Court Standards.27 
(ii) Roster 
The Wingspread Conference recommends that "training should be ... required for 
attorneys who wish to be appointed as counsel in guardianship cases...."28 To better 
ensure the qualifications of the lawyer representing the respondent, we recommend 
that, unless the respondent has the lawyer of his or her own choosing, the district court 
appoint a lawyer from a roster of lawyers maintained by the Utah State Bar under the 
authority of the Supreme Court. There should be minimum requirements for training, 
observation, mentoring and continuing education to qualify for the roster. We 
recommend an appropriation to pay for some of the appointments, but all appointments 
should be from the roster, unless the respondent has retained his or her own lawyer. 
The appointment would be, essentially, a rotation: I • 
When a petition in a protective proceeding is filed, the I Training should be required I 
clerk would offer the appointment to the first lawyer in I for attorneys who wish to I 
order on the roster willing to accept assignments in that I be appointed as counsel. | 
county. The lawyer would review the case for conflicts 1 • 
of interest and other factors that might impede the lawyer from independent and zealous 
representation of the respondent. If the lawyer declines the appointment, the clerk 
would offer the appointment to the next lawyer on the roster. Upon accepting the 
appointment, the judge would enter an order appointing the lawyer, and the clerk would 
move the lawyer's name to the bottom of the roster. 
The executive director of the Utah State Bar would maintain and publish a roster of 
lawyers qualified to represent respondents in protective proceedings. A lawyer would be 
added to the list in the order in which s/he certifies to meeting the minimum 
requirements. To qualify for the roster, a lawyer would have to: 
> acquire at least four hours of MCLE or four hours of accredited law school 
education in the law and procedures of protective proceedings; 
> observe, serve as co-counsel, and serve as lead counsel with a mentor 
representing at least one respondent, which may be satisfied under Rule 14-807, 
Law student assistance; and 
> be recommended by one's mentors. 
To be retained on the roster the lawyer would biannually certify to have: 
> acquired at least two hours of MCLE in the law and procedures of protective 
proceedings; and 
> represented at least two indigent respondents. 
Minimum education requirements would be part of and not in addition to existing 
mandatory continuing legal education requirements. If there are not at least two indigent 
respondents to be represented, that requirement would be waived The executive 
National Probate Court Standards Standards 3.3.5 and 3.4.5. 
28
 Wingspread Conference. Recommendation ll-D(2). 13 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 271, 
286(1989) 
15 
director should be able to waive the initial or continuing requirements that show 
competence if the lawyer demonstrates by education and experience proficiency in the 
law and procedures of protective proceedings. 
Even if the respondent has retained a lawyer, the court should have the discretion to 
evaluate the lawyer's qualifications and, if they are found lacking, to appoint someone 
from the roster. 
(Hi) Money 
The Wingspan Conference recommends that "innovative and creative ways be 
developed by which funding sources are categorically directed to guardianship."29 
Finding the money to pay lawyers willing to take assignments is the most difficult part of 
this program. Until the significant recession and the decline in state revenue, we were 
prepared to recommend using public funds to pay lawyers to represent indigent 
respondents who do not qualify for other free programs. Under current economic 
conditions, it would be futile and irresponsible to pursue that objective, but we continue 
to believe the objective is sound. So we describe our proposal but include no 
implementing legislation. We do, however, recommend that the courts and the Bar 
pursue funds that might be available through and Justice for All, the Utah Bar 
Foundation, grants, and other sources. And we recommend that the Utah Access to 
Justice Council and the Utah State Bar organize and support a panel of trained, pro 
bono attorneys. 
The needs of the most indigent are being met - as well as they can be met -
through Legal Aid Society of Salt Lake and Utah Legal Services. We mean not to 
interfere with those services. Utah Legal Services can serve clients whose income is 
below 200% of the federal poverty guideline, so we start our program where they leave 
off. 
We recommend that a lawyer appointed from the roster be paid $50 per hour if the 
respondent's income is between 200% and 300% of the federal poverty guidelines or 
the respondent does not have sufficient income, assets, credit, or other means to pay 
the expenses of legal services without depriving the respondent or the respondent's 
family of food, shelter, clothing, and other necessities. In future years, the $50 per hour 
wage would be adjusted for inflation. Respondents who do not meet this test would pay 
for representation from their estates, based on the ability to pay. 
(iv) Role of respondent's lawyer 
Currently, Utah law distinguishes between the role of the respondent's lawyer in 
guardianship and conservatorship cases. If the petition is to appoint a guardian, the 
lawyer has the traditional duty to "represent" the respondent. If the petition is to 
appoint a conservator, the lawyer "has the powers and duties of a guardian ad litem "^ 
Under the 1997 Uniform Act, the court appoints a lawyer to "represent" the respondent 
in guardianship and conservatorship cases.32 The National Probate Court Standards 
Wingspan Conference. Recommendation 7, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 596 (2002). 
30
 Utah Code Section 75-5-303(2). 
31
 Utah Code Section 75-5-407(2). 
321997 Uniform Act, Section 406 
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recommend that the role of counsel is to advocate for his or her client. The 
Wingspread Conference34 and the Wingspan Conference35 recommend zealous 
advocacy by the respondent's lawyer. 
We concur that the lawyer's role is to represent the respondent independently and 
zealously, just as in any other attorney-client relationship. If the court sees a need for an 
independent voice to represent the respondent's best interests, the court can appoint a 
guardian ad litem. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.14 already advises the lawyer on 
representing a person of diminished capacity,36 and that rule has recently been revised, 
in keeping with the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission and the recommendations of the 
Wingspan Conference,37 to allow the lawyer greater flexibility to take protective action. 
The Probate Code should not interfere with that relationship. 
(7) Petitioner's lawyer 
Utah law does not contain any provisions for petitioner's representation in a 
guardianship proceeding, but permits the petitioner in a conservatorship proceeding to 
charge the cost of his or her lawyer to the respondent's estate.38 There is no sound 
reason to distinguish the two. 
Public policy should encourage family members to serve as guardians as well as 
conservators. Family members know and love the respondent better than anyone. 
Without family members willing to serve, the role falls to the Office of Public Guardian, 
which will increase the cost to the state. The tasks of a guardian and conservator are 
already difficult and time-consuming. The recommendations in this report, although they 
will improve the process, also will increase the cost. 
If a protective proceeding is legally necessary to benefit the respondent, and if the 
respondent's estate is ample enough to provide for the respondent and still pay the 
expense of that process, then the court or conservator should be permitted to pay 
reasonable and necessary fees and expenses from the estate. This is the conclusion of 
the 1997 Uniform Act.39 
If a petition is brought in good faith with the goal of protecting the respondent, and 
the court appoints a guardian or conservator, or enters some other protective order, 
then the petitioner's costs should be paid, if possible, by the respondent's estate. This 
will encourage family members who may hesitate to file a protective proceeding 
because of their own lack of funds. It is far better to expend the estate to protect the 
respondent than to preserve it for the heirs. 
There should be restrictions. The petition should be found to have been brought in 
good faith and prosecuted responsibly. The costs and fees should be reasonable and 
National Probate Court Standards. Standards 3.3.5 and 3.4.5. 
34
 Wingspread Conference. Recommendation ll-C. 13 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 271, 285 
(1989) 
35
 Wingspan Conference. Recommendation 28. 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 601 (2002). 
36
 Rule of Professional Conduct 1.14. See also RPC 1.6, also amended as part of the Ethics 2000 
project to allow disclosure of some information. 
37
 Wingspan Conference. Recommendation 59. 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 607 (2002). 
38
 Utah Code Sections 75-5-414 and 75-5-424(3)(w). 
391997 Uniform Act, Section 417. 
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necessary. The petition should result in the appointment of a guardian or conservator or 
in another order that benefits the respondent. And the respondent's estate must be able 
to afford the expense. 
The Legislature rejected a similar policy in the 2005 General Session,40 but we 
believe it to be a sound policy, and urge the Legislature to reconsider. 
(8) Court process 
(a) The hearing 
Although called a "hearing" by statute, it has all of the trappings of a trial. The 
respondent has the right to be present and to be represented by a lawyer. The 
respondent has the right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. The 
respondent in a guardianship proceeding has the right to a trial by jury,41 although that 
right is seldom exercised, and is not included in the 1997 Uniform Act. Much more 
concerning than the infrequency of trial by jury is the frequency with which the 
respondent is absent from the hearing. The statute establishes the respondent's right to 
be present, but in our experience, the respondent often 
is not. There is no inadequacy in 
due process rights. Rather, 
the inadequacy is in 
practicing what the law 
requires or permits. 
The due process hearing rights that are uniformly 
recommended42 are all recognized by Utah law. There 
is no inadequacy in that regard. Rather, the inadequacy 
is in practicing what the law requires or permits. 
Beyond ensuring the rights already established, we 
recommend that, if possible, the court conduct the hearing in a setting that is accessible 
by and comforting to the respondent. This would include ADA accommodations, but 
also: 
> holding the hearing later in the morning, rather than first thing; 
> more open space in the hearing room to accommodate wheelchairs; 
> holding the hearing in chambers or other less intimidating surroundings; and 
> slowing the frenetic pace of too many hearings in too short a time. 
We began this report by likening the effect of appointing a guardian or conservator to 
a criminal sentence or commitment to a mental health facility. The deprivation of civil 
liberties is almost as great. Therefore, just as in a criminal or commitment proceeding, 
we recommend that the judge appoint a certified interpreter at state expense if the 
respondent does not adequately speak or understand English. The forms and other 
public information and instructions recommended later in this report should be 
translated into Spanish. We recommend that Rule 3-306 be amended to add protective 
proceedings to the list of casetypes requiring a court-appointed certified interpreter. 
40
 See HB 167, Elder Protection Provisions by Rep. Patricia Jones. 
41
 Utah Code Section 75-5-303(4). 
42
 National Probate Court Standards, Standard 3.3.8; 1997 Uniform Act, Section 308. Wingspan 
Conference. Recommendation 27, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 601 (2002); Wingspread Conference. 
Recommendation ll-B(2); 13 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 271, 283 (1989). 
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(b) Mediation 
Mediation would seem to be particularly suitable for adult guardianship 
cases for a number of reasons. These cases usually 1) involve ongoing 
family relationships and the inevitably-attendant emotional issues; 2) 
include sensitive information that the participants would prefer to keep 
private; 3) sometimes require flexible and creative resolutions; and 4) 
often involve parties who cannot afford protracted litigation. Yet the use of 
mediation in adult guardianship cases raises a host of questions. ... An 
adult guardianship case, by its very nature, centers on an individual whose 
capacity is in question. Guardianship adjudications are designed to offer 
maximum protection to that individual because he or she may not be 
capable of protecting himself or herself. Mediation, on the other hand, is 
grounded in the principle of self-determination and presumes that the 
parties are capable of participating in the process and bargaining for their 
own interests. Can these two concepts be reconciled? 
Is the Use of Mediation Appropriate in Adult Guardianship Cases? Mary F. 
Radford, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 611, 639-640 (2002), hereafter cited as 
"Radford." 
Although mediation of guardianship and conservatorship proceedings is not without 
its critics,43 many organizations and individuals recommend that mediation be an 
integral part of those cases,44 and we concur. 
Professor Radford concludes, after a thorough 
analysis from which we draw liberally, that mediation 
is appropriate in guardianship and conservatorship 
cases, but that these cases present several issues 
that must be carefully considered by the mediator and 
the judge. 
Mediation would seem to 
be particularly suitable for 
adult guardianship cases for 
a number of reasons. 
(i) Capacity of respondent to mediate 
The ADA Mediation Guidelines recommend special factors for the mediator to 
consider when mediating with a person of potentially diminished capacity: 
1. The mediator should ascertain that a party understands the nature of 
the mediation process, who the parties are, the role of the mediator, the 
parties' relationship to the mediator, and the issues at hand. The mediator 
should determine whether the party can assess options and make and 
keep an agreement. 
2. If a party appears to have diminished capacity or if a party's capacity to 
mediate is unclear, the ... mediator should determine whether a disability 
43
 See e.g., Winsor C. Schmidt, Jr., What is Known and not Known about the State of the 
Guardianship and Public Guardianship System Thirteen Years After the Wingspread National 
Guardianship Symposium. 31 Stetson L. Rev. 1027, 1032-1033 (2002). 
44
 See e.g., National Probate Court Standards, Standard 2.5.1. Wingspan Conference. 
Recommendation 24, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 600 (2002) The Center for Social Gerontology, 
http://www.tcsa.orQ/. Professor Mary F. Radford, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 611, 685 (2002). 
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is interfering with the capacity to mediate and whether an accommodation 
will enable the party to participate effectively. 
3. The ... mediator should also determine whether the party can mediate 
with support. 
ADA Mediation Guidelines, Guideline I.D.45 
Even if the respondent lacks capacity to participate, the ADA Guidelines permit 
mediation if s/he is present and a surrogate represents the respondent's interests, 
values and preferences and makes decisions for the respondent46 
[The Center for Social Gerontology's] Adult Guardianship Mediation 
Manual also offers mediators a set of guidelines for determining whether 
the adult has capacity to participate in the mediation. These guidelines 
appear in the form of eight questions: 
1) Can the respondent understand what is being discussed? 
2) Does he or she understand who the parties are? 
3) Can the respondent understand the role of the mediator? 
4) Can the respondent listen to and comprehend the story of the other party? 
5) Can he or she generate options for a solution? 
6) Can he or she assess options? 
7) Is the respondent expressing a consistent opinion? 
8) Can he or she make and keep an agreement? 
Radford, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 611, 650 (2002), citing The Center for Social 
Gerontology's Adult Guardianship Mediation Manual. 
(ii) Power imbalance among the parties 
The mediator must remain alert to power imbalances among the parties and take 
appropriate measures to neutralize them, such as: 
> ensuring that the respondent is adequately represented; 
> structuring presentations so that the respondent is allowed to speak first; 
> ensuring the neutrality of the mediation site; 
> encouraging experts to convey information in an understandable manner; and 
> intervening to clear up confusion and assuage the respondent's fears. 47 
The more subtle obstacle to self-determination by an adult ... is the 
tendency of family members, attorneys, judges, and perhaps even 
mediators to want to structure a framework that is protective of the adult 
but that may not necessarily protect the adult's fundamental right to 
autonomy. ... The mediator, as guardian of the principle of self-
determination, must remain alert to the distinct possibility that the other, 
"saner," parties to the mediation are asserting their own values rather than 
reflecting the values of the adult. 
http://www coicr.org/ada.html 45 
46
 ADA Mediation Guidelines, Guideline I.D.4. 
47
 Radford, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 611, 652 (2002). 
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Radford, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 611, 653-654 (2002). 
Standards and training for 
mediators should be 
developed in conjunction 
with the Alternative 
Dispute Resolution 
community. 
(iii) Mediator training 
The Wingspan Conference recommends that "standards and training for mediators 
be developed in conjunction with the Alternative Dispute Resolution community to 
address mediation in guardianship related matters."48 We concur. 
Mediation of protective proceedings requires 
training and experience that the Utah community may 
not yet have. Because mediation of protective 
proceedings has a relatively short history in Utah, 
because the only specialized training of court-annexed 
ADR providers focuses on family law disputes,49 and 
because of the special risks of mediating protective 
proceedings, we encourage the mediation community 
to develop training classes and materials along the lines recommended by the 
Wingspread Conference: 
(a) the rights and procedures applicable in guardianship proceedings; 
(b) the aging process and disability conditions, and the myths and 
stereotypes concerning older and disabled persons; 
(c) the skills required to effectively communicate with disabled and elderly 
persons; 
(d) the applicable medical and mental health terminology and the possible 
effects of various medications on the respondent; and 
(e) services and programs available in the community for elderly and/or 
disabled persons. 
The Center for Social Gerontology also offers a substantial curriculum for mediation 
training in guardianship proceedings. 
(c) Probate commissioner 
The Wingspan Conference recommends judicial specialization in guardianships,52 
however, we do not. We recommend extensive judicial education and training, but we 
do not recommend appointing a specialized probate judge. Training for all will have to 
serve the objectives of specialization by a few. 
Although the clerks' office in some districts has a recognizable probate department, 
the district court has favored the general assignment of cases among its judges for 
many years. The same factors that make specialization in probate attractive - small 
caseload, specialized procedures, and expansive geography - also work against 
(1989) 
48
 Wingspan Conference. Recommendation 22. 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 599 (2002). 
49CJA4-510(3)(C). 
50




 Wingspan Conference Recommendation 56 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 606 (2002). 
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specialization. At some point, there may be sufficient caseload to merit an arrangement 
similar to the district court's "tax court," a handful of judges from around the state, who 
are assigned the regular variety of cases from their 
home district and who are assigned probate cases from 
all of the districts when a case is contested. 
The district courts should 
consider appointing 
commissioners to specialize 
in probate law much as they 
have done in family law. 
We do recommend that the district courts consider 
appointing commissioners to specialize in probate law 
much as they have done in family law. In the Third 
District, instead of adding a judge when growth 
warrants it, consider appointing a probate commissioner - not a guardianship specialist, 
but a probate specialist. In the other urban districts - Districts Two, Four and Five -




(d) Access to records 
During our study, the Judicial Council 
asked for our recommendations on public 
access to guardianship and 
conservatorship records. We 
recommended that, except for the 
appointment order and letters, which 
must be public, guardianship and 
conservatorship records be classified as 
"private": available to the court and to the 
parties, but not to the public. Rule 4-
202.02 has since been amended 
accordingly. 
Our research showed that, of the 
states that make an express 
classification, about half allow public 
access and half do not.53 
As we noted in our earlier 
recommendation: guardianship and 
conservatorship records and hearings 
historically have been public not because 
of any deliberate decision, but because 
no one seems to have asked whether 
they should be private. Hearings should remain public. Public scrutiny controls abuse 
and assures people that the authority granted by the court is appropriate. Public records 
serve this important goal just as much as public hearings, but court records contain 
significant medical information, financial information, living situation, and personal 
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53
 The 1997 Uniform Act also recommends that guardianship and conservatorship records be 
confidential. Sections 307 and 407 
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vulnerable to being victimized and the court records provide the information with which 
to do so. The combination of public hearings and private records, while not common, 
has precedent in juvenile court cases and adoption cases. 
There are records that can safely remain public. The appointment order and letters 
have been mentioned. These are necessarily public because they need to be shared on 
a regular basis with people not associated with the case; sometimes even recorded as 
part of public land records. The existence of the case (case name and number) and the 
register of actions or docket should also be public. The latter of these was swept in with 
our earlier recommendation because of the district court case management system's 
inability to differentiate the docket from the rest of the case. But there is no privacy or 
security interest to be protected, and the administrative office of the courts is working to 
sequester the documents filed in a guardianship or conservatorship case while allowing 
public access to the record of the document having been filed. 
(9) Fiduciary authority 
(a) Less restrictive alternatives to guardianship or conservatorship 
Currently, in order to appoint a guardian with plenary authority, the court must make 
a finding that nothing less is "adequate."54 We believe that the petition should review the 
alternatives to appointing a guardian or conservator and explain why none are 
appropriate.55 The hearing should include evidence to support that conclusion. 
Less restrictive alternatives may go unexplored simply because of unfamiliarity, so 
we describe some here. The following options are some alternatives to guardianship or 
conservatorship (There may be others.) that may meet the respondent's needs. All 
require the respondent's cooperation. Some require the respondent's capacity. 
(i) Alternatives for financial decisionmaking 
Representative payee. Some federal agencies, such as the Social Security 
Administration, can appoint a person to receive benefits on behalf of a beneficiary who 
is unable to administer his or her finances. A representative payee maintains control 
over the benefits, signs all checks drawn on the benefits, and spends the benefit money 
to meet the needs of the beneficiary. A person applying to an agency to be a 
representative payee does not first need to be appointed as a guardian or conservator. 
Trust. Trusts can be useful planning tools for incapacity because they can be 
established and controlled by a competent person and continue if that person later 
becomes incapacitated. The trustee holds legal title to the property transferred to the 
trust and has the duty to use the property as provided in the trust agreement which can 
be for the benefit of the trustor during his or her lifetime. Trusts are regulated by statute 
and should be drafted by a lawyer. 
54
 Utah Code Section 75-5-304(2). 
55
 Wingspan Conference. Recommendation 20 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 598 (2002). Wingspread 
Conference. Recommendation l-A. 13 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 271, 277 (1989). 
56
 Borrowed liberally from Alternatives to Guardianship and Conservatorship for Adults in Iowa, The 
Iowa Department of Elder Affairs and the Iowa Governor's Developmental Disabilities Council, pp 6-13 
(2001). 
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Power of attorney. Power of attorney is a document in which a person authorizes 
an agent to act when the person cannot. The power of attorney can be for a specified 
time or until the person cancels it. The power of attorney can grant a specific authority 
or grant more general authority to act in financial transactions. Some common powers 
of attorney: 
> Open, maintain or close bank accounts or brokerage accounts 
> Sell, lease or maintain real estate 
> Access safe deposit boxes 
> Make financial investments 
> Borrow money, mortgage property, or renew debts 
> Prepare and file income tax returns 
> Vote at corporate meetings 
> Purchase insurance for the principal's benefit 
> Defend, prosecute, or settle a lawsuit 
> Start or carry on a business 
> Employ professional assistants, such as lawyers, accountants, and real estate 
agents 
> Apply for benefits and participate in governmental programs 
> Transfer property to a trustee 
> Disclaim an inheritance 
Joint bank account. In a joint bank account a trusted friend or family member co-
owns the account with the person. Both have ownership of and access to the account, 
so great caution should be taken. 
Automatic banking. A person might retain control of his or her own affairs with the 
help of automatic deposits and automatic bill payments. 
Trusted help. A person may be able to manage his or her own financial affairs 
simply with help, either by a trusted family member or friend or by a professional. Such 
an assistant could help organize a budget, write checks for the person's signature, 
assist with related paperwork, and propose and explain investments. Be watchful for 
undue influence by the person providing help. 
(ii) Alternatives for health care decisionmaking 
Advance health care directive. Advance directives are instructions a person gives 
to health care providers and family to make sure his or her wishes regarding health care 
are followed. 
Power of attorney. Power of attorney can also be used for health care decisions. 
The agent is required to make health care decisions according to directions provided by 
the principal. 
(iii) Crisis intervention 
Mediation, counseling, and respite support services. Counseling may be helpful 
if a person does not lack capacity, but is unwilling to agree to reasonable requests. A 
mediator may be able to help reach a compromise. Respite care provides temporary 
relief to the caregiver if the caregiver - or the person cared for - is aged 60 or older. 
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The respite may be brief, 2-3 hours, or longer than 24 hours, and the care may take 
place at the individual's residence or elsewhere. 
(iv) Organizations willing to help 
Area Agencies on Aging administer programs for those aged 60 and over such as: 
> Access to other services: transportation, outreach, information and referral; 
> Community services: congregate meals, legal services, case management, and 
continuing education; 
> In-home services: respite care, home health, homemaker, home-delivered meals 
and chore maintenance; and 
> Services to residents of care-providing facilities. 
Community based services. There are free and low-cost services offered by 
government agencies, religious organizations and others, such as home nursing, home 
health aides, homemakers, home delivered meals, mental health services, and 
transportation. 
(b) Fiduciary's limited authority 
If the respondent is incapacitated and a guardian is needed, plenary authority 
except when the respondent is completely incapacitated, is universally condemned. 
Although plenary appointments are relatively common under our current statutes, even 
current law directs the judge to "prefer" limited authority over plenary appointments.5 
Unfortunately, after that brief admonishment, the statute does nothing to support the 
result, other than require a finding that nothing else will do. 
We believe that the "petition and order 
should include detailed statements of the 
respondent's functional capabilities and 
limitations".59 The hearing should include 
evidence of the same. The order should be 
tailored to the respondent's particular 
limitations. In our proposed statutes, rather 
than presuming full authority and requiring an 
express limitation of it, as the Code does 
now,60 the guardian's authority should be 
presumed limited to the authority expressly 
stated in the order. Only by listing all available 
authority would the court be able to make a 
plenary appointment, which should require 
57
 Wingspread Conference. Recommendations lll-D and IV-B. 13 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 
271, 290 and 292 (1989). Wingspan Conference. Recommendations 38 and 39. 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 
602-603 (2002). National Probate Court Standards, Standard 3.3.10. 1997 Uniform Act, Section 314. 
Judicial Determination of Capacity, p 2. 
58
 Utah Code Section 75-5-304(2). 
59
 Wingspread Conference. Recommendation IV-B. 13 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 271, 293 
(1989). 
60
 Utah Code Section 75-5-312(2). 
The order should be tailored to the 
respondent's particular limitations. 
The guardian's authority should be 
presumed limited to the authority 
expressly stated in the order. 
The respondent should retain all 
rights, power, authority and 
discretion not expressly granted to 
the guardian by statute or court order. 
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findings supported by clear and convincing evidence that such a result is necessary. 
There is no simple formula that will help judges make the determination. 
The following broad classification could serve as an initial schema: 
If minimal or no incapacities, petition not granted, use less restrictive 
alternative. 
If severely diminished capacities in all areas or if less restrictive 
interventions have failed, use plenary guardianship. 
If mixed strengths and weaknesses, use limited guardianship. 
The cases in which there are "mixed areas" of strengths and weaknesses 
present the greatest challenge - and the greatest opportunity - for the 
"judge as craftsman" to tailor a limited order to the specific needs and 
abilities of the individual. 
Judicial Determination of Capacity, p 13. 
(i) Guardian or Conservator? 
In determining the appropriate authority, the judge should decide whether the 
respondent's limitations require a guardian, a conservator or both. And this ultimate 
decision should be reflected in the petition that starts the case. Practice over the years 
has degenerated to the point that many, probably most, petitioners request appointment 
to both offices, when one or the other alone might do. Petitioners, who know only the 
basic idea that a conservator is responsible for the respondent's estate and a guardian 
is responsible for the respondent's care and well-being, may not realize the significant 
additional fiscal responsibility that comes with being a conservator. 
Currently, guardians have some modest authority over the respondent's estate.62 
We propose delineating the guardian's authority for many everyday property 
transactions, reserved to a conservator if one is appointed, that may reduce the need 
for a conservator. Only if the petitioner requests authority beyond these transactions 
and the judge agrees that it is needed should a conservator be appointed. 
Under current law, a guardian may receive the respondent's money and property 
and has a duty to "conserve any excess for the ward's needs,"63 a simple standard met 
by a simple savings account. A conservator, on the other hand, must meet the much 
higher standards of a trustee,64 exercising reasonable care, skill, and caution as would a 
prudent investor65 and making reasonable efforts to verify facts66 while investing and 
reinvesting the respondent's estate.67 Family guardians probably do not have that 
acumen, do not need that authority, and would do well to leave the responsibility to a 
Wingspan Conference. Recommendation 39. 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 603 (2002). 
62
 Utah Code Section 75-5-312(2)(b) (commence protective proceedings); (2)(d)(i) (initiate 
proceedings to compel support); (2)(d)(ii) ((receive money and property deliverable to the respondent). 
63
 Utah Code Section 75-5-312(2)(d)(ii). 
64
 Utah Code Section 75-5-417(1); Utah Code Section 75-5-424(1). 
65
 Utah Code Section 75-7-902(1). 
66
 Utah Code Section 75-7-902(4). 
87
 Utah Code Section 75-5-424(2). 
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professional conservator or seek professional advice in carrying out a conservator's 
duties. 
(ii) Retained rights - Restrictions on authority 
The respondent should retain all rights, power, authority and discretion not expressly 
granted to the guardian by statute or court order. 
The right of the respondent to vote in governmental elections is particularly difficult. 
The right cannot be assigned to the guardian in any event, but when is it properly 
denied to the respondent? We propose the standard recommended by the ABA. The 
respondent retains the right to vote in governmental elections unless "the court finds [by 
clear and convincing evidence] that the person cannot communicate, with or without 
accommodations, a specific desire to participate in the voting process."68 It would be 
helpful if further statutory and practical changes were implemented to accommodate 
voting by respondents determined to be incapacitated, but that is beyond the scope of 
this report. 
The guardian should not be able to: 
> consent to commitment of the respondent to a mental retardation facility (The 
guardian should petition the court for an order under Title 62A, Chapter 5, Part 3, 
Admission to Mental Retardation Facility.); 
> consent to commitment of the respondent to a mental health authority (The 
guardian should petition the court for an order under Title 62A, Chapter 15, Part 
6, Utah State Hospital and Other Mental Health Facilities.); 
> consent to sterilization of the respondent; (The guardian should petition the court 
for an order under Title 62A, Chapter 6, Sterilization of Handicapped Person.); or 
> consent to termination of the parental rights in the respondent or of the 
respondent's parental rights in another. (The guardian should petition the juvenile 
court for an order to terminate parental rights under Title 78A, Chapter 6, Part 5, 
Termination of Parental Rights Act.) 
Unless permitted by the court, the guardian should not be able to: 
> consent to the admission of the respondent to a psychiatric hospital or other 
mental health care facility; 
> consent to participation in medical research, electroconvulsive therapy or other 
shock treatment, experimental treatment, forced medication with psychotropic 
drugs, abortion, psychosurgery, a procedure that restricts the respondent's 
rights, or to be a living organ donor; 
> consent to termination of life-sustaining treatment if the respondent has never 
had health care decisionmaking capacity; 
> consent to name change, adoption, marriage, annulment or divorce of the 
respondent; 
> prosecute, defend and settle legal actions, including administrative proceedings, 
on behalf of the respondent; 
> establish or move the respondent's dwelling place outside of Utah; or 
Resolution of the ABA House of Delegates approved on August 13, 2007. 
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> restrict the respondent's physical liberty, communications or social activities more 
than reasonably necessary to protect the respondent or others from harm. 
(iii) Maximizing respondent's independence - Decisionmaking 
standard 
Our Supreme Court requires that when appointing a guardian, the court "must 
consider the interest of the ward in retaining as broad a power of self-determination as 
is consistent with the reason for appointing a guardian of the person."69 Further, "the 
court's order should reauire the guardian to attempt to maximize self-reliance, autonomy 
and independence...."76 Reacquiring capacity is legally and practically possible, and the 
guardian should take reasonable steps to that end. 
If the court and the fiduciary 
are to give any realistic 
meaning to the standard of 
"substituted judgment," it is 
critical to learn the 
respondent's values, 
preferences and patterns of 
behavior that form the basis 
of what the respondent 
would have done. 
Regardless whether the respondent might 
reacquire capacity, maximizing independence 
includes applying the "substituted judgment" 
standard when making decisions on the 
respondent's behalf. When the guardian or 
conservator uses the substituted judgment standard 
s/he makes the decision that the respondent would 
have made when competent. The fiduciary therefore 
has a duty to learn the respondent's values, 
preferences and patterns of behavior that form the 
basis of what respondent would have done. 
Substituted judgment is the decisionmaking 
standard used in all circumstances except those that permit the "best interest" standard 
to be used. 
The fiduciary may use the best interest decisionmaking standard when: 
(a) following the respondent's wishes would cause her or him harm; 
(b) the guardian or conservator cannot determine the respondent's wishes; or 
(c) the respondent has never had capacity. 
When the guardian or conservator uses the best interest standard, s/he makes the 
decision that is the least intrusive, least restrictive, and most normalizing course of 
action to accommodate the respondent's particular functional limitations. 
(iv) Respondent's values, preferences and patterns 
The respondent's values, preferences and patterns of behavior should play a big 
role in shaping the outcome of a petition to appoint a guardian or conservator. Not only 
are they important in determining capacity, as discussed in Section (4) (c), but also in 
determining who the fiduciary should be, the fiduciary's authority, and even in some of 
the fiduciary's decisions, such as medical and financial decisions and living 
arrangements.71 If the court and the fiduciary are to give any realistic meaning to the 
In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085,1090-1091 (Utah 1981). 
70
 Wingspread Conference Recommendation IV-B. 13 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 271, 293 
(1989). 
71
 Judicial Determination of Capacity, p 5. 
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standard of "substituted judgment," it is critical to learn what those values, preferences 
and patterns are. The respondent may have something to say. The clinician and court 
visitor should include the respondent's values, preferences and patterns of behavior as 
part of their investigation. Family, friends, colleagues, religious ministers, care providers 
and others also may have useful evidence. 
(10) Emergency appointments 
Current Utah law permits the emergency appointment of a temporary guardian,72 but 
there is no similar provision for a temporary conservator. Emergency appointments are 
sometimes necessary, but our current statute provides less protection to the respondent 
than the Rules of Civil Procedure provide to a defendant for a temporary restraining 
order.73 The 1997 Uniform Act addresses these shortcomings and we have integrated 
many of its features into our proposed legislation. We have also integrated the features 
of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, procedures lawyers and 
judges are familiar with. 
The authorities differ on whether a regular petition should be filed with the 
emergency petition. Standard 3.3.6(a)(2) of the National Probate Court Standards 
recommends it. The 1997 Uniform Act Section 312 recommends against it. The 
Wingspan Conference also seems to recommend that a regular petition be required.74 
The commentary to the 1997 Uniform Act argues that requiring a petition "lends an air of 
inevitability that a permanent guardian should be appointed;" that respondent's need for 
a guardian might be temporary and his or her long-term needs might be met by other 
mechanisms. 
Our current Utah statute is silent on the question, and usually courts do not require a 
regular petition. We endorse that model, for the reasons explained in the 1997 Uniform 
Act, and simply because requiring a regular petition, especially the more detailed 
petition we envision, in the midst of an emergency is unrealistic. On the other hand, the 
court must guard against the emergency appointment becoming de facto permanent 
because of the failure to monitor the appointment. 
Our proposal requires a hearing on the emergency petition and notice to the 
respondent unless the respondent would be harmed before a hearing could be held. 
Only in the latter case, may the judge consider evidence of the emergency ex parte. 
The guardian's authority would be limited to what is justified by the emergency and 
expressly stated in the order. A hearing on the emergency appointment must be held 
within 5 days after the appointment and notice of the appointment and hearing given 
u
 Utah Code Section 75-5-310 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A Injunctions. Our current statute regulating emergency petitions 
does not require appointment of counsel for the respondent, even though counsel is required for regular 
petitions 
74
 Wingspan Conference. Recommendation 34. 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 602 (2002). Although not 
stating directly that a regular petition should be required, the Conference recommends that the 
emergency appointment require "a hearing on the permanent guardianship as promptly as possible...." 
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within 2 days. An emergency order without hearing and notice would expire after 5 
days. An emergency order with hearing and notice would expire after 60 days.75 
(11) "School guardianships" 
In 1985, the Legislature attempted to create bifurcated authority to appoint a 
guardian for a child who resides outside of Utah, giving the authority to the district court 
and local school boards. In the vernacular, these appointments have become known as 
"school guardianships." Their primary purpose appears to be to prevent a non-resident 
from avoiding non-resident tuition. Using the law of guardianship to answer such a 
simple question is poor policy. These appointments simply do not fit the generally 
accepted model for appointing a guardian for a minor, and we recommend that they be 
eliminated. 
Schools need the authority to distinguish resident from non-resident, and the child 
needs a guardian to make myriad decisions about schooling. Our recommendations do 
not interfere with these objectives, but the general laws of residency and guardianship 
are sufficient to reach these objectives. There is no need for a special process that was 
so poorly drafted over two decades ago that it removes from the district court the 
authority to enter the orders the schools rely upon. 
The Legislature intended to give the district court jurisdiction to appoint a "school 
guardian," but the statutes' plain language fails to do so. "A person becomes a guardian 
of a minor by acceptance of a testamentary appointment, through appointment by a 
local school board under Section 53A-2-
202, or upon appointment by the court."76 Under current law, a school board may 
permit a non-resident minor to attend 
school in Utah and may treat a non-
resident minor as a Utah resident, even 
without the appointment of a guardian. 
"The court may appoint a guardian for an 
unemancipated minor if all parental rights 
of custody have been terminated or 
suspended by circumstances or prior court 
order."77 Since the parents' custodial rights 
have not been terminated or suspended, the court has no authority to appoint a 
guardian. Although the district courts have been handling these appointments for many 
years, they have not had jurisdiction. 
For school tuition purposes, a minor is treated as a Utah resident, even though the 
minor's parent or guardian is not, if "the child lives with a resident of the district who is a 
responsible adult and whom the district agrees to designate as the child's legal guardian 
under Section 53A-2-202...."78 Section 53A-2-202 clearly gives the local school boards 
the authority to "designate" someone as a child's legal guardian and just as clearly gives 
the local school boards the discretion to opt out of that authority. Most of the local 
boards have opted out. Thus, there is a right to have a guardian appointed, but 
75
 Sixty days conforms to the 1997 Uniform Act, Section 312, but it is twice as long as current Utah 
law. We believe that by imposing a more rigorous process on the emergency appointment, it is safe to 
extend the time in which to conduct the medical and social evaluations and prepare evidence for the 
regular hearing. 
76
 Utah Code Section 75-5-201 
77
 Utah Code Sction 75-5-204. 
78
 Section 53A-2-201(2)(b). 
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technically no forum in which to do so. The district court does not have the authority, 
and the school boards have opted out. 
The petitioner must file the parents' affidavit as evidence of the parents' consent to 
the termination of parental rights, the appointment of the guardian and the minor's intent 
to reside in Utah. If the parent is not available to swear out the affidavit, the proposed 
guardian may do so on the parents' behalf.79 The Legislature has since passed laws 
imposing significantly more protections and requirements for relinquishing parental 
rights.80 Those laws certainly do not permit anyone other than the parent to waive the 
parent's rights. 
The judge may deny the petition to appoint a guardian if the school proves that the 
primary purpose of the guardianship is to attend a Utah public school81 or to avoid 
paying non-resident tuition.82 Having the purpose of attending a public school or 
avoiding non-resident tuition may be reasons to charge non-resident tuition, but they are 
not sufficient reasons to deny the guardianship. 
There are numerous other difficulties with the statutes regulating school 
guardianships. There is no need for this elaborate process. A school board may permit 
a non-resident minor to attend school in Utah under current law, even without the 
appointment of a guardian.83 A school board may treat a non-resident minor as a Utah 
resident under current law, even without the appointment of a guardian.84 A child may 
need a guardian for a variety of purposes, including school-related purposes. If there 
are grounds to appoint a guardian, the court should make that appointment. That 
appointment may affect the minor's residency, which in turn may affect the child's 
tuition, but that is governed by other Utah law.85 In all respects, the regular law of 
guardianships should apply. 
(12) Appointments by will or signed writing 
This is one of our more technical recommendations, and one in which we move 
away from current Utah law and the 1997 Uniform Act. Currently, Utah allows a person 
to appoint a guardian for a minor child or an incapacitated adult child or spouse by will 
or signed writing.86 A person may also nominate a guardian for a spouse or child, but 
the difference between a nominee and an appointee is not entirely clear.87 A person 
may nominate, but not appoint, a conservator for a spouse or child.8 Other designated 
people may nominate a guardian or conservator to replace them in the priority list of 
appointees.89 
/y
 Utah Code Section 53A-2-202(2)(d). 
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 Utah Code Section 78A-6-514. 
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 Utah Code Section 53A-2-202(2)(a)(i). 
82
 Utah Code Section 75-5-206(3)(b). 
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 Utah Code Section 53A-2-205. 
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The 1997 Uniform Act clarifies some points, but not others. The 1997 Uniform Act 
continues the distinction between appointing a guardian and nominating a conservator. 
It permits the appointing parent or spouse to petition the court to confirm the 
appointment before the parent's or spouse's death or incapacity but not to confirm a 
nomination. It permits a respondent to nominate a guardian or conservator while s/he 
still has capacity to do so, but it does not permit a respondent to confirm the nomination. 
The respondent's nominee has top priority, but that is always subject to the court's 
authority to appoint in a different order. 
The 1997 Uniform Act requires the appointee, whether confirmed beforehand or not, 
to file an acceptance of appointment, and if not confirmed beforehand, to file a petition 
to confirm the appointment. The 1997 Uniform Act makes the appointment effective 
upon acceptance by the appointee, without ever determining that the respondent is 
incapacitated.90 
There is no need for such complexity. There is need for more protection. 
We propose a simpler model applicable to guardians and conservators, minors and 
adults that better protects the respondent's rights. We begin with the premise that, if a 
guardian or conservator is to act under judicial approval, the court should make the 
appointment, not the parent or spouse. 
A person should be able to nominate a guardian or a conservator for oneself, for 
one's child or for one's spouse. And that person should be able to petition the court to 
confirm the nomination and cut off the rights of others to object. It is, in effect, a 
contingent appointment, subject to later determining the respondent's incapacity and 
determining that the appointment remains in the respondent's best interest. 
We endorse this new feature of the 1997 Uniform Act, but couch it in terms of 
nomination rather than appointment. A person who anticipates incapacity should be 
able to take comfort in the knowledge that his or her preference of guardian or 
conservator will be appointed at some future date; similarly for the spouse of an 
incapacitated person or parent of an incapacitated or minor child. Confirmation does not 
determine incapacity; only who will be the fiduciary. Upon the death or incapacity of the 
nominating person, the court would still determine the respondent's incapacity and the 
limits of the fiduciary's authority. If the nomination is not confirmed beforehand, the 
nominee would have his or her designated priority for appointment, subject to the usual 
court authority to appoint in a different order. 
Our recommended approach creates a simple, uniform process for all combinations 
of guardians and conservators, minors and adults. And it ensures that a court will 
determine the nature and extent of the respondent's incapacity and the limits of the 
fiduciary's authority. 
(13) Monitoring guardians and conservators 
(a) Planning 
1997 Uniform Act Sections 202, 302, 303, 310, and 413. 
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Oversight of guardians and conservators begins with the fiduciary's assurance to the 
court that s/he recognizes his or her authority, its limits and how it will be exercised. We 
recommend that guardians and conservators develop a plan for how they will implement 
the authority given them and that the plan be filed with the court. Some states require a 
new plan annually, but we do not. Once filed, the plan should be sufficient until there is 
a significant change in circumstances. 
The law should allow modest deviation from the plan. Circumstances are never 
entirely stable, and filing a new plan for every change, no matter how slight, merely 
increases the burden on the fiduciary without protecting the respondent. But the law 
should impose liability on the fiduciary for significant 
deviations from the plan, and whether the deviation is 
slight or significant may have to be decided by the 
judge after the fact. 
The plan will provide a baseline against which to 
evaluate the guardian's or conservator's actions, but the 
primary purpose of planning is not to trap the fiduciary. 
Rather, the purpose is to assure the court that the 
fiduciary knows how s/he will help manage the 
respondent's life before undertaking to do so. We recommend that a form for the 
fiduciary's plan be developed by the court and Bar. 
(b) Annual reports 
The Judicial Council and the district courts have already taken the important step of 
monitoring and enforcing the annual reporting requirements for guardians and 
conservators, and the administrative office of the courts has developed forms and an 
interactive web interview to guide the fiduciaries through that process. We recommend 
that the district court continue these essential efforts. 
If the protected person's parent is the guardian or conservator, current Utah law 
exempts the parent from annually reporting the protected person's condition or estate.91 
The 1997 Uniform Act does not contain this exception, and we recommend that it be 
eliminated. A protected person is no better off for having been abused or defrauded by 
a parent. We recommend that annual reports be required of all guardians and 
conservators. 
(c) Volunteer court visitors 
Annual reporting about the respondent's well-being and estate are a necessary first 
step to protect the respondent's personal and financial health and safety. But unless 
someone reviews those reports and follows up as necessary, they are of little value. 
Current Utah law relies for protection on objections by family members. If anyone 
objects, the court will conduct proceedings to decide the competing claims. If no one 
objects, the court is left on its own, which usually means the report will be approved. 
Giving those interested in the respondent standing to object is a necessary second 
step, but it is inadequate. Mistreatment of the respondent or misappropriation of money, 
Utah Code Sections 75-5-312(2)(e)(vi) and 75-5-417(5). 
Oversight of guardians and 
conservators begins with 
the fiduciary's assurance to 
the court that s/he 
recognizes his or her 
authority, its limits and how 
it will be exercised. 
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whether with intent or through neglect, may occur without it being obvious in the reports. 
Those who are interested in the respondent may themselves participate to harm or 
defraud. Perhaps the respondent is without family. We recommend, therefore, as does 
the 1997 Uniform Act,92 that the court select reports to be reviewed for errors or fraud 
and to follow up based on the results. We recommend that the court appoint visitors 
periodically to review records and interview respondents, fiduciaries and others after the 
appointment. 
Other jurisdictions have successfully established volunteer programs to monitor 
appointments more closely.93 The model is very similar to the Court Appointed Special 
Advocate (CASA) program in the juvenile court, 
which has been so successful at helping children 
whose parents are accused of abuse. The courts 
would hire a coordinator whose job is to recruit and 
train volunteers to perform the duties of a court 
visitor. The results can be invaluable to the court. 
The model is very similar to 
the CASA program in the 
juvenile court, which has been 
so successful at helping 
children whose parents are 
accused of abuse. The model came to light as we investigated 
methods of monitoring guardians and conservators 
after appointment, but court visitors should be used in the initial investigation of 
incapacity as well. An organized volunteer program such as this offers the best hope of 
also serving that need. The courts can create a volunteer program only over time, but 
eventually, in a fully developed volunteer program, a court visitor might: 
> Before appointment 
o Interview the respondent and proposed fiduciary 
o Interview family members and others as appropriate 
o Visit the respondent's current and proposed residences 
o Report to the court 
> After appointment 
o Review inventories, management plans, annual reports and other records 
of guardians and conservators 
o Interview the respondent, fiduciary, family members and others as 
appropriate 
o Report to the court 
The role of the coordinator is to build and support the program. 
> Develop partnerships (AARP, CPAs, Lawyers, Law students, Law enforcement, 
social workers, etc.) 
> Recruit volunteers from among partners 
> Develop training materials 
> Develop and conduct training classes for volunteers (initial and continuing) 
82
 1997 Uniform Act Sections 317 and 420 
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> Develop and conduct training classes for judges and court staff 
> Supervise and recognize volunteers 
> Reimburse expenses 
> Troubleshoot problems 
> Develop checklists, forms, & other aids 
> Record and report outcomes 
We recommend that the Judicial Council hire a coordinator to build and support a 
volunteer court visitor program. 
(d) Regulating guardians and conservators. 
(i) Professional conservators 
By a series of statutes, only a handful of financial institutions under permit from the 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions may be appointed as professional 
conservators.94 Professional conservators, therefore, are already highly regulated and 
nothing further should be needed. 
(ii) Professional guardians 
Professional guardians are regulated by virtue of their credentials in other regulated 
professions, but they are not regulated as guardians, and they should be. Like most 
states, Utah lists the priority of a person or institution to be appointed guardian. Last on 
that list is "a specialized care professional."95 A specialized care professional is defined 
as a person who: 
(i) has been certified or designated as a provider of guardianship services 
by a nationally recognized guardianship accrediting organization; 
(ii) is licensed by or registered with the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing as a health care provider including, but not limited 
to, a registered nurse licensed under Section 58-31b-301, a social service 
worker, certified social worker, or clinical social worker licensed under 
Section 58-60-205, a marriage and family therapist licensed under Section 
58-60-305, a physician licensed under Title 58, Chapter 67, or a 
psychologist licensed under Title 58, Chapter 61; or 
"Trust business" means ... a business in which one acts in any agency or fiduciary capacity, 
including that of... conservator...." Utah Code Section 7-5-1 (1)(b). "Only a trust company may engage in 
the trust business in this state." Utah Code Section 7-5-1(2). Trust company" means an institution 
authorized to engage in the trust business under this chapter. Only the following may be a trust 
company...." Utah Code Section 7-5-1(1)(d) (naming four types of depository institutions and any 
corporation continuously engaged in trust business since 1981). "No trust company shall accept any 
appointment to act in any agency or fiduciary capacity, such as ... conservator... under order or judgment 
of any court ... unless and until it has obtained from the commissioner a permit to act under this chapter." 
Utah Code Section 7-5-2(1). 
Under special circumstances (administration of the estate is supervised by the court and no trust 
company is willing to act as conservator after notice of the proceedings is given to every trust company 
doing business in Utah) the court may appoint a certified public accountant (or other listed financial 
professional) as conservator. Utah Code Section 7-5-1 (1)(c)(viii). 
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 Utah Code Section 75-5-311(4)(g). 
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(iii) has been approved by the court as one with specialized training and 
experience in the care of incapacitated persons. 
Utah Code Section 75-5-311(1 )(a). 
So, Utah law leaves designation as a professional guardian to (1) unnamed 
organizations with unknown standards; (2) licensure or registration with DOPL as a 
health care provider, which includes unnamed professions; and (3) the judge on a case-
by-case basis with no standards by which to decide. 
The most prominent "nationally recognized guardianship accrediting organization" is 
the National Guardianship Association. According to the National Guardianship 
Association, "Certification entitles the guardian to represent to the courts and the public 
that he or she is eligible to be appointed, is not disqualified by prior conduct, agrees to 
abide by universal ethical standards governing a person with fiduciary responsibilities, 
submits to a disciplinary process, and can demonstrate through a written test an 
understanding of basic guardianship principles and laws." 
Certification as either a Registered Guardian or a Master Guardian is administered 
through the Center for Guardianship Certification (CGC), an "allied foundation" of the 
National Guardianship Association. According to the 
Center "CGC has developed a two-tiered certification 
process, certifying Registered Guardians (RG) at the 
entry level and Master Guardians (MG) with a higher 
level of experience and responsibility. The eligibility 
standards, as well as content and level of difficulty of 
the core competencies tested, for the Master 
Guardian certification are much higher. Nevertheless, 
both the RG and MG must affirm they will abide by 
the NGA Model Code of Ethics and maintain a high level of conduct to be re-certified. 
The same process is used to determine if either certificate should be withheld or 
revoked." 
The health care providers listed in the Code as potential professional guardians are 
not exclusive.96 A quick review of the DOPL website shows any number of licensed 
professions that might be considered health care providers: 
Professional guardians are 
regulated by virtue of their 
credentials in other regulated 
professions, but they are not 
regulated as guardians, and 
they should be. 
> Acupuncture 
> Athletic Trainer 
> Audiology 
> Certified Dietitian 
> Certified Medication Aide 
> Certified Nurse Midwifery 
> Chiropractic 
> Dentistry 
> Direct-Entry Midwifery 
> Genetic Counseling 
> Health Facility Administration 




> Physical Therapy 
> Physician and Surgeon 
> Physician Assistant 
> Podiatry 





' Utah Code Section 75-5-311(1 )(a)(ii). 
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> Hearing Instrument > Recreation Therapy 
> Marriage and Family Therapy > Respiratory Care 
> Massage Therapy > Speech Language Pathology 
> Nursing > Substance Abuse Counseling 
All are valuable professions, and many might assist the respondent with his or her 
incapacity, but none are qualified professional guardians merely because of their other 
licensure, including those in the more traditional health care professions. 
We recommend that the administrative office of the courts begin discussions with the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing and professional guardians in Utah 
to draft legislation according to the DOPL model to regulate the professional guardian 
industry as it does other professions. We recommend that under that legislation only a 
guardian licensed by DOPL be permitted to be appointed as a professional guardian. 
Until then, we recommend that only someone certified by the National Guardianship 
Association be permitted to be appointed as a professional guardian. 
(Hi) Private fiduciaries 
We recommend that before a person is appointed guardian or conservator, s/he be 
required to disclose convictions that have not been expunged. We recommend no 
automatic disqualifications, but it is important that the judge know the background of the 
respondent's fiduciary, and whether an alternative might be more appropriate. 
(14) Conservators 
Some states have abandoned the distinctions between a guardian and conservator. 
If the respondent is incapacitated, the court appoints one or more fiduciaries and grants 
authority, which may be authority traditionally held by a guardian, authority traditionally 
held by a conservator, or some combination of the two. We do not recommend going so 
far. 
However, we recommend combining the laws common to both offices in order to 
isolate and emphasize the laws that create differences. Many of the standards for both 
officers are or should be the same. Many of the procedures are or should be the same. 
Many of the policies are or should be the same. 
But there are important differences. 
> The law should continue to permit protective orders short of appointing a 
conservator. 
> The grounds for appointing a conservator should include because the respondent 
is missing, detained, or unable to return to the United States. 
> The reasons for a conservator or protective order should continue to include 
because funds are needed for the support, care, and welfare of a person entitled 
to be supported by the respondent.97 
> If the reason for a protective proceeding is because the respondent is missing, 
detained, or unable to return to the United States or the respondent's request, 
there should be no need for an evaluation or a finding of incapacity. 
Utah Code Section 75-5-401 (2)(a) 
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> The authority of a conservator provided by statute is extremely detailed, listing 
almost 50 permitted acts.98 So, unlike a guardian's authority, which should be 
specified in the appointment order, the statutes should continue to identify the 
conservator's authority which flows to the conservator by reason of being 
appointed. The court might then expressly limit the statutory authority. 
(15) Training forjudges, lawyers, court personnel and volunteers 
Although they can be improved, we have found that Utah statutes currently provide 
reasonable due process protections." What seems to be lacking is the sense that this 
matters. Perhaps the law itself too easily permits its avoidance. Perhaps courts are 
pressed by contested cases and pay less attention to these in which the parties seem to 
agree. Perhaps it is a well-meaning but misplaced notion of doing what is thought to be 
in the respondent's best interest. Whatever the reason, too many short cuts are being 
taken. 
Education programs would seem to be the proverbial "no brainer." For judicial 
training at least, some of the work is already done. The American Bar Association 
Commission on Law and Aging in conjunction with the American Psychological 
Association and the National College of Probate 
Judges has prepared a manual entitled Judicial 
Determination of Capacity of Older Adults in 
Guardianship Proceedings. It serves as a wonderful 
benchbook, and the administrative office of the courts 
has already included it on the court's website among 
Utah statutes currently 
provide reasonable due 
process protections. What 
seems to be lacking is the 
sense that this matters. 
the benchbooks available to district court judges.100 But 
it is of little value unless it is used. We recommend it to the Judicial Institute as an 
outline on which to build a curriculum for district court conferences. 
The Utah State Bar's Committee on Law and Aging and Estate Planning Section 
sponsor CLE programs on protective proceedings, and we recommend they continue 
that important effort focusing on the recommendations in this report. 
We recommend that the Judicial Institute develop training programs for clerks and 
other court personnel on the new concepts, laws and procedures of guardianships and 
conservatorships and on the special importance of cases in which the court shares 
responsibility for the care and well being of a person with diminished capacity. 
We recommend that the volunteer coordinator work with the Judicial Institute to 
develop training programs for people who volunteer as court visitors: 
> How to draw out evidence of the respondent's capabilities and limitations. 
> How to draw out evidence of the respondent's values, preferences and patterns 
of behavior. 
> How to evaluate the respondent's circumstances during a guardianship or 
conservatorship. 
w
 Utah Code Sections 75-5-408 and 424. 
99
 Appointment of counsel, medical examination, court visitor, presence at hearing, limits on 
emergency appointments, and others. 
http://www.utcourts.Qov/intranet/dist/docs/auardianship proceedinqs.pdf 
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> How to evaluate the guardianship or conservatorship plan and annual reports. 
> How to recognize evidence of fraud and abuse. 
> Other matters on which the court visitor acts as the judge's surrogate. 
(16) Outreach and assistance for the public 
We urge the lawyer who represents the fiduciary to advise his or her client of a 
fiduciary's responsibilities and good practice standards.101 Sometimes the fiduciary does 
not have a lawyer, but often the petitioner, who is more probably represented, will be 
the fiduciary. A lawyer's representation of the petitioner may end with the appointment, 
but the lawyer's counseling on the fiduciary's continuing responsibilities is probably the 
single best opportunity to impress upon the guardian or conservator that s/he is 
responsible for someone else's life and that the law imposes many requirements. 
The Wingspan Conference recommends that "all guardians receive training and 
technical assistance in carrying out their duties."102 We recommend that the Committee 
on Resources for Self-represented Parties work with the 
Committee on Law and Aging of the Utah State Bar to 
develop web-based information and resources about 
guardianships, conservatorships, and less restrictive 
alternatives. The manual entitled Basic Guidelines for 
Court-Appointed Guardians and Conservatorsm 
All guardians should 
receive training and 
technical assistance in 
carrying out their duties. 
developed by the administrative office of the courts and the Bar committee is a start, but 
more thorough information is needed. 
We developed forms for an extensive clinical and social evaluation. Additional forms 
and information need to be developed. We again recommend that the Committee on 
Resources for Self-represented Parties work with the Committee on Law and Aging to 
continue this important work. We suggest to them that the following forms, as well as 
others that they may identify, be developed for the court's website: 
> Acceptance of appointment 
> Estimated estate value worksheet 
> Findings of fact and conclusions of law 
> Letters of guardianship (conservatorship) 
> Management plan for guardian (conservator) 
> Motion and order directing services for respondent 
> Motion and order to appoint a lawyer to represent a respondent 
> Motion and order to appoint a court visitor 
> Motion and order to evaluate respondent 
> Motion and order to withdraw money from a court-guarded account 
> Notice of petition and hearing 
> Order appointing a guardian (conservator) 






Wingspan Conference. Recommendation 66. 31 Stetson L. Rev. 596, 608 (2002). 
Wingspan Conference. Recommendation 9. 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 597 (2002). 
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> Petition to appoint a guardian (conservator) 
> Petition to confirm nomination 
> Proof of service 
> Report on clinical evaluation of respondent 
> Report on social evaluation of respondent 
> Special versions of forms adapted for use in protective proceedings for a minor 
(17) Information gathering 
As noted in the introduction, Utah, like most states, does not systematically record 
very much information about guardianships and conservatorships. We believe it would 
be helpful to distinguish the appointment of a guardian from that of a conservator, to 
distinguish an appointment for a minor from an appointment for an adult. It would have 
been helpful in our study to know how many respondents were not represented, were 
not interviewed by a visitor, not examined by a physician, or not present at the hearing. 
We recommend that the administrative office of the courts evaluate processing of these 
casetypes and determine what operational information and management information 
would help improve processing and help evaluate the success of our recommendations. 
We also recommend that the courts monitor how many annual reports and accountings 
result in findings of abuse, termination, or other modification. Such data would be 
groundbreaking. 
(18) Committee members and staff 
Kent Alderman, Attorney at Law 
Kerry Chlarson, Disability Law Center 
Mary Jane Ciccarello, Self Help Center 
Attorney 
Reese Hansen, J. Reuben Clark Law 
School 
George Harmond, Seventh District 
Court Judge, Chair 
Maureen Henry, Commission on Aging 
Richard Howe, Public Representative 
To review the Committee's briefing materials and minutes of discussions, go to: 
http://www.utcourts.gov/committees/adhocprobate/ 
Stephen Mikita, Assistant Attorney 
General 
Julie Rigby, Third District Court Clerk 
Kathy Thyfault, Second District Court 
Clerk 
Gary Stott, Fourth District Court Judge 
Committee Staff 
Marianne O'Brien, Program Manager 
Diana Pollock, Administrative Assistant 
Timothy Shea, Staff Attorney 
40 
MICHAEL A. JENSEN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 571708 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84157-1708 
(801) 519-9040; FAX: 519-9264 
Attorney for Petitioners 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN LOGAN, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of 
EVANKOLLER 
An Incapacitated Person. 
DECLARATION OF 
KENT B. ALDERMAN 
Civil No. 073100106 
Judge Clint S. Judkins 
1. The undersigned Kent Alderman being over the age of 21 years, declare based on 
my personal knowledge, the same as I would testify in court as follows: 
2. I am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar. 
3. I specialize my practice in the area of Elder Law, which includes guardianships 
and conservatorships. 
4. I have been for more than ten years a member of the Utah State Bar's Committee 
on Law and Aging (fkna as the Needs of the Elderly Committee), and I also have served as the 
Chair of the Committee. 
5. I have also served on the Judicial Council's Ad Hoc Committee on Probate and 
Procedure. 







 Exhibit A 
6. For more than 20 years, I have represented scores of either incapacitated persons 
or petitioners who have sought the appointment of a guardian or conservator for incapacitated 
persons. 
7. It has been my general experience that petitioners for the appointment of a 
guardian or conservator genuinely seek the protection of the incapacitated person, and therefore, 
such proceedings are not adversarial as between the petitioners and the incapacitated person. 
8. It has been my experience that the legal fees incurred by petitioners in 
guardianship proceedings are subsequently paid from the incapacitated person's estate, since the 
protection sought and achieved by court appointment was &em the benefit of the incapacitated 
person. 
9. I have not experienced a case where the petitioners' legal fees were not allowed to 
be paid from the incapacitated person's estate, unless the court found that the petition was not 
brought in good faith. 
10. In my opinion, if the legal fees in guardianships proceedings were not allowed to 
be paid from the incapacitated person's estate, it would have a substantial chilling effect on the 
family members who most often are the petitioners seeking the protection of their parents. In 
that event, the very protection that an incapacitated person needs would be either delayed or not 
provided. 
11. Other states that have also adopted the Uniform Probate Code (like Utah) have 
found that guardianship proceedings are generally not adversarial as between petitioners and the 
incapacitated person. As such, those jurisdictions have found that payment of the legal fees 
48134979-0083.1 2 
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incurred in establishing the guardianship should be paid from the estate that benefits from the 
guardianship; that is, the incapacitated person's estate. See e.g., In re Guardianship & 
Conservatorship of Donley, 262 Neb. 282 (Neb. 2001). Furthermore, I believe that the powers 
granted to the guardian are broad enough to encompass the authority to engage and pay counsel. 
".. .the guardian has the same powers, rights and duties respecting minor child.. ." (CA 75-5-312 
(2). Certainly a parent has the authority to hire and pay an attorney to protect the interest of his 
child. 
12. I submit this declaration in the hope that the Court understands the public policy 
impact its recent ruling will likely have on prospective petitioners who seek the protection of a 
parent or loved one. In effect, this Court's ruling denying fees to Petitioners will have a chilling 
effect on any petitioners who seek the protection of their unprotected family members. 
13. I personally urge the Court to reconsider its recent ruling on this issue and the 
adverse impact it will have on the willingness of family to seek protection of incapacitated 
family members. 
14. I have reviewed my declaration carefully, and I have not stated anything herein 
that is not supported by my personal experience and conviction. 
4813-1979-0083 1 
ani 
As provided by § 78B-5-705, Utah Code (2008), I declare and certify under criminal 
penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Dated this 2-1 day of October, 2008. 
4813-1979-0083.1 
KENT B. ALDERMAN (BAR #000034) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN LOGAN, STATE OF UTAH 
135 North 100 West, Logan UT 84321 
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In the Matter of 
EVAN KOLLER 
An Incapacitated Person. 
DECLARATION OF ATTORNEY 
TROY T. WILSON 
Civil No. 073100106 
Judge Clint S. Judkins 
1. I am Troy Wilson; I am over the age of 21 years, and my declaration is being made on 
my personal knowledge, the same as I would testify in court. 
2. I am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar. 
3. I focus my practice in the area of Estate Planning, Probate and Elder Law, which 
includes guardianships and conservatorships. 
4. I have been for more than 4 years a member of the Utah State Bar's Committee on 
Law and Aging (fka as the Needs of the Elderly Committee). 
Exhibit B 
5. Over the past six years, I have represented many incapacitated persons as well as 
petitioners who have sought the appointment of a guardian or conservator for incapacitated 
persons. 
6, It has been my general experience that petitioners for the appointment of a guardian or 
conservator genuinely seek the protection of the incapacitated person, and therefore, such 
proceedings are generally not adversarial as between the petitioners and the incapacitated person. 
1. It has also been my experience that the legal fees incurred by petitioners in these 
guardianship proceedings are subsequently reimbursed and paid from the incapacitated person's 
estate by the conservator once appointed, since the protection sought and achieved by court 
appointment was directly for the benefit of the incapacitated person, 
8. I have never experienced a case where the petitioners' legal fees were not paid from 
the incapacitated person's estate, unless and only unless the court did not appoint a guardian 
and/or conservator. 
9. In my opinion, if the legal fees in guardianship proceedings were not to be paid from 
the incapacitated person's estate, it would have a substantial chilling effect on the petitioner, who 
are most often the children seeking the protection for their parents. That is, the very protection 
that an incapacitated person needs would be either delayed or not obtained at all 
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10. I have conferred with other Elder Law Attorneys about this issue of payment of legal 
fees for petitioners seeking guardianships, and this is the first case I have ever heard of where a 
court has denied such fees for petitioners. 
11. I agreed to submit my declaration in this case in the hope that the Court would better 
understand the impact its recent ruling on this issue will likely have on prospective petitioners 
who seek the protection of a parent or loved one. In effect, this Court's ruling denying fees to 
Petitioners will have a chilling effect on any children who seek the protection of their parent or 
parents. 
12. I personally implore this Court to reconsider its recent ruling on this issue so as to 
avoid the adverse effect it will have on the protection of incapacitated persons. 
13. I have reviewed my declaration carefully, and I have not stated anything herein that is 
not supported by my personal experience and conviction. 
Dated this 23rd day of October 2008. 
Troy T.Cfiiilson 
Attorney at Law 
1555 E Stratford Ave, Ste 100 
Salt Lake City UT 84106-3581 
(801) 467-5800; Fax: 467-5170 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN LOGAN, STATE OF UTAH 
135 North 100 West, Logan UT 84321 
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In the Matter of 
EVAN ROLLER 
An Incapacitated Person. 
DECLARATION OF ATTORNEY 
MICHAEL A, JENSEN 
Civil No. 073100106 
Judge Clint S. Judkins 
1. I am Michael A. Jensen; I am over the age of 21 years, and my declaration is 
being made on my personal knowledge, the same as I would testify in court. 
2. I am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar. 
3. The primary focus of my law practice is in the area of Elder Law, which includes 
guardianships and conservatorships. 
4. I have been for more than ten years a member of the Utah State Bar's Committee 
on Law and Aging (fkna as the Needs of the Elderly Committee), and I currently serve as 
the Chair of the Committee. 
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QUO 
5. For more than 10 years, I have represented scores and scores of either 
incapacitated persons or petitioners who have sought the appointment of a guardian or 
conservator for incapacitated persons. 
6. It has been my general experience that petitioners for the appointment of a 
guardian or conservator genuinely seek the protection of the incapacitated person, and 
therefore, such proceedings are not adversarial as between the petitioners and the 
incapacitated person. 
7. It has also been my experience that the legal fees incurred by petitioners in these 
guardianship proceedings are subsequently paid or reimbursed from the incapacitated 
person's estate by the conservator that was appointed, since the protection sought and 
achieved by court appointment was directly for the benefit of the incapacitated person. 
8. I have never experienced a case where the petitioners' legal fees were not paid 
from the incapacitated person's estate, unless and only unless the court did not appoint a 
guardian and/or conservator. 
9. In my opinion, if the legal fees in guardianships proceedings were not to be paid 
from the incapacitated person's estate, it would have a substantial chilling effect on the 
children who most often are the petitioners seeking the protection of their parents. That 
is, the very protection that an incapacitated person needs would be either delayed or not 
obtained at all. 
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10. I have conferred with other Elder Law Attorneys about this issue of payment of 
legal fees for petitioners seeking guardianships, and this is the first case where a court has 
denied such fees for petitioners. 
11. Although Utah's Probate Code is silent on the issue, other states that have also 
adopted the Uniform Probate Code (like Utah) have found that guardianship proceedings 
are generally not adversarial as between petitioners and the incapacitated person. As 
such, those jurisdictions have found that payment of the legal fees incurred in establishing 
the guardianship should be paid from the estate that benefits from the guardianship; that 
is, the incapacitated person's estate, See e.g., In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of 
Donley, 262 Neb. 282 (Neb 2001). 
12. I have reviewed my declaration carefully, and I have not stated anything herein 
that is not supported by my personal experience and conviction. 
As provided by § 78B-5-705, Utah Code (2008), I declare and certify under criminal 
penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Dated this 27th day of October 2008. 
Michael A. Jensen \_J 
Attorney at Law 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN LOGAN, STATE OF UTAH 
135 North 100 West, Logan UT 84321 
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In the Matter of 
EVAN ROLLER 
An Incapacitated Person. 
DECLARATION OF 
BECKY ALLRED (Conservator) 
Civil No. 073100106 
Judge Clint S. Judkins 
1. I am Becky Allred; I am over the age of 21 years, and my declaration is being 
made on my personal knowledge, the same as I would testify in court. 
2. I am a Partner, Karren, Hendrix, Stagg, Allen & Company and also Manager, 
Stagg ElderCare Services, a Division of Karren, Hendrix, Stagg, Allen & Company. 
3. With Stagg Eldercare Services ("Stagg"), I have personally been doing 
Conservator and Fiduciary work for 7 years. However, Stagg has been actively involved 
in conservatorship case for more than 10 years and has been appointed by many district 
courts throughout the State of Utah. 
4. I am an active Member of the Utah State Bar's Committee on Law and Aging. 
Exhibit C 
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5. I have also been working with the Judicial Council's Ad Hoc Committee on 
Guardianships and Conservatorships. 
6. In guardianship and conservatorship cases, Stagg is sometimes a petitioner along 
with a professional guardian as a co-petitioner. 
7. More often, Stagg is not a petitioner but is requested to serve as conservator by a 
petitioner or a court or as a result of mediation between feuding siblings. 
8. After appointment, Stagg is often presented with invoices for legal fees incurred 
by the attorney representing the incapacitated person and incurred by the petitioners. 
9. Generally, if a conservator has been appointed, Stagg will pay the legal fees for 
petitioners since they sought the protection of the incapacitated person and thereby 
benefitted the incapacitated person and protected his estate. 
10. It is my belief, and understanding from working with numerous Elder Law 
Attorneys, that payment of such legal fees is an acceptable practice; and while not 
expressly authorized by the Probate Code, it is not prohibited by the Code. 
11. As Conservator, Stagg also pays the legal fees of the attorney appointed for the 
incapacitated or protected person. 
12. In highly contested cases, Stagg may ask petitioners or the attorney for the 
incapacitated person to submit his or her fees to the court for approval. 
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13. In all cases in which I have been involved, the court has never denied legal fees 
for petitioners when a guardian and/or conservator has been successfully appointed. 
14. However, Stagg will generally not pay the attorney fees for a party in the 
guardianship proceedings who opposed the guardianship, since such opposition was of no 
benefit to the incapacitated person. 
15. The rationale used by me and by Stagg in deciding whether or not legal fees 
should be paid is simple: was the particular legal effort opposed to protecting the 
incapacitated person or was it in support of such protection? In effect, was the opposing 
party motivated by the best interest of the incapacitated person? If so, the fees are paid; if 
not, the fees are not paid from the estate of the incapacitated person. 
16. Stagg works closely with several providers for the incapacitated person (referred 
to by Stagg as a "Client") for whom the appointment was made. These providers include 
professionals such as attorneys, other accountants, real estate agents, home repair 
services, or whatever services are necessary to help and protect the Client. 
17. Often, the court-appointed guardian also needs assistance from professionals to 
accomplish his, her or its duties in serving the ward. If those services are necessary and 
the Guardian has retained professional help, such as an attorney, Stagg will pay those fees 
as well, since those fees are incurred for the benefit and welfare of the Client. 
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18. There have been several guardianship cases where a divorce was necessary or a 
restraining order had to be obtained. These actions fall squarely under the role of the 
Guardian and they most often require legal assistance. Hence, the Guardian's legal fees 
should also be paid from the Client's estate, and Stagg routinely pays such fees as 
provided by the Probate Code without submitting them to the court for approval. 
As provided by § 78B-5-705, Utah Code (2008), I declare and certify under criminal 
penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Dated this 2L. daY o f September 2008. 
Becky Allred Conservator) 
Stagg Elderca*y Services 
111 East Broadway, Ste 250 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-5241 
(801) 521-7620 x810; Fax: 521-7641 
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In the Matter of 
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I, Michael A. Jensen, certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing pleading, 
DECLARATION OF BECKY ALLRED (Conservator), to be Mailed to the following 
persons: 
Steven EL Gunn 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker 
36 S State St Ste 1400 
PO Box 45835 
Salt Lake City UT 84145-0385 
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nhall@rqn.com 
Attorneys for Kathryn Prounis 
Kenneth C. Allsop 
Attorney at Law 
40 W Cache Valley Blvd Ste 9A 
PO Box 255 
Logan UT 84323-0255 
(435) 753-2899 
ken@allsoplaw.com 
Attorney for LuAnn Shaffer 
Dated this day of October 2008. 
Michael A, Jensen 
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